Understanding SE Growth: The Case of Bangladesh by Al Faruq, Abdullah
i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Understanding SE Growth: The Case of 
Bangladesh 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to Middlesex University in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
Abdullah Al Faruq, MA, MSc, MPhil 
Middlesex University Business School 
 
 
April 2016 
 
ii 
 
Declaration 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis has been composed by myself and it has not been submitted in any previous 
application for a degree. The work reported within was executed by myself and all 
information cited is acknowledged at the appropriate point in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statement of Copyright 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without prior written consent and any information derived from it should be 
acknowledged.
iii 
 
 
Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explore the hybrid nature of Social Enterprises (SEs) by 
investigating how they incorporate co-existence of social and economic goals and embed in 
multiple institutional domains. By synthesising insights from three literature domains - hybrid 
organisations, institutional views and strategic management - this thesis advances the 
understanding about the hybrid nature of SEs mainly in two ways. First, it examines the extent to 
which managerial tensions may result in hybrid SEs due to co-existence of values and influences 
from pluralistic institutional domains. Second, it explores how such organisations mobilise 
resources and capabilities in order to respond to internal tensions. The three research questions 
addressed in the thesis are: i) What is the nature of SE growth in Bangladesh?; ii) How does the 
institutional context influence SE growth in Bangladesh? and iii) What role do SEs’ resources 
and capabilities play in responding to the institutional influences?  
The study adopts a multiple case study approach, collecting data from eleven 
Bangladeshi SEs. With rapid rise of hybrid forms of SEs in Bangladesh, the findings of the study 
have both practical and policy implications. The insights on SEs’ internal tensions can enable 
Bangladeshi policy makers to realise the needs and challenges of hybrid SEs in the country. This 
may aid the development of customised policies, incentives and support systems that are required 
to facilitate the growth of such organisations. The insights on the management of tensions can 
aid the leaders and managers in hybrid SEs to respond to their internal tensions more 
appropriately. 
The study identifies six operational models through analysis of the social goal, 
economic mission, income source, governance structure and institutional setting of the studied 
cases. These models are: SEs that are fully reliant on grant, NGOs with trading elements, NGOs 
with full reliance on trading, social businesses, public and private limited corporations, and 
NGOs with conventional subsidiary enterprise. The findings further showed that the studied SEs 
have pursued social and economic goals simultaneously through adoption of four growth 
strategies: expansion, diversification, autonomous growth and partnership. The study identifies a 
number of competing pressures originating from multiple institutional domains which have 
affected the way they accomplished their social and economic goals. This interplay between SEs’ 
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dual goals and institutional influences led to ten different tensions inside the studied cases. The 
management of these tensions, at the functional level, involved orchestration of SEs’ resources 
and capabilities in a particular way. The specific ways of mobilisation of resources and 
capabilities ultimately led the SEs towards five different growth paths: i) forced 
adoption/coercive adoption, ii) proactive response, iii) adapt, iv) influence, and v) side-stepping. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Social Enterprises (SEs) have been identified as prime examples of hybrid organisations 
in a recent stream of studies (e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014). Hybrid 
organisations are defined by Doherty et al (2014:418) as “structures and practices that allow the 
coexistence of values and artefacts from two or more categories. These organisations draw on at 
least two different sectoral paradigms, logics and value systems”. In the case of SEs, hybridity 
occurs as they span the institutional boundaries that characterise private, public and third sectors 
(Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 2010). Previous studies identify that hybrid SEs operate in multiple 
functional domains in order to achieve their social and economic goals (Michaud, 2013; Santos 
et al., 2015; Smith & Lewis, 2011). In a recent paper, Doherty et al. (2014) posit that the internal 
management processes in SEs mediate the external and internal demands faced by any hybrid 
organisation. They argue that the concept of hybridity can potentially capture the complexity of 
the managerial processes in the SEs. Previous studies suggest the prevalence of competing 
pressures within the hybrid organisations (e.g. Besharov & Smith, 2014:365). These competing 
pressures are elicited due to hybrid organisations’ exposure to pluralistic institutional domains 
(Billis, 2010; Pestoff, 1998;2005).  
Only recently, a small body of researchers started to explore whether and how SEs, as 
hybrid organisations, experience internal tensions in responding to these conflicting demands 
(e.g. Besharov & Smith, 2014; Smith et al., 2013) and also, what strategies they adopt to cope 
with these tensions (e.g. Pache & Santos, 2013; Santos et al., 2015). Previous studies have also 
found that the balancing of social and commercial goals may create internal tensions in SEs 
(Santos, 2012; Smith & Lewis, 2011). Smith and Lewis (2011) define tension as a situation when 
acceptance of “contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over 
time” (p.328) becomes necessary for achieving organisational goals. As a consequence, the 
allocation of limited resources in order to pursue multiple goals and gain legitimacy from 
different institutional actors could be a significant strategic act for SE managers (Battilana & 
Lee, 2014). Despite some recent exciting attempts (e.g. Doherty et al., 2014; Hockerts, 2015; 
Santos et al., 2015), the current scholarship does not yet fully capture the nature of SEs’ strategic 
responses to their internal tensions. There is still a lack of micro-level empirical analysis of how 
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SEs respond to multiple institutional influences that they may experience in the process of 
pursuing their dual bottom lines (Doherty et al., 2014). By placing hybridity at the centre of 
analysis, this thesis seeks to extend this understanding mainly in two ways. First, it examines 
how managerial tensions may result in hybrid SEs due to co-existence of values and influences 
from pluralistic institutional domains. Second, it explores how such organisations mobilise 
resources and capabilities to respond to internal tensions. The thesis addresses these two 
objectives by synthesising insights from three bodies of literatures - hybrid organisations, 
institutional views and strategic management. The thesis aims to contribute to the emerging 
interest in SEs as hybrid organisations by drawing on data gathered from eleven SEs in 
Bangladesh that exhibit a variety of organisational forms and practices.  
Research papers focusing on both institutional and strategic management views suggest 
that the dependence on external sources of support can pressurise the organisations to be 
responsive towards the demands stemming from influential resource providing institutions (e.g. 
Oliver, 1991; Wry et al., 2013). This act could be even more complex for hybrid organisations 
with experiencing competing demands from public, private and third sectors (cf. Pache & Santos, 
2010; Pache & Santos, 2013). Pache and Santos (2010) find that a number of hybrid SEs do not 
blindly comply with a particular institutional demand. They note some degree of reflexivity in 
SEs’ responses spurred by their need to impress multiple resource providers (e.g. Nicholls, 
2010a; Nicholls, 2010b; Vickers & Lyon, 2012). These SEs have selectively adopt a few 
dominant logics that affect their core missions and strategies (Pache & Santos, 2010). Similarly, 
Jones et al. (2012) found that hybrid organisations may adopt single dominant logic while 
leaving others at the periphery. Previous studies have, therefore, found a range of responses 
adopted by hybrid SEs in order to respond to pluralistic institutional pressures. While these 
studies reflect upon SEs’ responses at the strategic level, they have not addressed how these 
responses may translate into functional level actions involving specific orchestration of resources 
and capabilities. Therefore, this complex relationship between structure and agency in the cases 
of hybrid SEs is still less understood in the SE literature (Doherty et al 2014). This thesis seeks 
to explore this complex interplay and the outcome of it in terms of internal tensions in hybrid 
SEs. 
As set out previously, the study draws on data collected from Bangladeshi social sector. 
The home of 22,000 SEs including NGOs, co-operatives and social businesses (NGOAB, 2015), 
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Bangladesh is regarded by some commentators as the ‘laboratory’ or ‘Mecca’ of SEs (Ahmed, 
2009). Despite having numerous SEs with different forms and approaches, this country has 
received relatively little attention in SE research. In her literature review, Haugh (2005) finds 
that 82 per cent of the SE studies were focussed on developed countries. Defourny and Kim’s 
(2011) study on the nature of SE growth across East Asian countries is among the few 
exceptions. Overall, there is still a lack of research papers exploring the growth of the South 
Asian social sector. Granados et al. (2011), in their bibliometric analysis of SE literatures from 
1991 to 2010, found that most studies (61%) focus mainly on two countries: USA and UK. 
Bangladesh did not even feature in their pie chart that included the list of countries investigated. 
Therefore, this study seeks to collect data from Bangladeshi SEs in order to address this 
empirical gap.  
In the last decade, there has been a significant rise in the number of hybrid SEs in 
different parts of the world (Santos et al., 2015). The rise of hybrid SEs has not only shaped the 
internal management of many organisations in the third sector but has also paved the ground for 
a revived thinking by the policy makers about how to develop appropriate policies and support 
institutions in order to promote their growth. With shrinking donor funds since 2000s, the 
Bangladeshi social sector has also experienced the emergence of such hybrid SEs (Yunus, 2011; 
Yunus et al., 2010). Nevertheless, previous studies on Bangladeshi social sector predominantly 
highlight the needs and challenges of the conventional non-profit non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) (Davis, 2006; Rahman, 2006). Subsequently, the policy and support needs 
of the new generation hybrid SEs in Bangladesh are limitedly addressed (Bangladesh Social 
Enterprise Project, 2010a; Tasnim, 2014). Bangladeshi policy makers need to develop an 
understanding on the needs and challenges of new generation hybrid SEs in order to offer an 
appropriate regulatory environment for their growth. This thesis seeks to aid Bangladeshi policy 
makers with insights on how the nature of institutional environment surrounding the hybrid SE in 
Bangladesh has influenced their growth. This insight has implication for the development of 
custom made policies and support systems for the new generation hybrid SEs in Bangladesh. 
Further to this, the findings of the thesis contributes towards the knowledge of hybrid SE leaders 
and managers in Bangladesh about how to mobilise resources and capabilities in order to manage 
their internal tensions.  
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1.2 Conceptual framework and working definitions  
This section summarises the conceptual framework used in the study and sets the 
working definitions of the key constructs including SEs, hybrid organisations and institutions. 
The EMES research network conceptualises that SEs should ideally possess three common 
characteristics: an economic project, a social mission and a participatory governance structure 
(EMES Network 2013). Later, the EMES research network has added ‘pluralistic institutional 
setting’ as the fourth characteristic after identifying how SEs duel on the boundaries of multiple 
institutional domains such as, state, market and society (Pestoff 1998; 2005). Therefore 
according to the EMES Network (2013:17), SEs are defined as: 
 
“A specific organisational form that have an economic project, a social mission, a 
participatory governance structure and embeddedness in pluralistic institutions”.  
 
The application of this definition is explored in the context of Bangladeshi hybrid SEs 
in this thesis. The more Bangladesh-specific aspects of this definition are identified in the 
empirical section of the study. This study considers five key dimensions for analysing the 
operational models of the studied SEs. These are: social goal, economic mission, governance 
structure, institutional setting and income source. The first four dimensions are adapted from the 
analytical tool proposed by the EMES Network (2013) for examining different models of SEs. A 
fifth dimension has been added drawing upon Lyon and Sepulveda (2009), in which they suggest 
that a common characteristic of SEs is that they earn income from multiple sources. As a result, 
the fifth dimension in the working definition of SEs is ‘income source’. Therefore, the current 
study uses an adapted version of analytical tool proposed by the EMES Network (2013). 
As set out previously, the study seeks to explore the hybrid nature of SEs. Thus the 
definition of hybrid organisations offered by Doherty, Haugh, and Lyon (2014: 418) is adopted 
as a working definition in this thesis:  
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“…structures and practices that allow the coexistence of values and artefacts from 
two or more categories. These organisations draw on at least two different sectoral 
paradigms, logics and value systems”.  
 
This definition of hybrid organisations points to two key characteristics evident in 
hybrid organisations: first, they draw on two/multiple different sectoral paradigms; and second, 
they have coexistence of values (Doherty et al., 2014). In identifying the hybrid nature of the 
studied SEs, the presence of these two characteristics with these cases is explored in the 
empirical section of the thesis.  
The conceptual framework of the study includes three key constructs: i) institutional 
context; ii) the dual-value system in Hybrid SEs and iii) SEs’ resources and capabilities to cope 
with tensions. The interplay of these three constructs will be explored in the thesis. The 
institutional context surrounding the SEs (the first construct) is analysed by drawing upon one of 
the dominant analytical frameworks in institutional studies, the three institutional pillars of Scott 
(1995; 2008). Comprising of regulatory, normative and cultural institutions, Scott’s framework 
aids the analysis of how institutional issues influence organisations and defines institutions as: 
   
“…comprising a combination of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with the associated activities and resources, provide stability 
and meaning to social life” (Scott, 1995:47-48).  
 
This definition aims to be comprehensive by identifying the three key factors underlying 
institutional order, including soft, intangible (cultural-cognitive and normative) aspects and other 
harder, more-visible elements (regulatory). Each element offers a different rationale for 
legitimacy claims, whether by virtue of being legally sanctioned, morally authorized, or 
culturally supported (Scott, 2008:51). The breadth of Scott’s typology, therefore, appears to offer 
particular promise as a conceptual basis for examining the roles of regulatory and social 
institutions and the extent to which they enable or constrain SE growth.  
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The dual value system in hybrid SEs (i.e. the second construct in the conceptual 
framework) is analysed by drawing upon the literatures on hybrid organisations (e.g. Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 2011). The organisation and development of SEs resources and 
capabilities and related management of tensions within SEs (i.e. the third construct) are analysed 
drawing upon the resource-based approach (Barney, 1991; Foss, 2012) and is broadened by 
including the capabilities-based view (Deakins & Freel, 1999). In the case of this thesis, adopting 
the extended resources and capabilities based view offers the potential to consider the range of 
entrepreneurial resources and capabilities developed and utilised by SEs, such as learning and 
innovation (e.g.  Vickers & Lyon, 2012), marketing and communication, earning generation, 
alliance building, lobbying and staffing (e.g.  Bloom & Smith, 2010). Therefore, the approach is 
focused on identifying how SEs in the context of Bangladesh orchestrate different resources and 
capabilities to interdependently accomplish overall organisational goals (both social and 
financial) while responding to multiple institutional logics to gain legitimacy and secure support 
from external institutions. 
 
1.3 Research questions and objectives 
The main research questions of the study and the sub-questions are: 
RQ1: What is the nature of SE growth in Bangladesh? 
RQ1a: What are the different types of SEs in Bangladesh? 
RQ1b: What are the forms of growth adopted by the studied SEs? 
This question responds to the call of Doherty et al. (2014) to further investigate the 
hybrid nature of SEs. The diversity of operational types of SEs present in Bangladesh is 
addressed through RQ1a. The five key dimensions (economic mission, social goal, governance 
structure, institutional setting and income sources) set out in the working definition is analysed to 
generate the SE categories.  
RQ1b addresses the forms of growth of different types of SEs in Bangladesh, with 
reference to SEs’ dual bottom lines and their hybrid nature (Austin et al., 2006; Battilana & 
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Dorado, 2010). To this end, the study examines the strategies/means adopted by Bangladeshi SEs 
in order to advance their social and economic goals. 
RQ2: How does institutional context influence SE growth in Bangladesh?    
Doherty et al. (2014) urged SE scholars to investigate institutional conditions that 
promote the establishment and growth of hybrid SEs, as well as those that hinder their creation 
and growth. Inspired by this call, RQ2a seeks to clarify both the positive and negative influences 
of the institutional environment on hybrid SEs’ resource acquisition and growth. It further 
identifies the creation of internal tensions in hybrid SEs arising from their need to respond to 
competing institutional demands (Pache & Santos, 2013).  
RQ3: What role do SEs’ resources and capabilities play in responding to the 
institutional influences? 
The academic motivation of the question follows again from Doherty et al. (2014) who 
urge to develop an understanding of how hybrid SEs respond to mixed institutional demands by 
creating and leveraging their resource portfolios. Henceforth, RQ3 focuses on the role of SEs’ 
resources and capabilities in terms of responding to institutional influences. It identifies how 
hybrid SEs mobilise resources and capabilities to manage/minimise internal tensions and adopt a 
range of strategies to respond to institutional influences.      
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is composed of nine chapters. Following this introduction, Chapters 2-4 
review the relevant literature in order to develop a theoretical and contextual understanding. 
Chapter 5 details on the approach, data collection and analysis methodology adopted for 
conducting the thesis. Chapters 6-8 present the findings derived from the data analysis. The final 
chapter summarises the key findings, contribution and limitations of the research. The overview 
of the chapters is as follows.  
Chapter 2: Theoretical approaches to understand SE growth      
This chapter sets out the theoretical approach adopted by the study by defining SEs as 
hybrid organisations and by analysing how they are embedded in mixed institutional logics. SE 
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growth is then discussed, with specific reference to the managerial dilemmas posed by their 
mixed institutions contexts. The theory of organisational isomorphism, neo-institutional 
perspectives and mixed institutional logics are drawn upon to conceptualise this interplay of 
institutional influences and SEs’ internal management dilemmas and responses.   
Chapter 3: Studying SE growth – the conceptual framework     
The chapter first addresses the nature of SE resources and capabilities, with reference to 
the tensions that can arise from having to balance the dual bottom line and pluralistic 
institutional influences. The relevant literature examined includes that on the resources and 
capabilities based view, scaling up and hybrid organising. The second section discusses the 
analytical framework adopted by this study drawing on literature review presented in Chapter 2 
and 3.  
Chapter 4: Overview of the SE sector in Bangladesh 
Drawing on the existing literature and policy documents collected during field work, the 
chapter first summarises the history of the social sector and then identifies and describes the 
main institutions, both regulatory and social that are likely to be key influences on the behaviour 
of SEs in Bangladesh.    
Chapter 5: Research methodology 
This chapter lays out the research methodology adopted for the study. This involved a 
qualitative multiple case study approach, interviews and documentary data and thematic analysis 
using Nvivo software. The chapter provides justification for the chosen method  in addressing 
each of the three research questions.  
Chapter 6: Findings – The nature of SE growth in Bangladesh 
The chapter examines the nature of growth of the selected SE cases. Six categories of 
SEs are identified based on the five criteria that constitute the working definition of SE. The 
chapter further investigates the forms of growth of the six SE operational models with particular 
reference to the dual-value system: the means of achieving social goals and the means of 
achieving financial goals.  
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Chapter 7: Findings – Tensions management strategy within the case studies  
The chapter analyses the tensions that studied SEs experienced due to the conflicting 
influences/logics from multiple institutions and how they sought to balance and resolve those. It 
also illuminates how the studied SEs had developed and mobilised their resources and 
capabilities in order to respond to those tensions. The SE categories identified in Chapter 6 are 
used to examine how the nature of the tensions, their experience and management strategy varied 
across the categories of SEs in Bangladesh.  
Chapter 8: Findings – The interplay of institutional influences and mobilisation of 
SEs’ resources and capabilities  
This chapter presents the findings on the interaction between the institutional influences 
faced and how SEs mobilise resources and capabilities in order to grow. The negative and 
positive institutional influences are identified and their role in SEs’ internal tension creation are 
analysed. In so doing, the chapter builds upon an understanding of the regulatory, normative and 
cultural-cognitive institutions  existing in state, market and society. The chapter then identifies 
the different growth strategies adopted by SEs in order to respond to institutional influences and 
resolve/minimise internal tensions. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This final chapter summarises the results of the study and discusses their implications 
for theory building, and for SE practice, policy and support. It also outlines some limitations of 
the research and makes suggestions for future investigation. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical approaches to understand SE growth  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on SE growth and sets out the theoretical background 
for the study. By placing the hybrid nature of SEs at the centre of discussion, the chapter sheds 
light on how competing demands from the institutional environment can impact on SEs’ 
resources and capabilities, and their development by drawing upon theories relating to 
institutional isomorphism, a neo-institutional perspective and mixed institutional logics. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing literatures on SE 
growth, identifying the main schools of thought and gaps in understanding. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
examine the definitions of SE and how they have been conceptualised as hybrid organisational 
forms. The chapter then discusses SE growth, focusing on the interplay between institutional 
influences and enterprise growth. The final part concludes by summarising the theoretical 
approach developed by the study.  
  
2.2 Studying SE growth: a literature review 
The start of the research on SE dates back to the late 1990s, gathering momentum from 
the mid-2000s. One of the first definitions of SEs proposed by Dees and Elias’s (1998) is,  
 
 “SEs play the role of change agents in the social sector by adopting a mission to 
create and sustain social value, recognising and rentlessly pursuing new 
opportunities to serve that mission, engaging in a process of continuous innovation, 
adaptation and learning, acting boldly without being limited by resources currently 
in hand and finally exhibiting a heightened sense of accountability to the 
constituencies served and for the outcomes created.”(p.166). 
 
Kanter and Purrington (1998) defined SEs as “A profit-orientated businesses operating 
in public welfare fields”. Drawing upon these earlier definitions, Defourny (2001) argue that 
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“the [existing] literature is not able to embrace the whole reality of the SE” (p.23). Since 2006, 
SE has been defined from different perspectives, with identifying different models and 
organisational forms (e.g. Bull & Crompton, 2006; Jones & Keogh, 2006; Weerawardena & 
Mort, 2006). Since 2009, there has been a phenomenal growth of studies concerned with respect 
to defining, modelling and mapping SE, with growth emerging as a particular focus of research 
(e.g. Defourny & Kim, 2011; Lyon & Sepulveda, 2009; McKague & Tinsley, 2012; Teasdale, 
2010, 2011; Young & Lecy, 2014; Zahra et al., 2009). The rising number of studies have also 
been accompanied by different and sometimes conflicting views, with the level of ambiguity and 
complexity surrounding the concept also becoming an integral part of this research area (Young 
& Lecy, 2014).  
A number of scholars have studied SE growth through the lens of resources and 
capabilities based perspectives adopted from the field of strategic management (e.g. Kar, 2012; 
Lyon & Fernandez, 2012; Sunley & Pinch, 2012). SE growth has been studied in terms of how 
they develop human resource and build capacity (Bloom & Smith, 2010; Royce, 2007; Todres et 
al., 2006). The organisation of resources, conceptualised as ‘bricolage’, has also received 
academic attention in SE growth literature (Sunley & Pinch, 2012). SE growth has been studied 
in terms of their social impact and thereof, understanding how they undertake scaling up 
strategies (Bloom & Smith, 2010; Lyon & Fernandez, 2012; Vickers & Lyon, 2012). SE growth 
has also been examined with respect to social innovation (Vickers et al., 2014) and the strategic 
management of different internal functions (Doherty et al., 2009; Spear et al., 2013). 
The institution-based perspective has contributed towards the understanding of SE 
growth in a number of previous studies (e.g. Bidet & Eum, 2011; Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; 
Mawson, 2010). The influences of a country’s historical landscapes and institutions on the nature 
of growth have received attention in these studies (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008, 2010; Kerlin, 
2010). The other factors studied to understand their influences on SE growth are the policy 
environment (Mawson, 2010), legal framework (Bidet & Eum, 2011; Yu, 2011), and support 
institutions (Lyon & Ramsden, 2006; Mair & Marti, 2009). Previous studies have drawn on the 
theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and the neo-institutional 
perspective (DiMaggio, 1988; Tracey, 2012). For instance, in line with the theory of institutional 
isomorphism, Sud et al. (2009) found that SEs mould into the demands of influential institutions 
in order to achieve legitimacy. In contrast, Nicholls (2010b) draws on the neo-institutional 
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perspective and argue that instead of blind compliance, SEs strategically craft their response 
towards key institutional actors in order to gain their favour and support. The findings of these 
earlier studies indicate a possible interplay between institutions and agency (Gawell, 2013).       
Fundamental to the understanding of SE growth, which has been overlooked in early SE 
studies, is that they  have to simultaneously achieve both social and financial goals (Ridley-Duff 
& Bull, 2011); and that they are subject to the competing logics of the multiple institutions in 
which they are embedded (Pache & Santos, 2010). A more recent stream of studies has 
addressed this gap by conceptualising SEs as hybrid organisations (e.g. Battilana & Lee, 2014; 
Doherty et al., 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011). 
According to this conceptualisation, SEs do not fall within the clear cut boundaries of any single 
sector (i.e. public, private or third sector), but rather need to be understood as a cross-sector 
phenomenon (Billis, 2010; Huybrechts & Nicholls, 2013). Hence, Pestoff (1998;2005) 
conceptualises SEs in terms of how they respond to various actors, whether as part of the state, 
market or wider society in order to gain legitimacy and access to their resources. He proposed 
that third sector organisations are set at the blurred boundaries between state, market and society. 
Similarly, Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011) argue that such a hybrid conceptualisation of SEs has 
potential to illuminate the current ambiguity regarding SEs’ origins, ethos and management 
practices including how they internally manage organisational functions to maintain their dual 
bottom line (Doherty et al., 2009) and how they seek to build legitimacy with key institutional 
actors (Pache & Santos, 2010).  
Previous studies argue that the current SE conceptualisation falls short of providing an 
adequate framework for future research, policy and practice (e.g. Defourny & Nyssens, 2006; 
Young & Lecy, 2014). Therefore, it is clear that research on SE growth can significantly benefit 
from a framework that helps unpack the ambiguities surrounding the concept. In this respect, 
Doherty et al. (2014) claim that a hybrid framework can potentially resolve the current 
abstractness and tensions that have characterised much SE growth research. To further unpack 
this current ambiguity, new studies need to adopt a micro-level perspective on how SEs’ internal 
organisation/management of resources and capabilities are influenced by their embeddedness 
within plural institutional contexts and how they influence key external actors (Doherty et al., 
2014).  
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The current thesis extends this school of thought by examining the interplay between 
SEs’ and their institutional influences in the context of Bangladesh. Drawing upon perspectives 
on hybrid organisations, resources and capabilities, and mixed institutional logics. This study, 
therefore, makes a theoretical contribution to research on the interplay between structure and 
agency by cross-fertilising theories from three areas of literature: social entrepreneurship, 
strategic management and institutional perspectives. 
 
2.3 Defining SE 
The concept of social enterprise emerges from the idea that non-profit organisations can 
respond to the limited and shrinking funding available from government and donors by 
diversifying their income sources through engaging in trading activities (Crimmins & Keil, 
1983). There has been a trend in recent years for non-profit organisations to increasingly become 
quasi-commercial bodies in order to earn income from sales of goods and services, government 
funding, donations, grants and in-kind support. This trend has contributed to the emergence of 
SEs (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006). Alter (2002), Nicholls (2006), Dees and Anderson (2006) 
and few others propose SEs to be completely reliant on income from commercial activities and 
to be independent of any funds from government or donors. In contrast, the British model of SE 
stresses that a significant part (usually 50% or more) of the total income must be market-based 
for the enterprise to qualify as a ‘SE’ (Social Enterprise UK, 2011). Dees (1998) interprets that 
the different models of SEs can be positioned along a continuum involving purely philanthropic 
activities at the one end and purely commercial activities at the other end (Table 2.1). Thus, SE is 
considered the key term for a range of organisational forms including non-profit organisations, 
charities and foundations, cooperatives, mutuals, and social businesses (Grant, 2008). 
Definitions of SE are, therefore, diverse according to different schools of thought 
(Defourny & Nyssens, 2010) and with different meanings in different parts of the world (Kerlin, 
2010). The most dominant schools of thoughts can be characterised by their main focus, i.e. in 
relation to ‘earned income’ (DTI, 2002), ‘social innovation’ (Dees, 1998; Drayton, 2002; Mair & 
Marti, 2006); ‘ownership structure’ (DTI, 2004) and being ‘mission-driven’ (Thake & Zadek, 
1997). These are presented in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.1: The SE continuum 
 
 
General motives, 
methods and goals 
Social value 
creation 
Social and economic value Value creation  
Beneficiaries  Pay nothing  Subsidized rates and/or mix of full payers and those 
who pay nothing  
Pay full market rates  
Capital  Donations and 
grants  
Below-market capital and/or mix of full payers and 
those who pay nothing  
Market rate capital  
Workforce  Volunteers  Below-market wages and/or mix of volunteers and 
fully paid staff  
Market rate 
compensation  
Suppliers  Make in-kind 
donations  
Special discounts and/or mix of in-kind and full 
price  
Charge market prices  
Source: Dees et al. (2002) 
 
Table 2.2: SE definitions and schools of thought 
School of thought Definition Author/s 
Earned income  A business with primarily social objectives, whose surpluses are principally 
reinvested in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the 
need to maximise profits for shareholders 
(DTI, 2002) 
A business that trades for a social purpose (Lyon & 
Sepulveda, 2009) 
A profit-orientated businesses operating in public welfare fields 
 
(Kanter & 
Purrington, 1998) 
Social innovation Social sector organisations play the role of change agents by adopting a mission 
to create and sustain social value, recognize and relentlessly pursue new 
opportunities to serve that mission. They engage in a process of continuous 
innovation, adaptation and learning, act boldly without being limited by 
resources, and exhibit a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies 
served and for the outcomes created. 
(Dees, 1998) 
A process of creating value by combining resources in new ways…intended 
primarily to explore and exploit opportunities to create social value by 
stimulating social change or meeting social needs. 
(Mair & Marti, 
2006) 
An organisation constantly looking for new ways to serve constituencies and add 
value to existing services. 
(Brinkerhoff, 2001) 
A major change agent, one whose core values centre on identifying, addressing 
and solving societal problems. 
(Drayton, 2002) 
Ownership 
structure/ 
governance 
Autonomous organisations governed and owned by participating stakeholder 
groups and trustees. 
(DTI, 2004) 
Democratically controlled organisations blending social and economic goals. (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2006) 
Mission-driven A mission-driven business approach. (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2010) 
Social entrepreneurs are driven by a desire for social justice. They seek a direct 
link between their actions and an improvement in the quality of life for the 
people with whom they work and those that they seek to serve. They aim to 
produce solutions that are sustainable financially, organizationally, socially and 
environmentally. 
(Thake & Zadek, 
1997) 
The art of simultaneously pursuing both a financial and a social return on 
investment (the ‘double bottom line’). 
(Fuqua-School, 
2005) 
SE continuum 
Purely Philanthropic Purely Commercial Hybrid 
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Given these different schools of thought and their respective definitions, the 
terminological ambiguity around SE is still unresolved. In a recent paper, Young and Lecy 
(2014) reviewed existing SE definitions and compared this definitional landscape with the 
metaphor of a ‘SE zoo’. Few studies embrace more than one school of thought in defining SE. 
For instance, Teasdale (2010) defines SE in relation to ownership structure and a mission-driven 
approach, using two axes with ownership ranging from individualistic to collective and mission 
ranging from purely economic to purely social. Based on this matrix, Teasdale (2010) identifies 
four forms of SE: social business (individualistic-economic), earned income for non-profit 
(individualistic-social), co-operatives (collective-social), and community enterprise (collective-
social). Similarly, Lyon and Sepulveda (2009) explore the definition of SE by combining three 
dimensions: trading income, ownership structure and social aim/mission. 
The EMES approach to SE is the most comprehensive and covers economic, social and 
entrepreneurial dimensions, as “organisations which combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to 
provide services or goods with a primacy of social aims” (The EMES Network 2013: 25). They 
conceptualise SEs to be non-profit private organizations that provide goods or services for the 
direct benefit of the community. In general, they rely on participatory forms involving various 
types of stakeholders in their governing bodies, place a high value on their autonomy and bear 
economic risks related to their activity. In 1996, EMES funded a major research project that 
resulted in the formation of the EMES European Research Network, including a group of 
scholars who devoted themselves to investigating ‘SEs’ in each of the 15 countries forming the 
EU. Their original approach included a list of four economic indicators and five social indicators, 
with the more recent addition of governance structure as another key dimension. In defining SE, 
they presented nine indicators in three subsets: an economic project, a social mission and a 
participatory governance structure. Drawing upon an understanding of the pluralistic institutional 
embeddedness of SEs Pestoff (1998;2005), a recent addition to the EMES’s original three 
dimension framework is the ‘institutional setting’ (Table 2.3) (EMES Network, 2013).  
The application of this definition is explored in the context of Bangladeshi hybrid SEs 
in this thesis. The more Bangladesh-specific aspects of this definition are identified in the 
empirical section of the study. This study considers five key dimensions for analysing the 
operational models of the studied SEs. These are: social goal, economic mission, governance 
structure, institutional setting and income source. The first four dimensions are adapted from the 
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analytical tool proposed by the EMES Network (2013) for examining different models of SEs. A 
fifth dimension has been added drawing upon Lyon and Sepulveda (2009), in which they suggest 
that a common characteristic of SEs is that they earn income from multiple sources. As a result, 
the fifth dimension in the working definition of SEs is ‘income source’. Therefore, the current 
study uses an adapted version of analytical tool proposed by the EMES Network (2013). 
 
Table 2.3: Indicators of EMES ideal-type SEs 
Economic project 
A continuous production 
Some paid work 
An economic risk  
A social mission 
An explicit social mission 
Limited profit distribution, reflecting the 
primacy of social aim 
An initiative launched by a group of citizens 
or a third sector organisation(s) 
A participatory governance 
A high degree of autonomy 
A participatory nature, which involves 
various parties affected by the activity 
A decision-making power not based on 
capital ownership 
Institutional setting  
Accreditation  
Federative bodies  
Share of market resources, public grant and 
voluntary resources 
Market-based principles  
Source: The EMES Network (2013:17) 
 
2.4 SEs as hybrid organisations 
The definition set out above conceptualises SEs in terms of their adherence to both 
social and commercial goals. Bull and Crompton (2006) suggest that SEs takes a variety of 
organisational forms along a continuum of ‘social organisation’ (with a social purpose) and 
‘enterprise’ (business with a social mission). Previous studies have placed SEs at the boundaries 
of the third, private and public sectors (Brandsen et al., 2005; Defourny, 2001; Ridley-Duff & 
Bull, 2011). Therefore, SEs not only balance the social and economic goals but also respond to 
external influences originating from multiple institutional fields. As a consequence, a relatively 
new body of literatures has conceptualised SEs as hybrid organisations, in which their 
mobilisation of external and internal resources (Battilana & Lee, 2014), internal strategic 
management (Doherty et al., 2014) and external communications (Michaud, 2013) takes a 
specific form.  
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From the resource-based perspective, SEs can draw on the market, the society and the 
state for income and support (Aiken, 2006). Meeting the expectations of various institutions and 
achieving legitimacy with key actors is often a precursor to gain access to institutional resources 
and support. For instance, the market logics typically require organisations to comply with the 
principles of competition; the state requires compliance with its policies and related regulations; 
and the communities expect care and loyalty from a given organisation (Brandsen et al., 2005). 
Being positioned within the lumpy landscape of a cross-sector model (Aiken, 2006), SEs need to 
be able to understand and combine, within one organisation, the components and rationales of 
state, market and civil society in order to gain access to the resources they need in order to grow 
(Evers, 2001). 
Hybridity as a concept is scattered across numerous academic disciplines and defined in 
various ways (Brandsen & Karré, 2011). A relatively broad definition of hybrid organisations is 
that they are “organisations with heterogeneous arrangements, characterised by mixtures of 
pure and incongruous origins, (ideal) types, cultures, co-ordination mechanisms, rationalities or 
action logics” (Brandsen et al., 2005: 750). By definition, hybrid organisations are “sites for 
contradiction, contestation and conflict” (Doherty et al., 2014:425). A more clear and 
comprehensive definition of hybrid organisations offered by Doherty et al. (2014: 418) is 
adopted as a working definition in this thesis:  
 
“…structures and practices that allow the coexistence of values and artefacts from 
two or more categories. These organisations draw on at least two different sectoral 
paradigms, logics and value systems”. 
 
The very nature of a hybrid organisation, therefore, places SEs in an ambiguous position 
regarding their origins and primary ethos. In this respect, Billis (2010) posits that despite their 
cross-sector nature, hybrid organisations will tend to have roots and a primary adherence to the 
principles of one sector. Based on this pre-assumption, he identifies two main types of hybrid 
organisation: organic and enacted. Organic hybrids originate from a particular root, embracing 
the ethos of a particular sector and evolve over time by incorporating elements from other sectors 
when seeking resources and legitimacy from key actors. On the other hand, enacted hybrids cross 
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fertilise their ethos from multiple sectors from their inception, and thus are conceptualised as 
‘born hybrids’. Drawing upon this typology, SEs can be viewed as ranging from organic (i.e. 
having evolved from classic non-profit organisation) to enacted hybrids (i.e. established as a 
hybrid organisation from inception).  
By definition, SEs have to internally manage their resources and capabilities in order to 
comply with logics for both business success and welfare/social value creation (Tracey et al., 
2011). Furthermore, SEs have to achieve legitimacy with multiple external actors within the 
environment in which they operate (Pache & Santos, 2010). In so doing, they have to be 
competitive to be sustainable in the market, coercive to secure support from public institutions, 
and open to receiving acceptance and support from the communities which they serve (Brandsen 
& Karré, 2011). Being hybrid organisations, SEs face certain tensions and paradoxes (Doherty et 
al., 2014; Smith et al., 2013), which they need to be able to manage in order to survive and grow, 
as further explored below. 
 
2.5 Theoretical approaches to understanding SE growth  
SE growth has been studied from different perspectives, with strategic management and 
institutional views being the most dominant. The strategic management approach conceptualises 
SE growth as involving internal changes aimed towards maximising social impact (Lyon & 
Fernandez, 2012) and finding ways of demonstrating this to others (Paton, 2003). In line with the 
strategic management thinking, the concept of SE growth is also addressed in terms of the 
differentiation of services (Nicholls, 2006), diversification of programmes (Doherty et al., 2009), 
and increased market penetration and growth through developing multiple sites (Grossman & 
Rangan, 2001). Studies that draw upon institutional perspectives conceptualise growth as being 
largely driven by the degree to which SEs are embedded in different institutional contexts and 
their consequent growth patterns and management of institutional influence (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2008; Mair & Marti, 2009; Sud et al., 2009; Yu, 2011).  
A number of studies at the intersection of strategic management and institutionalist 
approaches conceptualise SE growth as a function of the ability to manage relationships with 
multiple institutional actors to achieve legitimacy (Pache & Santos, 2010) while managing the 
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tension between social-economic goals (Doherty et al., 2009; Michaud, 2013). The current study 
seeks to incorporate the mixed institutional logics and resource and capabilities based view in the 
conceptual framework for two reasons: first, this allows for the cross-fertilisation of concepts 
from two dominant perspectives, i.e. institutionalist and strategic management. Second, such a 
framework is comprehensive and holistic as it allows an in-depth micro-level analysis of both 
external and internal activities, as well as encompassing their inter-dependent role in terms of 
institutional legitimacy and SEs’ dual bottom lines. Due to the hybrid nature of SEs, their 
growth, therefore, needs to be understood in terms of the effective orchestration of resources and 
capabilities in response to the challenges and opportunities presented by the institutional context.  
 
2.5.1 The interplay between SE growth and institutional influences 
This section examines in greater detail about what is known about the interplay between 
SE growth and institutional influence. The section first focuses on the early theories related to 
institutions and institutional isomorphism, criticisms of this and the development of new neo-
institutionalism. It then examines a more recent wave of studies that seek to combine old and 
new institutionalism by focusing on mixed institutional logics and strategic isomorphism. 
 
Early neo-institutional view and SE growth research  
The interplay between institutional influences and organisational behaviour and growth 
has long been studied by institutional and organisational scholars (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tracey, 2012). The theoretical building blocks for studying the 
interplay between structure and agency were developed thirty years ago with the emergence of 
the neo-institutional perspective. A series of seminal papers (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983) theorised that organisations in a given industry 
or sector face similar legitimacy pressures, and thus may become isomorphic (i.e. more similar) 
to one another over time. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three types of institutional 
pressures resulting in three categories of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. 
Coercive isomorphism is observed when organisations increasingly become homogenous as they 
seek to comply with the expectations of other organisations and also societal pressures. Mimetic 
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isomorphism occurs when organisations in a given sector imitate others in response to 
uncertainty. Normative isomorphism reflects the process of homogenisation arising from the 
influence of professional standards and their adaptation of other network pressures such as, those 
emanating from business associations, and social networks. This notion of isomorphism 
constituted the main focus of early works adopting a neo-institutional view. 
A number of studies in the social entrepreneurship domain have examined how the 
institutional environment can influence SEs in a given sector to adopt similar patterns of growth. 
For instance, Defourny and Nyssens (2008) in their study of SEs in Europe find that the 
institutional environments have given rise to varied patterns of SE growth in different national 
contexts. They also identified that SEs in a given sector in a particular EU country show similar 
growth patterns as they are influenced by the respective legal frameworks, support structures and 
public procurement policies. Similarly, Defourny and Kim (2011) find that the patterns of SE 
growth in East Asian countries varied according to institutional influences relating to the 
development of new laws, policies and programmes, governments’ support through donations 
and subsidies, the financial crisis, and economic downturn. Yu (2011) found that the legal 
framework in China has influenced the country’s SEs to adopt similar organisational features. 
Sud et al. (2009) identified that SEs scale up to respond to moral, political and structural 
pressures, and thus exhibit a tendency towards a isomorphic growth. Millar (2012) found that 
agencies in the English health and social care sector adopt a particular organisational form to 
comply with professional practices and market norms. The above studies uncover that SEs in a 
given institutional environment tend to adopt particular growth paths that are influenced by the 
pressures of regulatory and social contexts (coerciveness), competitive pressures from other 
firms (mimicking), and/or professional practices in their respective sector (normative 
isomorphism).   
     
New neo-institutional view and SE growth research  
By the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of weaknesses of the neo-institutional view 
had become apparent (Greenwood et al., 2008). A core assumption underlying the early neo-
institutional view relates to the need to achieve legitimacy from key stakeholders, thus 
facilitating access to the resources they are able to provide in a given context. Hence the 
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organisations are compelled to adopt the dominant and widely accepted practices in the 
institutional environment. It has been argued, however, that this emphasis on conformity and 
isomorphism exaggerated the role of institutional influences on organisational change. Such 
theorisation was criticised as an inadequate explanation of organisational behaviour in a world 
that is increasingly concerned with innovation (Tracey, 2012). 
In response to such criticisms, institutional theorists developed the concepts of 
institutional entrepreneurship originally introduced by Dimaggio (1988). Thus Dimaggio (1988: 
657) proposes that “organised actors in a given institutional setting leverage resources to create 
new institutions or transform existing ones”. Similarly, Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) introduce 
the concept of institutional work, which refers to “the purposive action of individuals and 
organisations aimed at creating, maintaining and transforming institutions” (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006: 215). Such actors are regarded as ‘institutional activists’, who achieve socio-
political legitimacy through private lobbying of government operatives and gain constitutive 
legitimacy when making claims about the usefulness and validity of their new product/service 
(Rao, 2004: 261). Thus the new neo-institutional view was developed around the notion of 
institutional change and the role of legitimating discourse (Greenwood et al., 2008).       
As with the social entrepreneurship domain, the new neo-institutional view has been 
adopted in a number of subsequent studies (e.g. Nicholls, 2006, 2010b). Nicholls (2010b) 
theorises that to achieve legitimacy a SE may engage in negotiating its ‘own discourses’ and 
‘narrative logics’ with regulatory and social institutions. He identifies four different legitimating 
discourses used by social entrepreneurs in their efforts to enlist the support of four important 
resource providers in the sector, i.e. government, foundations, fellowship organisations and pure 
network organisations. Nicholls describes this phenomenon as part of a wider “contest for the 
control of the legitimating discourses that will determine the final shape of the social 
entrepreneurial paradigm” (p.611) and conceives of organisation legitimacy and associated 
access to resources as the consequence of a dynamic interplay between macro-level institutional 
structures and micro-level actors. Nicholls (2010b) characterizes a fourth type of isomorphic 
pressure namely “reflexive isomorphism” (p.617), contrasting with the other three forms 
identified by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and in similar vein to DiMaggio (1988), emphasised 
the role of agency in influencing and potentially causing change to regulatory and social 
institutions. He proposes that,  
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“...dominant SEs can shape the legitimacy of an emergent field to reflect their 
own institutional logics and norms. Reflexive isomorphism represents a 
legitimating strategy in which SEs actively engage in processes that align field-
level and internal logics to shape emergent institutional fields as closed 
systems of self-legitimization”. (p.623)     
Mixed institutional logics and SE growth research  
Other recent contributors have criticised this neo-institutional view for its neglect of 
social structure and exaggerating the capacity of actors to manipulate their institutional 
environment (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Lawrence et al., 2009). Lawrence et al. (2009) 
suggest that both the focus on isomorphism and institutional entrepreneurship represent 
“somewhat stylised interpretations of the relationships among actors, agency and institutions” 
(p.3). For instance, the wide spread acceptance of a particular practice may well be driven by the 
urge to gain competitive advantage, and failing to do so would undermine an organisation’s 
market position. Thus rather than representing blind compliance for the sake of conformity, it 
could be a strategic posture to utilise an existing market opportunity (Greenwood et al., 2008).  
Moreover, Tracey (2012) suggests that instead of influencing institutions (as 
conceptualised in new neo-institutional view), organisations are able to avoid/resolve particular 
institutional pressure through innovation. Combining old and new institutionalist thinking, a 
series of papers by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) propose that individual organisations are able 
to retain, adopt or avoid institutional demands. These papers highlight a new understanding of 
the interplay between agency and structure, whereby the role of organisations has greater 
emphasis and their responses can involve a range of options.  
A more recent criticism of neo-institutional theory points towards its lack of attention at 
to micro level actions undertaken by organisations in response to institutional influences (Powell 
& Colyvas, 2008). Greenwood et al. (2008) suggest reconnecting institutional research with 
processes that occur inside the organisation at the functional level involving their management of 
resources and capabilities. Tracey (2012) comments that, 
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“Neo-institutional theory remains vulnerable to the criticism that it is essentially a 
macro-level theory in which the micro-dynamics underpinning institutions have been 
marginalized” (p.101).  
 
This renewed interest stimulated further research on organisational responses 
institutional demands at both strategic and functional levels, with particular attention to the 
effects on institutions inside organisations (micro and meso levels) (Greenwood et al., 2010). 
Friedland and Alford (1991) introduced the notion of mixed institutional logics and 
proposed that organisations are embedded in multiple institutions, including the regulatory, 
social and market environments. Different institutional environments may impose different 
logics on organisations. Institutional actors consider these logics as a pre-condition to provide 
legitimacy and access to resources, yet different logics are often not compatible. The process of 
enacting these logics inside organisations can be complex, increasing the difficulty of 
formulating organisational responses. Organisations are faced with multiple factors (such as the 
goals and priorities of the resource provider) which influence the degree to which they are able to 
separate or reconcile the competing logics (Greenwood et al., 2010). 
Previous studies have identified different organisational responses towards competing 
institutional logic. These strategies involve decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), compromise 
(Oliver, 1991) and strategic logic combination (Greenwood et al., 2010). Decoupling refers to 
instances in which “organisations conform closely to the meaning and categories ritually 
defined by the environment, but do not attempt to seriously implement them at the operational 
level” (Scott, 2003:85). Decoupling allows organisations to symbolically endorse the demands 
prescribed by one institution while actually implementing the practices of another (often one that 
is closely aligned with organisational goals) (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Compromise refers to 
situations where organisations enact institutional prescriptions in a slightly altered form in order 
to maintain an acceptable balance between competing logics (Oliver, 1991). Thus, organisations 
can comply with the minimum standards and avoid the risk of losing endorsement, being able to 
bargain/lobby institutions and influence them to alter their demands (Scott, 1987). A number of 
recent studies find that organisations can strategically combine logics to comply with 
institutional demands (Greenwood et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2008). This response entails 
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purposeful and honest enactment of practices that are congruent with organisational goals or are 
imposed by influential institutions. For other logics they can symbolically adopt practices or 
involve negotiations with institutions. Therefore, organisations strategically apply various 
configurations to solve different types of problems.    
Being hybrid organisations, SEs are embedded in a pluralistic institutional environment 
and are more prone to competing logics than, say, more purely private or public sector 
organisations (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013). SEs have 
dual bottom lines and so are caught between social welfare logic (altruistic goals) and market 
logic (financial goals) (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014). The dilemma is not 
limited to enacting social and market logics, but can take other forms. For instance, SEs can be 
involved in public-private partnerships or receiving grants from the government (Jay, 2013), 
meaning that they may need to incorporate elements from state, market and civil society logics 
(Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011). 
Incorporating competing logics at the operational level poses the largest dilemma for 
SEs. Being hybrids, they are prone to more scrutiny by multiple institutions and vulnerable to 
being caught for fraud if they adopt the decoupling strategy. Compromise or avoidance as a 
response strategy is only viable when SE stakeholders agree over the objectives of enacting a 
particular logic, but disagree over the means of achievement. However, if stakeholders disagree 
over the objectives in the first place then compromise is unlikely (Pache & Santos, 2010). Pache 
and Santos (2013) identify that SEs mainly pursue selective coupling in line with the notion of 
strategic logic combination (Greenwood et al., 2010). Selective coupling allows SEs to 
selectively comply with mixed institutional logics to configure practices at varying levels. Pache 
and Santos (2013) identified this response among four work integration SEs and named the 
growth pattern as ‘strategic isomorphism’.     
 
2.5.2 SE growth and managerial tensions  
The sustainability of hybrid organisations depends on their ability to partner with 
competing logics at an operational level, externally managing the relationship with multiple 
stakeholders through different organisational responses. Internally, they manage organisational 
identity, resource allocation and decision-making in accordance with their external response 
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strategy (Battilana & Lee, 2014). SEs mobilize resources and develop capabilities for the 
advancement of their social goals alongside their financial ones (cf. Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
Legitimacy from state, market and society is important for their access to resources (Jay, 2013). 
As a consequence, SEs are required to craft the allocation of resources and capabilities 
development to match stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy (Pache & Santos, 2013). This 
process of enacting mixed logics at the operational level may give rise to managerial tensions 
(Doherty et al., 2009).  
The current study adopts the definition of tensions proposed by Smith and Lewis 
(2011). They define tension as “a situation when it becomes necessary to accept contradictory 
yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and persist over time” (p.382). A small but 
growing body of scholars  have noted SEs’ internal tensions in terms of mission drift, access, and 
the mobilization of financial and human resources (Doherty et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2013; 
Smith & Lewis, 2011).. For instance, Santos et al. (2015) explored how SEs may be vulnerable 
to mission drift in pursuit of dual goals and Hockerts (2015) examined how hybrid SEs can 
achieve their dual goals by turning antagonistic assets into complementarities.. Hybrid 
organisations can easily slip into mission drift, where an organisation can sacrifice one goal in 
order to achieve the other (Carroll & Stater, 2009). Although SEs are established to create social 
value, they may undermine this mission due to their adherence to other institutions. In order to 
achieve the commercial goals, SEs may need to compromise their social mission to a certain 
extent (Pache & Santos, 2010). Management rationality, therefore, suggests a need to pursue 
commercial goals despite any potential conflict with social or ethical goals (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010). Nevertheless, it is argued that the growth of hybrid organisations depends on their ability 
to optimise both social and financial value (Austin et al., 2006).  
External market pressures may compel SEs to reduce social goals, yet too great an 
emphasis on social goals may mean that financial sustainability aspect is neglected. Therefore, 
SEs’ internal management is a balancing act between maintaining social and commercial aspects 
(Brandsen et al., 2005). At the strategic level, tensions may arise from the degree of integration 
between commercial and social activities (Battilana & Lee, 2014). For instance, a micro-finance 
organisation can typically achieve a social mission by providing loans to less fortunate people 
who are excluded from mainstream financing institutions, and thus help them move out of 
poverty. At the same time, they may achieve their financial goals through appropriate risk 
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calculation and measures to ensure collection of the borrowed amounts. This results in their 
social and commercial activities being closely intertwined (Battilana et al., 2012). Conversely, 
Teasdale (2011) exemplify SEs that achieve their social mission through units that help 
unemployed young people by providing skills development training. SEs then recruit these 
unemployed individuals to produce goods and services that are then sold. In this case, social and 
commercial activities are performed in different organisational units and are not highly 
integrated.        
Tension may arise from enacting the demands of multiple institutions in order to 
achieve legitimacy. To meet the different demands of competing institutions SEs may need to 
keep organisational units loosely coupled together (Brandsen et al., 2005). This means that SEs 
may have to balance core organisational activities, workforce composition, organisational 
design, inter-organisational relationships and organisational culture (Battilana & Lee, 2014). 
Therefore, SEs may end up adopting fluid strategic solutions that result in complex management 
acts at a functional level.   
When translated into a micro-level, such management tensions can have significant 
implications for the practical development of functional resources and capabilities. In order to 
generate solutions to management paradoxes, the organisation of resources and capabilities may 
involve efforts to maintain an inward flow of resources, mobilisation and development 
capabilities. The act of balancing conflicting missions and legitimating discourses can influence 
the management of resources and capabilities and vice versa. This is an area where there is a 
need for further empirical analysis of the interplay between institutional influences, the dual-
value system in hybrid SEs and how they manage their resources and capabilities (Doherty et al., 
2014). The current study, therefore, seeks to extend the understanding of this interplay, the 
resultant tensions and their management at the micro-level.   
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has clarified the current theoretical understanding of the different growth 
paths that can be adopted by SEs. The old and new versions of neo-institutional theory and 
mixed institutional logics are drawn on to show how the interplay between structure and agency 
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can influence SEs’ response to institutions and shape their growth paths. SEs are introduced as 
hybrid organisations given there adherence to both social and financial missions and their 
exposure to multiple institutional domains relating to state, market and society. The chapter has 
discussed how SEs respond to the demands of multiple stakeholders to achieve legitimacy; and 
the management tensions SEs may face in balancing the conflicting missions and legitimation of 
discourses. 
41 | P a g e  
 
Chapter 3: Conceptual framework for studying SE growth  
3.1. Introduction 
After the theoretical background in Chapter 2, this chapter further develops the 
conceptual framework drawing in particular on the three institutional pillars of Scott (1995). 
Scott (1995)framework identifies three types of macro-institutions: regulatory, normative and 
cultural cognitive. The framework is particularly relevant to understanding SEs as hybrid 
organisations that are embedded in state, market and society (Pestoff, 1998;2005; Ridley-Duff & 
Bull, 2011). The study also draws on the resources and capabilities based view (Barney, 1991; 
Deakins & Freel, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Teece et al., 1997) to examine how resources 
and capabilities are developed and managed in SEs. Drawing upon these perspectives, this 
chapter presents a micro-level analysis of tensions inside SEs related to the management process 
of resource acquisition, resource mobilisation and capabilities development. The combinations of 
Scott’s institutional framework with the resources and capabilities based view allowed the study 
to examine the interplay of structure and agency by incorporating elements from both macro and 
micro aspects.  
The next section presents a discussion on the management of resources and capabilities 
and the subsequent internal tensions that can arise within SEs. Section 3.3 examines the 
relevance of Scott’s three pillars of institutions to understand SEs growth. The chapter concludes 
by summarising the key points and sets out the conceptual framework for the study.  
 
3.2. Managing resources and capabilities in SEs 
Barney (1991) suggests that enterprises are able to offer value by creating internal 
resources that are valuable, rare, costly to imitate and have organisational embeddedness. This 
resource-based view (RBV) suggests a need to understand a firm’s potential tracing the potential 
to create and appropriate more value than the competition through application of its resources 
(Barney, 1991). Other advocates of the RBV also focus on an enterprise’s ability to acquire 
external resources as a means of achieving sustainable growth (e.g. Jarillo, 1989; Renski, 2008). 
Jarillo (1989), for instance, found that firms using external resources to grow will do so, on 
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average, much faster (more than 10% every year) than competitors. In line with the RBV, 
therefore, an enterprise’s growth depends on both its internal resource endowment (Hoffman, 
2000) and its ability to acquire resources from external sources.   
Another strand of literature takes the scope of the resource-based view beyond the focus 
on internal and external resources, to encompass skills and learning that are more deeply 
engraved, namely the capabilities-based view (Ray et al., 2004). While resources refer to the 
tangible and intangible assets of an organisation, capabilities are the means of ‘creating’ those 
assets through practical skills, experiences and learning (Foss, 2012). Developing these 
capabilities enable an organisation to manage its entrepreneurial functions, such as operations, 
finance, marketing, human resources, research and development in a way that facilitates resource 
creation (Baum et al., 2011; Deakins & Freel, 1999). In this study, both the resources and 
capabilities based views are considered to allow comprehensiveness in unpacking the relevant 
managerial tensions. The following sub-sections examine the role of different resources and 
capabilities that are required for SE growth and what tensions could potentially be faced by SEs 
in the management of these resources and capabilities. 
 
3.2.1 Resource acquisition and managerial tensions in SEs 
Doherty et al. (2014) have highlighted two types of resource that they consider critical 
for SE growth: financial (Austin et al., 2006; Sunley & Pinch, 2012) and human (Austin et al., 
2006; Royce, 2007). While both human and financial resources are required for success, SEs are 
often faced with constraints in the acquisition of these due to their hybridity (Austin et al., 2006). 
For instance, a viable solution to acquire these resources could be a collaboration with a private 
or public organisation. However, such a collaboration may not remove all of the constraints 
related to acquisition, as SEs are then faced with the challenge of maintaining their social 
mission while also creating value for alliance partners. For instance, powerful alliance partner 
may prioritise the commercial goals undermining the expectations of the society, which can 
potentially harm SEs’ social objectives. In contrast, organizations embedded in single institutions 
tend to be more successful at securing external resources. Lee (2014), for instance, found that 
profit-making SEs were still less successful in securing external resources compared with their 
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charitable counterparts. The following sub-sections examine the role of financial and human 
resources in SE growth and the tensions and challenges associated in their management.  
 
Financial resources 
The financing of SEs has been identified as a severe constraint on their growth across 
different national contexts (Social Enterprise UK, 2011; Sunley & Pinch, 2012). With decreasing 
funding from government and donors, the funding of the entire third sector is moving towards a 
greater reliance on earned income. The challenge of generating earned income can become so 
all-consuming for SEs that they may struggle to pursue the social mission while achieving 
commercial goals. Also, the hybrid nature of SEs may result in market logics and reflected 
market pressures becoming a dominant influence. According to the norms of the market, poor 
financial performance of an enterprise is almost always readily punished (Doherty et al., 2014). 
This can mean that SEs become so focused on the internal creation of financial resources that 
their path towards creating social value becomes blurred  (Austin et al., 2006).    
On the other hand, the generation of optimum financial return may sometimes be 
constrained in SEs due to their commitment to social goals. The determination of price is a 
complex strategic act in SEs, with consideration of the affordability of their target beneficiaries 
who are often disadvantaged and socially excluded. As a consequence, charging a high price to 
increase trading surplus may limit beneficiaries access to their product/service  (Dees, 1998; 
Shaw & Carter, 2007). Such a situation may potentially undermine SE social goals. Therefore, 
SEs have to avoid mission drift which may, in turn, restrict gaining an optimum financial return 
(Teasdale, 2010).  
Previous studies have explored the possibility of SE financing from banks and venture 
capitalists (e.g. Bryson & Buttle, 2005), with Sunley and Pinch (2012) finding that 75 per cent of 
their studied SEs never had a loan and conceived this type of financing as a ‘last resort’, 
preferring to heavily rely on public sector grants and contracts. The authors highlight a number 
of challenges that deter SEs seeking loan financing, such as, fearing the burden of repayment and 
their inability to show sufficient assets as a guarantee, and finding commercial loans to be too 
expensive. In addition, Sunley and Pinch (2012) found that the studied SEs experienced slow 
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revenue growth and only a small surplus was left at year-end for reinvestment. Therefore, SEs 
prefer to avoid seeking a bank loan in order to reduce the risk of bankruptcy.  
Venture capitalists also tend to prefer conventional commercial ventures over social 
ventures for a number of reasons. Commercial ventures are more attractive to banks and 
financing institutions because they are more able to generate fast cash than social ventures  
(Lumpkin et al., 2013). As such, SEs are considered risky investments because there is always a 
possibility that in the future they will take actions to prioritise their social mission over 
commercial goals (Battilana & Lee, 2014). This means that the speed of financial return could 
also be slower in these types of organisations and investors will need patience and be more 
focused on long-term social change (Murphy & Coombes, 2009). Due to these challenges, SEs 
are often less successful in securing bank loans, even if they aspire to do so (Doherty et al., 
2014).   
Austin et al. (2006) suggest collaboration as a means of fulfilling the financial resource 
gap in SEs, arguing that collaboration allows SEs to leverage resources from external providers 
of support that they are unable to generate alone. Collaboration, however, can have its own 
problems. For instance, there could be misalignment between partners’ missions and SEs’ goals 
and SEs may have to compromise their social purpose in responding to partners’ self-interests. 
There is also a risk in sharing proprietary knowledge. Such concerns are likely to reduce SEs’ 
propensity to seek collaborative arrangements as a solution to financial deficiency.   
There is also evidence, however, that the hybrid nature of SEs can be beneficial for 
financial resource acquisition, as its very nature allows SEs to achieve legitimacy from multiple 
resource providers. While trading activities allow them to generate revenue from the market, 
their social mission allows them to collect grants and donations from the public sector and other 
donors (Austin et al., 2006). SEs are able to secure external resources by leveraging their 
community embeddedness as well (Dacin et al., 2011), suggesting that SE can acquire resources 
from a combination of external sources. However, Moreau and Mertens (2013) found that 
attaining and maintaining a financial mix between public and private financing can be a 
challenge for SEs. The tension comes from the urge to maintain financial equilibrium through an 
appropriate combination of income sources and minimising the possibility of external 
stakeholders undermining the social mission.      
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Therefore, SEs have to achieve legitimacy from multiple institutions in order to gain 
financial resources from government, donors, commercial banks and customers. External 
resource providers are embedded in their respective organisational fields and have their own 
legitimate concerns. Subsequently, they evaluate the performance of SEs according to their own 
criteria before providing access to these types of resources. While responding to these demands it 
is necessary for SEs to access finance from sources that do not overshadow their social purpose. 
However, it seems that hybridity complicates this process as SEs are required to maintain a 
balance between the competing demands they face from various institutions (Battilana & Lee, 
2014) by minimising the negative impact of hybridity while also leveraging its positive impacts 
(Doherty et al., 2014).   
 
Human resources  
The people dimension in SEs refers to employees, volunteers and board members 
(Austin et al., 2006), yet SEs’ ability to access skills and knowledge in the labour market has 
been questioned in previous studies (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Royce, 2007). SEs often lack the 
financial resources needed to pay individuals market rates, which limits their ability to recruit 
and retain highly skilled and talented individuals (Bridgstock et al., 2010). Austin et al. (2006) 
suggest that SEs are able to attract and motivate individuals with non-financial and non-
pecuniary incentives, as many individuals prefer intrinsic rewards as a motivating factor 
(Bridgstock et al., 2010). Nevertheless, staff turnover can be a particular problem in SEs (Liu & 
Ko, 2012) given their reliance on voluntary workers who generally have a higher turnover rate. 
In addition, while paid employees are expected to comply with managerial demands, voluntary 
workers can withdraw any time if they dislike the strategic direction of an organisation (Royce, 
2007).  
Previous studies have reported a lack of candidates with appropriate skills and that 
conventional educational institutions often fail to train students with the skills required by SEs 
(Bull & Crompton, 2006; Todres et al., 2006). While SEs focus on a desired set of skills, the 
conventional labour market falls short in supplying candidates with such niche requirements. 
Even if high-calibre candidates are available, SEs may need to cut corners when recruiting the 
skilled staff due to their social priorities, since a main reason for the existence of SEs is to 
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encourage individuals into the labour market who may normally be excluded by other 
organisations (Royce, 2007). 
Due to their hybrid nature, SEs require employees with skills from both social and 
commercial sectors (Liu & Ko, 2012). Therefore, ‘integrating’ and ‘socialising’ these employees 
and their values, as well as driving them towards dual bottom line practices, could bring a real 
challenge and management tensions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
Selecting appropriate board members and acquiring appropriate skills at board level also 
poses a challenge, given SEs’ dual mission and the need for board members to be accountable 
for financial sustainability as well as the achievement, and the pursuit of social goals. Board 
members are, therefore, required to have the skills needed to manage a profitable enterprise 
while also being able to respond appropriate to the needs of the society (Royce, 2007). However, 
most board members are likely to be experienced in a particular sector and thus lack an overall 
understanding of hybrid SEs (Doherty et al., 2014). 
 Therefore, the hybrid nature of SEs poses particular challenge in acquiring and 
mobilising human and financial resources. The process is an act of setting the balance, the target 
of which is to minimise any negative impact of hybridity on social missions (Austin et al., 2006). 
   
3.2.2 Capabilities development and managerial tensions in SEs  
Capabilities have been defined as the “self-sustaining ability to recognise, analyse and 
solve their problems by more effectively controlling and using their own external resources” 
(Todres et al., 2006:64). Research has found that SEs require a number of capabilities to respond 
to various players and forces in the external environment (Bloom & Smith, 2010), while their 
internal growth strategy can also influence the required capabilities (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012).  
Bloom and Smith (2010) list a number of capabilities seen as important to help SEs 
increase their social impacts, including staffing, communicating, alliance building, lobbying, 
earning generation, replicating, and stimulating market forces. In addition, other studies have 
identified the key roles played by marketing and branding (Doherty et al., 2009) and networking 
skills (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012). Learning is identified as an important capability for SEs in 
Bull and Crompton (2006), Bull (2008) and Todres et al. (2006), also the capabilities needed to 
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innovate and to identify and utilise opportunities at local and national scales (Gawell, 2013; 
Verreynne et al., 2013; Vickers et al., 2014; Zahra et al., 2009). 
The hybrid nature of SEs requires them to develop capabilities related to building 
solidarity with their communities (of both interest and place) as well as being business oriented 
(Linzalone & Lerro, 2014; Moreau & Mertens, 2013). Linzalone and Lerro (2014) find that 
business oriented capabilities are often regarded as ‘less important’ in SEs. Developing business 
oriented capabilities requires different ways of thinking, acting and operating that can cause 
tensions in a SE. For instance, conventional businesses focus on financial management as the 
foremost management tool, rather than the management of social purpose and mission (Anheier, 
2000). However, developing capabilities for a SE, therefore, needs to be seen as a dynamic 
process requiring strategic reflection and analysis of ongoing social impacts along with financial 
returns (Bull & Crompton, 2006).  
 
Communicating 
Effective communication in an SE context is defined by Bloom and Chatterji (2009)as 
the capability to persuade stakeholders to support their change strategy. SEs need to persuade 
potential benefactors to take advantage of an organisation’s services/products, motivate 
volunteers and employees to work for the organisation, encourage customers to purchase 
products/services, and convince donors/financiers to provide funds. They have to be able to 
clearly inform, frequently remind and convincingly persuade.  
In a hybrid organisation the different positions of stakeholders can increase the 
complexity of communications, as tensions may arise due to the heterogeneity of interests 
between and within individual stakeholder groups. Thus, SEs need to be able to adapt their 
communication style and message to the expectations and characteristics of different 
stakeholders (Moreau & Mertens, 2013). For instance, SEs can undertake research to identify the 
expectations of individual stakeholder groups in order to design communication strategies 
(Bloom & Chatterji, 2009), while including social and economic goals in both verbal and textual 
communications (Moreau & Mertens, 2013). 
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Alliance building  
SEs need to develop skills on alliance building, which refers to “the effectiveness with 
which an organisation has forged through partnerships, coalition, joint ventures and other 
linkages to bring about the desired social changes” (Bloom and Chatterji 2009: 119). SEs can 
increase its impacts by working in collaboration with complementary organisations or even with 
competitors (Austin et al., 2006).  
Tensions in alliance building may arise from failure to align self-interests that may be in 
conflict and around sharing of the proprietary knowledge. An alliance partner may be embedded 
in a different logic that conflicts with the primary goal of SEs. Hence, aligning the goals and 
self-interests of alliance partners is often a challenge for many SEs. SEs, therefore, need to 
develop capabilities to select the right partner and identify shared goals in order to achieve a state 
of alignment. While alliance facilitates leveraging from complementary resources of the alliance 
partner, it can also pressurise SEs into cutting corners on social propositions (Austin et al., 
2006). Sharing the proprietary resource involves a risk of leakage and loss of core competencies 
by both parties, which can limit the mutual value derived from alliance and should be kept to a 
minimum (Huybrechts & Nicholls, 2013).  
 
 Lobbying   
The capability of lobbying refers to “the effectiveness with which the organisation is 
able to advocate for government actions that may work in its favour” (Bloom & Chatterji, 
2009:120). Therefore, lobbying is a means to shape particular unfavourable or mildly favourable 
institutional norms, policies or practices (e.g. laws, regulations, budgetary and taxation rules) 
into the favour of an agency.  
This can include formal approaches, such as employing a registered lobbyist or 
involving judicial bodies and/or government leaders. An informal direction through political 
networking, interest mediation and using symbolic language could also be employed (Garud et 
al., 2002). Successful lobbying may require the development of social skills (framing and agenda 
setting), political skills (networking and bargaining), and cultural skills (the use of rhetorical 
devices and analogies) (cf. Mair & Marti, 2009). SEs, therefore, need to be able to craft their 
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lobbying efforts in order to provide a clear and considered reaction to the issue at hand (Bloom 
& Chatterji, 2009).   
As stated in Chapter 2, the success of institutionalised organisations depends on the 
degree to which they are able to respond to the norms and practices in the broader field (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). The role of agencies in influencing and shaping the institutions in their favour 
should not be ignored as well (DiMaggio, 1988; Tracey, 2012). However, given the hybrid SEs 
are exposed to pressures from multiple institutional domains, they need to decide on which 
institutional practices to be embraced and which ones to be changed. Thus the hybrid nature of 
SEs can increase the level of complexity and internal tension in setting the degree of being 
responsive to a particular institutional pressure in comparison to the other (Cooney, 2006).  
 
Earning generation  
Earning generation in an SE context is defined as “an effectiveness with which an 
organization generates a stream of revenue that exceeds its expenses” (Bloom and Smith 2009: 
121). With changing donor behaviours, government funding policies and the rise of quasi-
markets, SEs need to develop the ability to generate funding. Therefore, SEs may need to 
diversify into the space of mainstream markets, seeking to expand the scope and scale of 
activities through new lines of activity (Hudson, 2009), developing quality product with unique 
selling proposition and adopting a range of business-like capabilities (Bull & Crompton, 2006; 
Linzalone & Lerro, 2014). The business-like skills that SEs need to develop can include 
coordinating people and employees, planning activities and resources, projecting evaluation, 
remuneration design, and managing effective meetings (Linzalone & Lerro, 2014).  
The pragmatism underlying SEs’ earning generation often involves simply covering the 
costs and freeing the organisation from grants. In contrast, the key focus of a purely commercial 
entity is to increase profits. Hudson (2009) highlights two potential tensions that may arise from 
this difference. First, there could be tensions between the social origins, objectives, ethical, and 
moral motivation of SEs and the imperatives of markets. Second, the competitive dynamics of 
mainstream markets may dominate over social purpose and force SEs to increasingly look and 
behave as a conventional for-profit firm would. Therefore, Moreau and Mertens (2013) suggest 
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that SEs should develop management competencies to be able to include both areas (complying 
with social purposes and confirming economic imperatives) without slanting too much towards 
one side. 
  
Replicating  
SEs need to develop the capabilities of replicating defined as the effectiveness with 
which the organisation can reproduce its programmes and initiatives (Bloom and Smith 
2009:122). The notion of a replicable SE suggests that an organisation’s services, programmes 
and other efforts can be copied or extended without a reduction in quality by means of training, 
franchising, contracting and other tools to ensure control. Therefore, SEs need to be able to 
develop relationship with other similar and interested organisations and coordinate with them in 
order to enhance the replicability of their operational model. This may require SEs to adjust their 
model depending on the variations in the demographics of people and geography (Bloom & 
Chatterji, 2009).  
Hybrid SEs may experience tension in their efforts to allow replication of their model. 
For instance, the logics of markets may pressure them to retain property rights, while SEs’ social 
roots may urge them to share ideas that can have social benefits (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012).     
 
Marketing and branding 
Social marketing is proposed to be a means for preserving the social mission while also 
contributing towards the commercial success of a socially oriented organisation (Doherty et al., 
2009; Golding & Peattie, 2005). Andreasen (1994) originally defined social marketing as the 
application of commercial marketing techniques to the analysis, planning, execution, and 
evaluation of programmes designed to influence the voluntary behaviour of the target. Social 
marketing primarily draws upon the ‘social resources’ of an organisation to achieve credibility 
from customers (Doherty & Meehan, 2006). Doherty and Meehan (2006) propose three types of 
organisational resources needed: i) ethical and social commitments, ii) connections with partners 
in the value network, and iii) consistency of behaviour in order to build trust. Doherty and 
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Meehan (2006) also propose that ethical and social credibility are now the viable bases for 
differentiation and competitive positioning in mainstream consumer markets, which has opened a 
new door of SEs branding. Doherty et al. (2009) argue that in order to develop a brand, SEs need 
to identify the most effective triggers that encourage consumers to act on their ethical concerns. 
SEs, therefore, need to identify innovative means to position the brand, drawing upon a set of 
ethical values such as consumer responsibility and consumer citizenship (Lang & Gabriel, 2005).     
The hybrid nature of SEs can also bring challenges for their marketing efforts. While 
the use of ethics and social value is necessary to establish committed relationships with ethical 
consumers, operating in the mainstream market may require some adoption of conventional 
marketing practices (Doherty et al., 2009). However, using mainstream marketing practices 
involves the risk of losing organisational identity. Tensions may thus arise from balancing the 
practices of social and mainstream marketing, deciding on the ones to adopt and others to adapt. 
Doherty and Tranchell (2007) present a case study of Divine Chocolate Company Ltd., in which 
they explore how their marketing approach blends conventional and social marketing. Divine 
Chocolate adopts mainstream marketing practices by distributing chocolates through 
supermarkets and adopting conventional pricing methods, while also using social marketing 
techniques to communicate its socially rooted ethos and practices. Doherty and Tranchell (2007) 
suggest that this blended approach can counterbalance some of the risks associated with 
competing in mainstream market.       
 
Learning and skills development   
A number of studies have stressed the importance of developing a learning culture in 
SEs (e.g. Bull, 2008; Bull & Crompton, 2006; Todres et al., 2006). Bull and Crompton (2006) 
examine learning in SEs by measuring levels of improvement of internal skills, such as staff 
productivity increases, hours and other resources spent on training. Bull (2007) suggests that SEs 
need to act upon and behave like a learning organisation in order to develop the capability of 
learning and skills development. He further proposes that a learning SE should develop a culture 
of training, participative decision-making, team working and continuous improvement. Todres et 
al. (2006) propose that learning in SEs should focus on developing capabilities in three areas: i) 
developing business skills, ii) developing skills to identify community needs, and iii) 
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empowering employees towards a full social outlook. They further suggest that SEs’ learning 
activities should enable individual employees to conduct business-like functions, such as 
managing finance, marketing and human resources. The learning activities should emphasise 
teaching individual staff about the relationship of the organisation with the target disadvantaged 
community, as well as interacting with them and identifying their needs. Such an approach draws  
upon experiential learning,  tacit knowledge sharing and empowering the employees (Kar, 2012). 
A number of tensions arising from SE learning processes can be identified from 
previous studies. Bull (2007) found  that SEs adopt informal learning techniques for skills 
development, such as on the job training, trial and error, and informal interactions with 
stakeholders. In these SEs, learning is more naturally evolved and not organised through 
structured policies and procedures. For instance, Kar (2012) identifies that in Sambalpuri 
Bastralaya, a rural handloom community enterprise in India, the creation of members’ skills 
occured through knowledge transfer from senior community members. This informal learning 
process is in contrast to a more formal approach in mainstream business, and it is suggested that 
SEs’ preference for informal learning may conflict with their need to adopt business-like 
development and a more formalised approach to learning. 
Due to their hybrid nature, SEs may need to recruit individuals from social, commercial 
or public sectors. As a consequence, these individuals are likely to inherit the logics and 
practices of their previous employment sector. Therefore, it may take time and involve 
significant challenges for these individuals to ‘de-learn’ a single outlook and understand the need 
for a balanced SE outlook and practice. Todres et al. (2006) identify that SE employees find 
themselves in a position where they need to resolve the perceived conflict between being both 
socially and profit driven. This learning process involves a pragmatic shift in thinking and can 
thus give rise to tension, both for the employee and the organisation.  
 
Networking and relationship building 
Due to their hybrid nature, SEs need to develop and manage relationships with a large 
number of people and institutions, including clients/beneficiaries, public authorities, local 
communities, private donors, for-profit and non-profit partner organisations, and peer SEs 
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(Austin et al., 2006). The ability to effectively manage these relationships is linked to networking 
skills, as mentioned by Moreau and Mertens (2013). Previous studies in the SE field have 
emphasised the role of networking in facilitating resource acquisition (Verreynne et al., 2013), 
knowledge sharing (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012), opportunity identification, and leveraging 
complementary skills (Doherty & Meehan, 2006; McKague & Tinsley, 2012).     
A number of studies focus on networking from a marketing perspective (e.g. Doherty & 
Meehan, 2006; McKague & Tinsley, 2012). These studies investigate how SEs manage and 
benefit from relationships with distribution partners, customers, suppliers and other collaborative 
partners performing different functions. Through the Divine Chocolate case, Doherty and 
Tranchell (2007) show how the organisation’s ‘value network’ involves relationships with 
multiple stakeholders from both social and commercial sectors: UK supermarkets (e.g., 
Sainsbury, Tesco and Co-op), charity retail shops (e.g., Oxfam), Cocoa farmer’s village trust, 
cocoa marketing companies, Fair Trade Labelling Organisation (FLO) approved cocoa 
processors, and a number of others. On the other hand, Lyon and Fernandez (2012) evoke the 
role of the network in sharing knowledge. They refer to both informal and formal knowledge 
networks, such as learning alliances, associations and trusts where knowledge is transferred 
during group meetings by sharing ideas and good practices. Therefore, the capability of 
networking corresponds to managing relationships and leveraging complementary resources and 
the skills of network members.  
The hybrid nature of SE can increase the complexity of networking activities and in so 
far as they participate in heterogeneous network groups espousing varying norms and practices. 
Identifying the appropriate groups to know, deciding on the degrees of conformity with those 
groups, and positioning the organisation within the sphere of those groups can be challenging (cf. 
Moreau & Mertens, 2013). In addition, SEs are required to confirm with group norms in order to 
access network resources but without unduly sacrificing their own norms and practices. 
Therefore, the process of network management can involve tensions for SEs which need to be 
carefully addressed and managed.  
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Innovation  
SEs need to be able to innovate, with some SEs being opportunity exploiters (namely 
‘social constructionists’) and others being innovators (namely ‘social engineers’) (Zahra et al., 
2009). Some SEs are able to develop, launch and operate ventures that tackle social needs 
currently not addressed by existing institutions, businesses, NGOs and government agencies. 
These SEs develop the capability to fill such holes in the fabric of social systems. Some other 
SEs demonstrate a higher degree of innovation capability, and are able to introduce significant 
changes in the social sphere. Such SEs are able to address the formidable barriers to reform and 
disrupt existing institutions, and then replacing them with more socially efficient ones.     
However, Gawell (2013) argues that the innovative potential of SEs should not be 
exaggerated as there is a need for legitimacy from multiple institutions which can challenge their 
ability to innovate. This means that SEs’ ability to develop and adjust with competing logics 
becomes crucial. Furthermore, Gawell (2013) argues that SEs are mostly followers, with his 
findings implying that the hybrid nature of SEs can challenge their innovation capability. While 
SEs’ innovation may be rewarded by one institution, it may be punished by others, which may 
then result in the degree of innovation requiring adjustment and resulting tensions. Vickers et al. 
(2014) argues that the possibilities for creativity and innovation can be enhanced in hybrid public 
service organisations due to the role of their combined business/commercial, public service and 
social value logics. The embeddedness of these hybrids in multiple institutions provided a 
platform for innovation, supporting new strategic directions for experimentation in some cases.   
In sum, this section identifies a range of resources and capabilities that SEs need to 
acquire for their successful growth and development. At the same time, however, the hybrid 
nature of SEs may complicate the process of resource acquisition and capabilities development. 
SEs experience in competing institutional logics and their dual bottom line can potentially create 
tensions affecting how they orchestrate the acquisition of resources and capabilities. The next 
section will shed further light on the different institutional contexts of SEs and how these can 
potentially affect their growth.             
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3.3. The institutional environment and SE growth 
A number of scholars have defined institutions adopting different perspectives (e.g. 
March & Olsen, 1984; North, 1990; Peters, 2000; Scott, 1995). North (1990) proposes a 
relatively broad view: “institutions consist of formal written rules as well as typically unwritten 
codes of conduct that underlie and supplement formal rules” (p.32). The sociological view of 
institutions, on the other hand, considers, “institutions as the systems of established and 
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” (Hodgson, 2006:2). Peters (2000) 
identifies four different perspectives – normative, rational choice, historical, empirical – 
embraced by the institutionalists over the years. He argues that institutionalists adopting the 
normative approach focus on institutions as the major repositories of social values (e.g. March & 
Olsen, 1984). Those espousing the rational choice approach emphasise rules and incentives, and 
postulate that members of institutions behave in accordance with these basic components of 
institutional structure (e.g. North, 1981). The historical approach, however, evokes that policy 
and structural choices made at the inception of the institution will have a persistent influence 
over its future behaviour (e.g. Hall, 2010). This approach stresses that institutional structure is 
transmitted across generations, and is maintained and reproduced over time. Finally, empirical 
institutionalists focus on the nature and influence of the formal structures of government on 
policy choices and political stability (e.g. Weaver & Rockman, 1993).  
Drawing on these different perspectives, Scott (1995) suggests a more comprehensive 
definition: “institutions are comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements 
that, together with the associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life” (p.47). His institutional framework consists of three pillars: regulatory, normative 
and cultural cognitive.  
 
- Regulatory institutions: This aspect of institutions, as suggested by Scott (1995), includes 
rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities in an attempt to influence future 
behaviour. Scott (1995) defines regulatory institutions as “the ones that possess the 
capacity to establish rules, inspect others enforcing conformity to them and as necessary 
manipulate sanctions, rewards or punishments – in an attempt to influence future 
behaviour” (p.52).   
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- Normative institutions: This refers to the values that underlay individuals and 
organisations’ conceptions of what is desirable and expected in their particular contexts. 
It also includes norms that dictate a legitimate means to pursue goals of individuals and 
organisations (Scott, 1995). Normative institutions shape an individual’s behaviour, 
perception, attitude and feelings, and both social (i.e., kinship groups, social classes and 
religious systems) and regulatory systems set the expectations of how actors are supposed 
to behave. Over time, however, these behavioural expectations become normative 
institutions (Knight & Sened, 1998; March & Olsen, 1984). 
- Cultural-cognitive institutions: Scott (2008) defines cultural-cognitive institutions as “the 
shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and frames through which 
meaning is made...the cognitive containers in which social interests are defined and 
classified, argued, negotiated and fought out” (p.57). The concept of cultural-cognitive 
institutions partly stems from social cognition theory, which stresses how world views are 
formed within an individual’s situational context (Busenitz et al., 2000). The cultural-
cognitive institution rests primarily on the idea that such cognitions are constituted by an 
individual’s interpretive processes in response to their external cultural framework. The 
affective dimension of this institution refers to the positive feeling exerting certitude and 
confidence when actions conducted by the individual fit with wider cultural values. Yet, 
negative feelings create confusion and disorientation when actions are in conflict with 
cultural values (Scott, 1995). 
 
Scott’s framework offers a particular promise as a conceptual basis for studying SE 
growth, making reference to multiple institutional domains surrounding SEs. Based on an 
analysis of different forms of SEs, Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011) identify three domains in which 
SEs can be associated: state, civil society and market. They argue that the hybrid nature of SEs 
enable them to form and operate organisations that draw upon the regulations, norms and 
thinking from more than one economic sector. The domains surrounding SEs can encompass 
their own regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive practices, which can then influence SE 
growth (cf. Mair & Marti, 2009). Kerlin (2009) argues that SE growth follows dominant 
influences with their particular socio-economic domain. The relative strength of influence of a 
particular domain determines the extent to which SEs will be embedded in that particular 
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domain. Kerlin (2009) finds that the significant growth of entrepreneurial SEs in the USA is due 
to the strong and supportive civil society and market in that region. In contrast, in most Western 
European countries the strong supporting role of the state has given birth to SEs that partner with 
the government to solve national issues such as unemployment. SEs in this region often receive 
funding and strategic development support from government, which can also result in greater 
intervention from the state in their operational activities. Therefore, it is clear that the nature of 
SE growth is likely to be strongly influenced by multiple institutional influences and their 
relative strength.  
     
3.3.1 Regulatory institutions and SE growth 
Kerlin (2009) suggests that state, market, civil society, and donors have distinct policies 
and rules which influence the pattern of SE growth across the globe. Lyon and Ramsden (2006) 
identify a range of support required by SEs, including counselling, SE specific advice, sector 
specific advice, and training, networking and marketing related support. Institutional support for 
SE is likely to be most effective when public, private and third sector organisations combined 
offer the facilities needed by them. Therefore, the regulatory environment in different 
institutional domains can support or constrain SE growth (cf. Kerlin, 2009).     
 
State policy environment and legal framework 
 A number of studies have investigated the role of a state’s policy environment and legal 
framework in shaping SE growth in different contexts (e.g. Defourny & Kim, 2011; Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2008; Galera & Borzaga, 2009). Kerlin (2009) points out that the US economy’s 
slowdown in the 1970s, and subsequent government deficit in the 1980s, resulted in a withdrawal 
of state funding from the non-profit sector. During this period, non-profit organisations seized 
the idea of commercial revenue generation as a way to replace the loss of government funds. 
Therefore, SEs in the USA started to rely heavily on market driven activities. Defourny and 
Nyssens (2008) highlight that although SEs in the USA are dedicated to their social mission, 
most behave like for-profit organisations in terms of dynamism, personal involvement and 
innovative practices. In addition, there has been no SE specific new legal framework introduced 
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over the last 50 years to govern these enterprises in the country (Kerlin, 2006). As a result, the 
SEs have taken various legal forms, including sole proprietorships, partnerships with private 
corporations, limited liability companies, and non-profit and for-profit (Galera & Borzaga, 
2009).  
In contrast, a number of studies identify how the growth of SEs in the European nations’ 
economy has been supported by introduction of SE specific legal frameworks and related 
government initiatives (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008; Galera & Borzaga, 2009; Kerlin, 2009). 
Cooperatives and associations are the most prominent forms of SE observed in  Europe 
(Defourny & Nyssens, 2008), which have evolved since the passing of new law on ‘social 
solidarity co-operatives’ by Italian Parliament in 1991. This new law  contributed to the rapid 
emergence of two specific types of cooperatives in the country: social service cooperatives and 
work integration SEs (WISE) (Galera & Borzaga, 2009). Other Western European governments, 
such as Spain, Portugal and France, followed Italy and created supportive legal frameworks for 
cooperatives and WISE in the late 1990s/early 2000s. In the UK SE growth has increased since 
2004 with the creation of a new legal form the ‘Community Interest Company’. A number of 
other supportive initiatives were implemented by the previous Labour government including the 
creation of a SE Unit at the Department of Trade and Industry to deliver support for SEs and the 
development of a three-year (2004-2006) National Procurement Strategy for local government to 
increase the amount of work contracted out to SEs (Chapman et al., 2007; Mawson, 2010).           
A faltering economy, subsequent rise of unemployment, and government revenue 
reductions have also contributed to the emergence of SEs in the European region (Kerlin, 2009). 
The states in the region have undergone various reforms, including privatization, decentralisation 
and a reduction in public services. This has resulted in a rise in unemployment to which civil 
society has responded by establishing new WISEs and cooperatives. State governments have 
provided funding and other support to these SE initiatives (Defourny, 2001).  
The SE landscape in East Asia shares the strong influence of public policy, similar to 
Europe (Defourny & Kim, 2011). A number of studies show how SE growth in East Asian 
countries – including South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan – has increased in pace in the 
2000s and was followed by rising unemployment due to financial crisis in 1997 (e.g. Bidet & 
Eum, 2011; Chan et al., 2011; Defourny & Kim, 2011; Laratta et al., 2011). Defourny and Kim 
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(2011) find that the governments of these states provided funding support and others 
implemented supportive initiatives to encourage the third sector to contribute to resolving the 
unemployment problem. Later, a culture of contracting with non-profit organisations has pushed 
SEs toward a more market-oriented approach.  These trends in state regulations have given birth 
to five types of SEs in East Asia: trading non-profits, WISE, non-profit cooperatives, non-profit 
private enterprise partnerships, and community development enterprises (multi-stakeholder 
partnerships) (Defourney & Kim 2011).   
In short, these examples indicate how both the policy environment and legal 
frameworks in a state can influence patterns of SE growth.   
 
Market related regulations 
Mair and Marti (2009) identify a number of regulatory institutions in the market 
environment that can be relevant to SEs and can potentially influence their growth. These 
regulatory institutions involve the legal frameworks that govern SEs operating in the market 
sphere, such as property rights, enforcing mechanisms, the banking system, competitor 
organisations and the monetary system. Lyon and Ramsden (2006) argue that SEs obtain support 
from solicitors, accountants and special consultants accessed through market mechanisms, and 
that loan policies of private banks and other financing institutions can influence lending patterns 
in the social sector. They further argue that private banks can play a strong role in facilitating SE 
growth in communities that suffer from under-investment.  
SEs are often found to be forming collaborative relationships with private sector 
organisations (Huybrechts & Nicholls, 2013), with such arrangements being influenced by the 
partner corporations’ own rules and policies such as governance structure, code of ethics and 
mission. Therefore, the findings of these studies suggest how the regulatory environment of 
markets can influence SE growth.   
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Societal rules and regulatory practices 
There are regulatory institutions apply to the wider society or to particular social groups, 
which may also a shaper of SE growth (Defourny & Kim, 2011; Mair & Marti, 2009). For 
instance, Mair and Marti (2009) found that Islamic pre-emption law (Shufa law) imposes 
restrictions on female beneficiaries in the workplace in Bangladesh. Drawing upon this Shufa 
law, religious leaders in rural Bangladesh impose punishment (fatwas) on NGO female 
beneficiaries. In addition, rural areas in Bangladesh have local regulatory bodies (panchayet) that 
regulate societal issues by means of informal courts (shalish). Mair and Marti (2009) found that 
this regulatory practice hinders the growth of SEs and particularly in the area of female 
empowerment. Other rules and regulations related to civil society have been found to be relevant 
for SE growth in Bangladesh. For instance, a number of non-profit organisations draw upon the 
Child Marriage Act and Dowry Prohibition Act as the basis of working women and children in 
Bangladesh (Mair & Marti, 2009).   
 
3.3.2 Normative institutions and SE growth 
Normative institutions exist in the political, social and market spheres and can 
potentially influence SE growth (Mair & Marti, 2009), as is further discussed below.  
 
Norms in public institutions and political sphere  
A number of scholars studying entrepreneurship growth have examined the influence of 
norms relating to state institutions, including excessive bureaucracy (or red tape) and also 
nepotism and corruption (Aidis et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010). Enterprises have been found 
to be offering bribes and exploit political patronage in order to gain access to resources and 
support from state institutions (Puffer et al., 2010; Tonoyan et al., 2010). In their study in the 
context of Russia, Aidis et al. (2008) point out the role of trust in shaping enterprises’ access to 
public resources, which is particularly relevant given the potential influence of public agencies 
on the growth of commercial enterprises.  
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Mair and Marti (2009) found that SEs can also be influenced by the norms in the 
political sphere, with patron-client norms in rural Bangladesh found to have constrained the 
activities of a number of NGOs. These traditional patrons, which include the elites and religious 
leaders, resisted the programmes of NGOs that attempted to empower poor people because they 
found the NGOs’ programmes to be threatening to their age old hierarchical position.  
In a similar vein, Defourny and Kim (2011) point out that Confucian thoughts and 
Buddhism has played a significant role in the growth of SEs in the East Asian region. They argue 
that the Confucian belief of ‘shared destiny’ has helped to push the ‘developmental ideology’ of 
the political sphere. Thus East Asian state policies are often referred to in terms of a ‘Confucian 
welfare state’ or ‘developmental welfare state’ or ‘productive welfare state’ by Jones (1993), 
Kwon (2005) and Wilding (2008), respectively. Defourny and Kim (2011) argue that the 
Confucian or developmental ideology has stimulated welfare regimes and encouraged individual 
governments to promote SE growth in order to deliver shared benefits.  
 
Norms of competition in the market 
Normative institutions exist in the market domain, with competitive norms being one of 
the most dominant influences. SEs not only compete with similar organisations by operating in 
the market sphere, but enter into direct competition with capitalist firms (Hudson, 2009). ‘Fair 
competition’ is a competitive norm, but SEs are often accused to be receiving preferential 
advantage as opposed to their mainstream counterparts. The conventional businesses generally 
assume that SEs are cushioned by funding from the private sector, tax benefits and government 
support and thus may argue that SEs are impinging on the spaces of mainstream organisations 
and not adhering to competitive norms (cf. Chapman et al., 2007).  According to the norms of 
competition, SEs are expected to protect their proprietary knowledge, have a unique selling 
proposition and be responsive to their customers. Many of these expectations are contradictory to 
their other goal of creating social value (Chang et al., 2012), which means that these tensions can 
influence SE growth.      
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Societal norms and practices 
Society encompasses norms that can control the behaviours of any organisations 
including SEs. Mair and Marti (2009) point out a number of societal norms that influence SE 
growth in the context of Bangladesh. For instance, kinship norms in Bangladesh limit the rights 
of women to sell, delegate or rent property. Other norms – early marriage expectations on 
women, the marriage dowry practice and working gratis for patrons – are among those found to 
be constraining the activities of NGOs in Bangladesh. 
On the other hand, Defourny and Kim (2011) find that the moral obligation of shared 
destiny in Confucian beliefs has enabled SEs in East Asia to achieve legitimacy within society. 
Being influenced by the norm of shared destiny, the people in these societies have contributed 
towards SE growth through the supply of resources such as volunteering and in-kind donations. 
This shows how SEs’ access to resources and their growth can be strongly influenced by the 
norms and expectations in  society.    
 
3.3.3 Cultural-cognitive institutions and SE growth 
Previous studies have identified the influence of cultural values on different aspects of 
entrepreneurship, such as innovation (Mueller & Thomas, 2001), entrepreneurial intention (Lim 
et al., 2010), attitude towards risk taking (Bruton et al., 2005), network embeddedness (Zapalska 
& Edwards, 2001) and family embeddedness (Steier et al., 2009). The process by which 
entrepreneurs relate to and seek support from their surrounding environment can be considered 
as a culturally embedded process (De Clercq & Voronov, 2009; Jack et al., 2004; Zapalska & 
Edwards, 2001). Cultural values can influence the cognition process of not only entrepreneurs 
themselves, but also their stakeholders in state, market and society (Mair & Marti, 2009).  
 
Work culture in public institutions 
Cultural aspects can potentially influence the work culture of public institutions. 
Previous researchers have reported that societies valuing hierarchy, power imbalance and group 
loyalty are more prone to corruption (e.g. Puffer et al., 2010; Tonoyan et al., 2010). Takyi-
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Asiedu (1993) reported that bureaucrats in Sub-Saharan countries used their hierarchical position 
to accumulate wealth and power. Entrepreneurs seeking support from them had to offer 
patronage in the form of bribes, gifts and hospitality. Puffer et al. (2010) found that public 
institutions in China and Russia were hierarchical and highly bureaucratic. They found that the 
existence of higher degree of power distance and collective values had shaped the work culture 
in the public sector of both these countries, which constraints access to public resources and 
support for enterprise.  
In their study on a Bangladeshi SE, Mair and Marti (2009) found that the political 
sphere of Bangladesh is characterised by a highly asymmetric relationship between patrons and 
clients. This situation is a result of the hierarchical cultural setting in Bangladesh, with the 
cultural values presiding in state institutions therefore potentially influencing SEs’ access to 
public resources.  
 
Culture and the role of market  
Cultural values may influence the attitude of resource providers in the market domain. 
For instance, Li and Zahra (2012) find the attitude of venture capitalists in high uncertainty 
avoidant societies to be risk averse. As a consequence, banks and financial institutions in such 
societies prefer to finance clients who are already within their existing and known network in 
order to avoid risk. The risk averse nature of venture capitalists may, therefore, limit access to 
get financial resources for risky ventures (cf. Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003).    
Cultural-cognition may also determine the level of autonomy practiced by decision 
makers in the market (Mair & Marti, 2009). Defourny and Kim (2011) argue that hierarchical 
culture and collectivist Confucian values in East Asian countries provide the state with the 
ultimate power to shape the governance models of SEs. Although public policy measures push 
SEs in this region to be more market oriented, this trend towards market reliance is still mitigated 
by various types of public policies and support. Therefore, the argument implies that the cultural 
setting can determine the level on autonomy given to the market as opposed to the state. The 
relative autonomy of decision makers in different stakeholder groups can influence the growth of 
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SEs in terms of shaping their governance models, their focus on social goal, and their ability to 
participate in decision making (Defourny & Kim, 2011).  
 
Cultural values and societal cognition 
Previous studies have found that cultural values can shape a range of cognitive aspects 
of the outlook of individuals in society, which in turn, can potentially influence the extent to 
which innovative ventures can emerge (McGrath et al., 1992; Mueller & Thomas, 2001). Mueller 
and Thomas (2001) found that the level of innovation by entrepreneurs and the level of 
acceptance by society was likely to be higher in those societies that particularly valued individual 
achievement, freedom and autonomy. In a similar vein, McGrath et al. (1992) find that the level 
of innovativeness to be higher in enterprises in USA, as compared to those in China, attributing 
this variation to the contrasting cultural aspects of the studied countries, such as the extent of 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance. This is in line with the argument of Mueller and 
Thomas (2001) and McGrath et al. (1992), which also support that cultural values in society are 
likely to influence the level of innovativeness of SE (cf. Gawell, 2013).  
Social issues may emerge from cultural values, which may enable or constrain SEs 
growth. For instance, Mair and Marti (2009) observe that the masculine cultural setting in 
Bangladesh resulted in a gendered division of labour, with the primary responsibility of women 
for household work and child bearing, reducing their ability to participate in external work in 
order to generate income. Therefore, SEs working for female empowerment often face resistance 
from Bangladesh people. Similarly, Defourny and Kim (2011) argue that the collectivist cultural 
values prevalent in East Asian societies have enabled SEs to achieve easier acceptance and a 
higher level of support from civil society. It seems likely that as SEs work more closely with 
society compared to their commercial counterparts (Urbano et al., 2011), they will be 
increasingly influenced by cultural values, although the SE literature has thus far paid little 
attention to this phenomenon.     
In sum, the discussion in this section develops the rationale and argument supporting a 
need to further examine how the regulatory and social institutions of the state, market and society 
may shape the growth of SEs.       
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3.4. The conceptual framework 
The insights from chapters 2 and 3 are summarised in this section and used to set out a 
conceptual framework for the current study. Previous studies have identified that the institutional 
environment can play a key role in influencing SE growth by facilitating and/or constraining the 
process. These studies have analysed the nature of SE evolution in specific countries or regions 
by examining the influences of regulatory institutions (Defourny & Kim, 2011; Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2008) and social institutions (Mair & Marti, 2009) on SE growth. Research on the SE 
landscape has also explored the influence of institutional factors on SEs’ functional level 
activities, including their resource acquisition (Lyon & Ramsden, 2006; Sunley & Pinch, 2012) 
and capabilities development process (Bloom & Chatterji, 2009; Bloom & Smith, 2010).  
In recent years, there has been a rise in studies conceptualising SEs as hybrid 
organisations (Brandsen et al., 2005; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 2011) that “pursue an explicit social 
mission through business-inspired earned income” (Hockerts, 2015: 83). By definition, hybrids 
draw on “co-existence of values” (Doherty et al., 2014:425). A recent body of work has, 
therefore, focused on how hybrid organisations accommodate and organise their dual missions at 
the strategic level (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Santos et al., 2015).  
Another feature highlighted by the definition of hybrid organisations relates to their 
enactment in “multiple institutional paradigms” (Doherty et al., 2014:425). Until the 
incorporation of the notion of hybridity in SE research, previous studies have mostly explored 
the isolated influence of individual institutions on SE growth. Recent studies on hybrid SEs have 
demonstrated the prevalence of influences from multiple institutions such as, the state, market, 
civil society and international donors (e.g. Kerlin, 2010), although they tend to treat these 
influences as relatively homogeneous (cf. Besharov and Smith 2014).  
Besharov and Smith (2014) argue that institutional logics within hybrid organisations 
can be ‘nested’, ‘intertwined’ and ‘heterogonous’. Hence, a particular tension within such 
organisation may arise due to influences from two or more institutional domains. It is, therefore, 
likely to be complex to clearly identify the origin of the influencing factor. In line with this 
thinking, the boundaries of regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive institutional influences 
in hybrid SEs may be blurred. Hence, influences from these institutional categories and the 
resultant outcome may not be clearly distinguishable in the case of hybrids. To this end, the merit 
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of Scott’s typology needs to be tested through application to the study of institutional 
environment surrounding hybrid SEs.   
With rising research in the hybrid nature of SEs, a body of recent research has explored 
the interplay of the two unique features in hybrid SEs: i) their dual-value system and ii) their 
enactment in multiple institutions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Tracey et al., 2011). For instance, 
Pache and Santos (2010) have investigated how competing institutional demands influence the 
core missions and strategies in hybrid SEs and how they respond to the institutional pressures. In 
this respect, the theory of institutional isomorphism suggests that organisations in a given 
institutional context adopt similar processes or structures. Although organisations may develop 
independently, they tend to adopt homogeneous behaviour under the influence of similar 
institutional environment that offer similar opportunities and constrains (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Organisations tend to mould into the expectations posed to them by their surrounding 
institutional actors in order to achieve legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2010). In contrast, neo-
institutional theory contends that organisations are able to challenge institutional demands and 
shape them to be more favourable to their situation (Tracey, 2012). Organisations that embed 
multiple institutional logics have to respond to competing pressures to gain legitimacy (Smith et 
al., 2013). At the same time, they have to also avoid too much drift from their social or economic 
missions in the process of responding to institutional demands (Santos et al., 2015). For instance, 
prioritising market logics may lead towards undermining the demands of society. Smith et al. 
(2013) exemplify that SEs often tend to hire disadvantaged employees in order to respond to 
unmet social needs, but that market logics entail hiring staff based on skills or in other words, 
employing staff who are from advantaged sections of society. Therefore, the process of 
responding to institutional influence is fundamentally complex in the case of hybrid SEs. 
While previous research has started to reveal the complexity of the interplay between 
the dual-value system in hybrid SEs and their pluralistic institutional ties, the internal tensions 
resulting from this interplay are still little understood (Smith et al., 2013). Even less understood 
are the strategies adopted by hybrid organisations in response to such tensions (Smith & Lewis, 
2011). A small number of studies have identified response strategies, such as, selective coupling 
(Pache & Santos, 2010) and loose coupling (Cooney, 2006), but have not examined how such 
strategic responses translate into functional level actions or the mobilisation of resources and 
capabilities. This field of research, therefore, lacks a micro-level understanding of how tensions 
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are managed at a functional level in hybrid SEs and how they orchestrate their resources and 
capabilities (Doherty et al., 2014).    
The review of literature by Doherty et al. (2014) centres on the hybrid nature of SEs and 
how hybridity affects the pursuit of dual missions at a strategic level and the acquisition of 
financial and human resources at the functional level. They present a framework for 
understanding the tensions in SEs that arise from their hybrid nature. This study extends the 
framework proposed by Doherty et al. (2014) by conducting an empirical investigation of the 
interplay between institutional influences, the dual-value system in hybrid SEs and their 
mobilisation of resources and capabilities in the context of Bangladesh and the outcomes of this 
interplay in terms of internal tensions and their management strategies. The current study is, 
therefore, a synthesis of ideas originating from institutional, strategic management and hybrid 
organisational studies. A literature map is presented in Figure 3.1, which also underpins the 
development of the conceptual framework of this study.  
 
Figure 3.1: Social enterprise and growth: mapping the relevant literatures 
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The literature review presented in Chapters 2 and 3 has informed the design of the 
conceptual framework for this study which is the taking-off point for examining the interplay of  
three constructs: i) institutional context; ii) the dual-value system of hybrid SEs; and iii) the 
functional level of resources and capabilities. While the institutional context represents the 
macro level factors, the other two constructs (i.e. the value system and resources and 
capabilities) aim to capture the enterprise/micro level factors. The institutional influences are 
identified and categorised drawing upon the typology of Scott (1995). It should be noted, 
however, that institutional logics are ‘intertwined’ and ‘nested’ in hybrid organisations 
(Besharov & Smith, 2014) meaning that a clear categorisation of regulatory, normative and 
cultural-cognitive institutions may be problematic in this case. The empirical section of this 
study will explore the usefulness of Scott’s typology in categorising the pluralistic institutional 
influences within hybrid SEs. 
One of the micro/enterprise level construct in the framework draws on the dual values 
(social and economic) that drive the strategies in hybrid SEs as suggested in previous studies 
(e.g. Smith & Lewis, 2011; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The other enterprise level construct 
involves the resources and capabilities of SEs, with reference to the resource and capabilities 
based view (Barney, 1991; Ray et al, 2004). In sum, the review of literature suggests that the 
influences from different institutional domains can shape the way SEs can pursue their dual goals 
and can be the cause of their internal tensions. The SEs may adopt different strategies to respond 
to the institutional influences through mobilisation of resources and capabilities in a particular 
manner and thus cope with internal tensions. The responses may drive SEs to a range of possible 
growth paths, which are analysed based on the theoretical insights from institutional 
isomorphism, neo-institutional view and mixed institutional logics. Overall, the interplay 
between these institutional/macro and enterprise/micro aspects are examined in this thesis. To 
this end, the study seeks to contribute to the broader conversation of the interplay between 
structure and agency, while also incorporating the notion of hybridity in the framework.  
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Figure 3.2: A conceptual framework for explaining SE growth 
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Chapter 4: Overview of the SE sector in Bangladesh 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a long history of NGOs and SEs contributing to the economic and social 
development of Bangladesh. The world’s largest hybrid NGO – Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) – originated in Bangladesh (Ahmed et al., 2012). With the new revolution of 
the social business model promoted by Professor Yunus, an alternative to poverty reduction and 
job creation has come to dominate recent debates around SE (Yunus Centre, 2013). This sector 
in Bangladesh is diverse in terms of organisational forms and the approaches adopted (Mair & 
Marti, 2009). Most SEs can be broadly situated along a continuum that runs from primarily 
economic activities, such as service delivery (e.g. in health, education, sanitation, etc.) or credit 
and income generation, to more radical approaches which seek to mobilise and empower the 
poor (Lewis, 2004). The institutional environment in which SEs are embedded in Bangladesh has 
undergone several phases of change and reform, which have shaped the patterns of growth and 
the process of institutionalisation, bureaucratisation and professionalization (Feldman, 2003; 
Mohiuddin et al., 2014).  
Drawing upon existing literatures and secondary data, the chapter examines the 
regulatory and social institutions surrounding SEs in Bangladesh. In so doing, the chapter first 
identifies and describes the main policies and institutions relevant to SEs and second  analyses 
the way in which policies and institutional frameworks have influenced the forms and activities 
of SEs.  
 The next section (4.2) describes the evolution of NGO-state relationships in 
Bangladesh and subsequent patterns of SE growth. Section 4.2 discusses the legal framework, 
regulatory bodies and support institutions affecting the country’s SE sector. Section 4.3 reviews 
the socio-cultural environment of social enterprises in Bangladesh. 
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4.2 The nature and scale of SEs in Bangladesh 
A number of studies suggest that the social sector in Bangladesh is one of the most 
sophisticated national development networks in the world (Devine, 2003; White, 2000: 308). 
According to NGOAB (2014), since 1970 the number of NGOs in Bangladesh has increased 
from 40 to 22,000. This includes registered microfinance institutions, developmental NGOs and 
non-registered societies, such as clubs, associations and credit associations, most of which 
provide services in remote villages.  
According to the World Bank (2006), by 2003 almost 90 percent of the villages in 
Bangladesh had at least one NGO. In a sample of 720 NGOs, the organisation found that 90 
percent were small NGOs having operations in less than five districts (out of 64) and just two 
(i.e. BRAC and ASA) had branches in all districts. Gauri and Galef (2005) suggest that larger 
NGOs mostly operate through a branch/headquarters structure, with few found to be operating 
stand-alone and only serving local communities. Some of the most dominant NGOs in terms of 
reach, impact and resource ownership are BRAC, ASA, Grameen Foundation, Proshika and 
Caritas.  
According to the World Bank (2006), in 2003 an estimated 92 percent of NGOs 
provided microcredit as a service, and most provided healthcare as well as sanitation 
employment and education. The study also suggests that 93 percent of NGOs were attempting to 
raise public awareness of sanitation, health issues and nutrition.  
The first pilot experiments in microcredit services started at the end of the 1970s 
(Ahmed 2009). However, after the end of liberation war in 1971 the priority of NGOs shifted to 
relief and rehabilitation, as this was urgently needed by the war-torn country. During the 1980s, 
with the success of Grameen Bank, many NGOs started to provide social services through micro-
credit. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, several exclusive micro-finance institutes (MFIs) 
that were registered as NGOs started their operations and introduced innovative financial 
products with the objective of poverty alleviation. An overview of the NGOs sector is 
summarized in Table 4.1. 
The growth pattern of SEs in Bangladesh has progressed through four phases. After the 
country’s independence NGOs were primarily funded by western donors (Matin & Taher, 2001). 
From 1971 to 1975, the major focus and activities of NGOs was limited to relief and 
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rehabilitation of war torn Bangladesh. From 1975 to 1990, during the military period, focus 
changed to developmental activities while also continuing to target relief and rehabilitation. Over 
20 years after independence, NGO’s activities were mostly limited to implementing the priorities 
and ideas of donors which tended to lack strategic integration or coordination with NGO’s own 
ideas and vision (Stiles, 2002: 837). 
 
Table 4.1: Overview of NGO sector in Bangladesh 
Topic Facts and Figures 
First NGO in 
Bangladesh 
Gono Shastya was an NGO that started its operation with a mobile medical unit providing 
support to freedom fighters in 1971 (Zohir, 2004) 
Number of NGOs Since 1970, the number of NGOs in Bangladesh has increased from 40 to 22,000. This 
number includes registered microfinance institutions, developmental NGOs, and non-
registered societies, such as clubs, associations and credit associations (NGOAB, 2014) 
Trend of donor 
funding  
In 1989 donor funds accounted for 94% of all NGOs income sources. This reduced to 35% 
in 1999 (Thornton et al., 2000) 
Proliferation of 
NGOs 
By 2003, almost 90 percent of villages in Bangladesh had the presence of at least one 
NGO. Among these 90 percent are small NGOs with operations in less than five districts 
(out of 64) and just two large NGOs (BRAC and ASA) had branches in all districts 
(World Bank, 2006) 
Governance 
structure  
NGOs mostly operate through a branch/headquarter structure in which branches have 
limited autonomy. Few small NGOs operate stand-alone by only serving their respective 
local communities (Gauri & Galef, 2005) 
Activity pattern Highest number of NGO projects approved in health following the education sector. 
(NGOAB, 2011) 
Awareness raising 
activities 
93% of NGOs attempt to raise public awareness related to the three most common 
subjects: sanitation, health issues and nutrition (World Bank, 2006) 
 
During the early 1990s, after democracy was restored, a second major shift in the 
Bangladeshi social economy occurred through the development of a partnership between the 
government and NGOs and MFIs in the delivery of social services (White, 2000: 308). Gauri and 
Galef (2005) found that the majority of NGOs from their sample group were involved in some 
sort of partnership with the government, mostly with the Ministry of Social Welfare followed by 
the Ministry of Women’s and Children’s Affairs, the Ministry of Health and Planning, and the 
Ministry of Education. As Zohir (2004:4112) comment: “disguised in such partnership was the 
seed of a new type of SEs, initially working on contracts to deliver certain services”. During this 
period the focus of NGOs’ activities thus shifted from implementing the ideas of donors to 
implementing the priorities of government. For example, the Slum Improvement Project, run by 
the municipalities and the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED), employed 
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NGOs to train local community health and sanitary workers (Water Aid) (Zohir, 2004: 4112). 
NGO-government partnership is still a dominant growth approach in the social enterprise sector 
of Bangladesh. Accordingly, recent data shows that the NGOAB approved its highest number of 
NGO projects in the health and education sector, an area where the government puts most of its 
priority and seeks NGO participation.  
The third major change in the social economy has been the introduction by NGOs of 
different revenue generating activities in order to ensure their own financial sustainability (World 
Bank, 2006). As Devine (2003) argued, “the new competition is all about sustainability” 
(p.231). Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a reduction in funding from both 
donors and the government (Khandker, 1998), which resulted in NGOs thinking about alternative 
approaches to increase their financial self-reliance and introduce their own revenue generating 
activities.  
 
4.2.1 The new generation of SEs in Bangladesh 
The financial pressures exerted on NGOs have encouraged them to seek alternative 
models to address social problems. There has been a movement to integrate conventional 
business elements to the operations of NGOs. Mohiuddin et al. (2014) identify social 
campaigners, such as Sir Fazle Hasan Abed of BRAC and Professor Yunus of Grameen, as 
setting examples for NGOs of how to approach social problems with more creative, 
unconventional and sustainable approaches, including the integration of conventional business 
models. Each of these new forms of enterprise has a strong social motive embedded in their 
culture and values, and are run as conventional enterprises. In some cases they are even 
registered legally within the conventional framework governing the sector (Sardana, 2013; 
Yunus et al., 2010). The integration of a more business oriented approach has enabled large 
NGOs, such as Grameen and BRAC, to move away from donor dependency and adopt a more 
self-sustainable model, setting an example for other NGOs and SEs (Yunus, 2011). 
Given the institutional context and related changes to decrease a donor dependency 
culture, and seeing the success of Grameen and BRAC, a growing number of NGOs have chosen 
a pragmatic path: adopting a less ‘political’ approach in order to avoid antagonising the 
government and/or jeopardising their relationships with the donors (Sardana, 2013). At the same 
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time, with increasing competition around funding sources, many existing NGOs had started their 
own income generating activities. For instance, BRAC’s Aarong, a retail outfit, sells  products 
stitched by rural women to urban elites and foreigners. Delta BRAC housing society, BRAC 
bank and BRAC University are just some of BRAC’s commercially oriented activities, the 
revenue from which supports its traditional service delivery initiatives (BRAC, 2012).  
Some emerging SEs have adopted a ‘small is beautiful’ and ‘go it alone’ approach to 
exert real change and poverty alleviation through social mobilisation, focusing on addressing 
deeply rooted problems in specific communities rather than aiming for general coverage rates. 
Given the institutional context, they are likely to be operating individually instead of following 
the growth path of traditional service delivery NGOs (Yunus et al., 2010). For instance, Grameen 
Danone is financially self-sustaining and helping to address the nutritional requirements of the 
poor through its fortified yogurt, while simultaneously creating employment for individuals 
(Rodrigues & Baker, 2012).   
The founder of Grameen Bank, Professor Yunus, is regarded as a strong campaigner of 
this new model for NGOs and calls it ‘social business’. Yunus defined social business as “a non-
loss, non-dividend company dedicated entirely to achieving social goals, an investor cannot take 
profit out of it but they can take out their initial investment”. Since 2010, Yunus has been one of 
the front runners in promoting the concept of social business as an alternative to conventional 
approaches to employment creation, poverty reduction and achieving social and economic goals. 
The concept of social business allows an enterprise to run as a conventional enterprise, in some 
cases even registered within a conventional business framework, yet the core element of the 
enterprise is self-sustainability achieved through trading in the market and through the fulfilment 
of social goals (Yunus et al., 2010). Grameen Danone, Grameen Veolia and Grameen Intel are 
just some of the social business ventures of the organisation that have been operating in 
Bangladesh since the late 2000s (Yunus Centre, 2013). 
The SE philosophy and business model has also been promoted by BRAC through its 
creation of successful SE ventures, such as Aarong and BRAC Aarong Dairy. Despite being the 
largest NGO in the world, BRAC has moved away from the conventional donor dependency to a 
self-sustainable approach that operates an enterprise and fulfils a social goal (BRAC, 2015).   
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4.3 Regulatory institutions and SE behaviour 
This section reviews what is known about the main regulatory influences and their 
potential to influence the nature of SEs in Bangladesh. The section includes what is known about 
the process through which most SEs in Bangladesh have adapted their behaviour in line with 
various social and institutional pressures.  
 
4.3.1 The history of public policy: from conflict to cooperation and coordination 
The NGO movement in Bangladesh is strongly associated with the responses to a series 
of major incidents during the 1970s, all of which had catastrophic outcomes for large numbers of 
people and for the country’s infrastructure. These include the cyclone in 1970, the liberation war 
in 1971 and the famine in 1974. During these incidents NGOs contributed significantly as 
partners of the government in its efforts to rebuild the country’s social and physical fabric by 
participating in relief and rehabilitation activities. An important transition occurred between 
1978 and 1980, when NGOs shifted their focus from relief and rehabilitation to social 
transformation aims. They started questioning the problems seen as more ‘socially embedded’ 
(cf. Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990), notably gender inequality, and the highly uneven distribution of 
resources and wealth (Kabeer et al., 2012; Zohir, 2004). Examples include the work of Nijera 
Kori in facilitating and legitimising the collective actions of poor farmers against exploitations 
by local elites, Proshika’s focus on improving agricultural productivity through the sharing of 
water rights, and Grameen Bank’s efforts to empower poor women through its microcredit 
programme (Rahman, 2006). With support from various international donor funds, these NGOs 
attempted to address social discrimination as reinforced by local elites and state bureaucrats. 
These socially and state imposed constraints were seen as inhibiting the potential for purposive 
economic reorganisation. Some NGOs also lent support to the democracy movements that 
opposed the dictatorship of General Ershad in the 1990s, particularly through their efforts to 
raise awareness on the meaning of democracy, the importance of citizen empowerment and 
freedom of vote (Ismail, 2012; Lewis, 2011).  
NGOs’ efforts to promote themselves as an alternative force for stimulating economic 
change and social justice, and their heavy dependency on foreign aid, have resulted in them 
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being perceived as anti-government and a threat to state-directed developmental activities. This 
growing perception amongst those in power has contributed to a worsening relationship between 
NGOs and the state. NGO-state relational tensions led to a less cooperative stance on the part of 
the government and public support institutions towards the SE sector (Lewis, 2011).  
There is evidence to suggest that conflictual relations with the state have significantly 
restricted the growth of the NGO sector since late 1980 (e.g. Buse, 1999; Matin & Taher, 2001). 
Many projects have been cancelled, new proposals not approved, increased bureaucratic 
constraints imposed by the state, the  registrations of many existing NGOs have been cancelled, 
and there has been increased scepticism on the part of the government towards the utilisation of 
foreign funds. In attempting to overcome these institutional challenges, most NGOs started to 
shift away from projects and services that could be perceived as critical of the policies of the 
military government (Matin & Taher, 2001). There was thus a shift away from activities focused 
on social mobilisations to supporting the government by adopting a narrower approach focused 
on implementing state sanctioned developmental projects (Hasnain, 2013). As a result of the 
strict governance and control imposed by the military government, the growth of NGOs and 
social organisations in Bangladesh was considerably slow during 1987 to 1990 (Kabeer et al., 
2012).  
In 1990, General Ershad’s government was toppled as a result of a public protest 
movement led by the coalition of the Bangladesh Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party, the two main opposition parties. After the fall of the military government, the whole 
country went through a period of dramatic change, with many new projects and initiatives being 
undertaken by the newly elected government to foster economic development. It was during this 
time that NGOs and social organisations experienced greater freedom and levels of cooperation 
from policy makers, with the government recognising the need to enrol NGOs, social 
organisations and civil society in support of economic growth (Tasnim, 2014). Therefore, many 
of the large first generation NGOs, such as BRAC, Proshika and Gono Shasthya, were no longer 
treated by the government and the elites as a threat to national projects, but rather as central 
players in carrying forward state vision.  
As a result, the large NGOs established almost 12,000 new branches in the form of 
small, regional organisations as part of their collaboration with government departments on 
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social and developmental projects in rural Bangladesh, which were mostly in primary health and 
education (Arifeen et al., 2013). This process of organisational expansion and institutionalisation 
was further promoted by the various lobbying activities of NGO leaders, who were able to build 
strong relationships with key state bureaucrats and links to international networks. Through their 
strong positions, family and educational backgrounds and solid contacts with government and an 
international community of scholars and donors, NGO leaders were successful in lobbying the 
government for policy changes, increased institutional support and the strengthening of co-
operative relations with the state (Hulme, 2013). 
However, since late 2000s there has been an increase in tensions between the state and 
civil society organisations, including NGOs and SEs. Central to these tensions has been a dispute 
between Professor Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank, and the current government. At the heart 
of the dispute are conflicting interpretations of Grameen Bank’s strategy, with a government 
review committee concluding in 2011 that since Grameen was created under a special law, while 
it was a statutory public authority, it remained a government bank. In contrast, Yunus contended 
that Grameen was an independent specialised bank, which, according to its founding charter, is 
run by its board of directors and not by the government. Grameen’s employees do not take their 
salaries from the government budget, and therefore should not be considered as public servants. 
This dispute is also attributed to the heavy involvement of Professor Yunus in party politics. He 
made an open declaration to contest the election of 2008, although later pulled back his 
candidacy for unexplained reasons. Professor Yunus’ declaration at that time made him a 
potential political foe for the current government, with these tensions continuing because of his 
current association and open endorsement of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) a major 
opposing political force. This has once again created a dark cloud on both the micro-finance 
sector and the wider social business/enterprise sector in Bangladesh (Al-Mahmood, 2012).  
The current government outlined a comprehensive economic plan titled “Vision 2021” 
in its election manifesto in 2008 and a group of NGOs are now regarded as important partners in 
the achievement of this vision. As the country celebrates its golden jubilee of independence in 
2021, the state envisions providing happy and prosperous lives for all citizens by this date. The 
visions include providing citizens with assurance of social justice, environmental protection, 
human rights and equal opportunities. Vision 2021 aims to transfer Bangladesh into a middle 
income country where poverty will be drastically reduced, citizens will be able to meet every 
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basic need and developments in support of these aims will be fast tracked. The government has 
particularly focused on increasing rates of inclusive economic growth in order to successfully 
implement these visions (BOI Bangladesh, 2015).  Government support is made available to 
those NGOs who are seen as contributing most to the Vision 2021 pathways (Chowdhury et al., 
2013; NGOAB, 2011). Therefore, NGOs are increasingly participating in projects in partnership 
with government, with health and education being the main sectors where most partnership 
projects are in progress (NGOAB, 2011).  
Table 4.2: Phases of SE growth in Bangladesh 
Period Focus of SE Type of SE Source of funding NGO-government 
relationship 
1971 to 
1975 
(post 
liberation 
war) 
Relief and 
rehabilitation of war-
torn Bangladesh 
 Short-term 
emergency 
project based 
 Purely non-profit  
Mainly donors NGOs are initially 
perceived to be 
contributing significantly 
and attracting foreign aid 
1975 to 
1990 
(military 
regime) 
Mainly developmental 
activities along with 
relief and 
rehabilitation 
 Mostly project 
based 
 Few big NGOs 
start long-term 
programme 
based activities 
 Mostly non-
profit 
Mainly donors Government see NGOs 
as threat to its power and 
authority, and as agents 
of foreign power 
1990 to 
1999 
(democratic 
Bangladesh) 
Mainly developmental 
in health and 
education sectors; 
limited micro-finance 
activities 
 Both project and 
programme 
based 
 Mostly non-
profit but some 
revenue 
generating 
activities 
Mainly donors and 
partnerships with 
government 
Relationship with 
government starts to 
improve; several 
partnership contracts are 
made between NGOs 
and the government 
1999 to 
early 2000 
(democratic 
Bangladesh) 
Primarily micro-
finance; other types of 
revenue generating 
activities with social 
aim 
 Non-profit and 
quasi-
commercial 
NGOs 
 Emergence of 
for-profit SEs 
Donor and government 
funds reduce; more 
focus on financial self-
reliance from service 
charges and sales  
Government sees SEs as 
partners of its 
development activities 
and expects their 
participation active 
2007 to 
present 
Social inclusion and 
empowerment; 
poverty alleviation 
 New breed of 
SEs namely 
‘social business’ 
promoted by 
Yunus 
Primarily rely on 
trading revenue and 
service charges 
Tension between Yunus 
government- sees social 
businesses as pro-Yunus 
and anti-government 
Promotion of projects 
adhering to ‘Vision 
2021’  
 Traditional 
NGOs converted 
to quasi-
commercial 
structure 
Combination of grants 
and trading revenue 
Government supports 
SEs and sees them as 
partners 
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While the emergence of partnership projects has improved NGO-state relationships, 
they have stimulated a specific growth pattern among NGOs that may potentially inhibit the 
implementation of inclusive growth. Lewis (2013) identifies that NGOs in Bangladesh have now 
become more narrowly focused on generic coverage rates and measurable outcomes – with a 
reduced emphasis on activities in support of outcomes that are harder to measure – including 
long-term commitments to social change. The increased pressure to conform has driven the 
sector to deliver services to the government that produce easily measurable results and coverage 
rates (Lewis, 2013). For this reason, many larger NGOs have tended to avail their services to 
those areas that have better infrastructure provision, such as transport, and a higher mobility of 
targeted beneficiaries. This approach has not necessarily involved the marginal poor population 
living in the more remote villages. In addition, being constrained by a lack of mobility, poor 
people have difficulty in accessing the services provided by the majority of NGOs (Fruttero & 
Gauri, 2007). This rising concern is further evidenced by NGOAB’s own data which shows that 
1,152 (60 percent) of NGOs operate in the Dhaka district (i.e. the capital city and its suburbs) 
(NGOAB, 2011). The evolution of NGO-state relations and subsequent effect on SE growth is 
summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
4.3.2 The current legal framework governing NGOs and SEs in Bangladesh  
This section focuses on the current legal framework governing the social sector in 
Bangladesh and the evidence relating to its impact on SEs’ behaviour and growth.  In order to 
leverage the partnership between NGOs and the state in 1990, the newly elected government 
established an NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB) to operate directly under the Prime Minister’s 
Office. NGOAB is responsible for monitoring the activities of NGOs, ensuring the proper 
utilisation of foreign funds, and supporting their growth and contribution to the country’s 
economy. As defined by NGOAB, an NGO is a non-governmental and non-profit organisation of 
Bangladesh with social and developmental goals to identify and address social problems. The 
regulations of  NGOAB allow NGOs to collect external funds from individual donors or donor 
institutions within the stipulated rules and regulations.  
NGOAB operates under The Foreign Donations Regulation Ordinance 1978 and The 
Foreign Contributions Ordinance 1982, under which all NGO projects/services and foreign 
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donations are subject to a strict approval process. Bangladeshi NGOs have to renew their 
registration every five years by submitting details of their financial statements, reports on 
projects and annual meetings. Non-renewal of their registration may follow from insufficient 
transparency and/or poor outcomes on their funded projects, which can lead to cancellation of 
their registration. The NGOAB only approves the release of foreign funds based on its 
assessment of the quality and viability of proposals submitted by NGOs and how they intend to 
utilise the funds. In addition to approval from NGOAB, NGOs require permission from district 
level authorities before they are able to implement the funds. On completion of every project, the 
NGOAB audits the financial performance and the impact of the project, providing certifications 
based on the audit results. NGO leaders and employees are also required to seek approval from 
the NGOAB to participate in foreign seminars and workshops. Moreover, the regulations state 
that any kind of reported corruption, lack of transparency or lack of accountability will result in 
the cancellation of registration and further punishment (NGOAB, 2011). 
According to the amendment of NGOAB regulations in 2006, NGOs are now required 
to prepare annual reports on their activities within three months of the end of the financial year 
and send copies to the NGOAB, the relevant Ministry, Divisional Commissioner(s), Deputy 
Commissioners and the Bangladesh Bank. The state may, at any time, inspect the accounts and 
other documents of these NGOs. It may also require them to submit a declaration as notified in 
the official gazette. Failure by the NGO to produce any accounts or other documents, or indeed 
failure to furnish any statement or information, is a contravention of state regulations. The 
accounts must be audited by the persons appointed by the organisation or persons 
enlisted/approved by  NGOAB. Audit reports must then be submitted to the NGOAB within two 
months of the end of the financial year. The NGOAB also inspects field level activities of NGO 
workers (NGOAB, 2011).  
On a positive note, there is evidence to suggest that the legal framework and rigorous 
accountability requirements of the state has served to increase the transparency of  NGO 
activities and enhanced professionalism in their approach (Chowdhury et al., 2013). For instance, 
NGOAB claims that the laws on renewal and auditing have enabled it to identify and root out 
corrupt practices in NGOs. In 2010, the NGOAB cancelled 585 registrations for failure to 
produce satisfactory audit results during renewal (NGOAB, 2011). However, a report published 
by the World Bank (2006) suggests that the current legal framework governing the social sector 
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has had a number of negative consequences for SE growth. The stringency of regulations has 
increased the operational complexity for NGOs, the power and interference of the state, and the 
potential for excessive bureaucracy and public corruption (World Bank, 2006). The World Bank 
(2006) states that:    
 
“…the legal framework [for NGOs] is outdated, obsolete, with an over-abundance of 
laws and official agencies with limited capacity... Staffing at NGOAB has barely 
changed since 1990, even though the number of NGOs the agency is supposed to 
oversee has tripled. As a result, delays are common, financial reports are not 
scrutinized adequately, and basic data relating to foreign-funded NGOs are not 
maintained systematically... Laws relating to internal governance and financial 
accountability of NGOs are inadequate. The reporting and accounting burdens 
placed on NGOs are contradictory, and weak capacity means that regulators present 
a feeble deterrent against cases of poor internal governance.” (p.8) 
 
NGOAB has also been criticised for being ‘unjustifiably supportive’ to a number of 
larger NGOs. The Daily Star (2011), a local newspaper in Bangladesh, reported that some 
NGOAB- favoured NGOs have been able to avoid the bureaucracy and rely on their political 
connections to gain approval without the need to provide the requisite paperwork. In contrast, 
those NGOs engaging in social mobilisation programmes have found themselves to be subject to 
greater scrutiny. These NGOs have sought to challenge the more socially and politically 
embedded causes of poverty and seek structural transformation. For instance, their missions 
often involve female empowerment, political activism and raising the voice of the marginalised 
poor. Due to the very nature of their mission, they intervene directly within the political space 
that defines the status quo. As a consequence, they are perceived to be threatening the 
established relationships that support government parliament members and their patrons (i.e.with 
the local/rural elites) (Hasnain, 2013; Rahman, 2006). Therefore, government and NGOAB 
regulations have been used to regulate the behaviour of such NGOs, including suppressing 
actions relating to social mobilisation. Such a stance by the government and NGOAB raises 
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important questions around the extent to which the increased policy legitimisation of NGOs has 
been achieved at the cost of their ability to enhance their role in society.  
 
4.3.3 The institutional support environment for SEs in Bangladesh 
A number of institutions provide a range of support to NGOs, including both financial 
and non-financial support, such as information, advice and training. One of these is the NGO 
Foundation which provides information and advice to SEs, but their service is mostly targeted at 
traditional NGOs (NGOAB, 2014).  
In order to provide financial assistance to NGOs, the Bangladesh government created 
the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) or Rural Works Assistance Foundation. Sinceits 
creation in 1990, the PKSF has financed a large number of microcredit programmes run by 
NGOs (PKSF, 2015). Private commercial and agricultural banks also provide loans to NGOs, yet 
the (World Bank, 2006) observes that the use of commercial banks as a source of finance is still 
limited in the NGO sector and other more active sources include funding from foreign NGOs and 
welfare organisations (Haque, 2002). 
Another support institution is the Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), a non-profit 
and non-political research centre that promotes issues of importance to the private sector and 
seeks to initiate measures for enterprise development. BEI’s more recent interest has been in 
sustainable businesses and SEs, suggesting their potential source of increased information and 
advice for SEs (BEI, 2014). 
The Foundation for Development Cooperation (FDC) is also a support institution that 
conducts research, creates awareness, and assists in the developmental initiatives of SEs through 
partnership. The organisation mainly supports SEs through finance and logistics (FDC, 2012). 
Research Initiatives Bangladesh (RIB) is an non-governmental, non-profit research-
support organisation promoting research on poverty alleviation that is relevant, participatory and 
action-oriented, and also seeks to create the necessary conditions for such research. The studies 
of RIB can also be potential sources of information for NGOs (RIB, 2012). 
Most of the above institutions provide support to traditional NGOs. The Yunus Centre is 
currently the only institution providing financial and non-financial assistance to new generation 
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SEs, namely social businesses, working to create awareness about social businesses. The 
organisation maintains international communication and networking to arrange successful 
partnerships and funds facilities for social businesses. It also acts as a resource centre for existing 
and potential SEs that seek knowledge about social business principles. Furthermore, it 
undertakes research and delivers academic programmes, seminars and workshops in order to 
foster social business education (YunusCentre, 2015).  
In Bangladesh, the supporting institutions for SE are extremely resource constrained and 
are unable to meet the demand of support seekers (Bangladesh Social Enterprise Project, 2010a). 
Staffing at many of these institutions has barely changed since their inception and many skills 
are outdated, with most institutions not even equipped with computerised systems to store data 
(World Bank, 2006). A study conducted by Bangladesh Social Enterprise Project (2010b) on ‘the 
perception of SE in Bangladesh’ supports that the lack of awareness about the concept of SE is a 
potential barrier to future growth. The study reveals that there is no clear definition of SE, which 
creates ambiguity among potential entrepreneurs, policy makers and the general public. In 
addition, the study finds that 63 percent of respondents (including NGOs, government 
organisations, MNCs and local firms) have a moderate understanding and thus hold vague ideas 
about the concept (Bangladesh Social Enterprise Project, 2010b). Respondents felt that because 
of this ignorance, “support institutions are less cooperative” (p.37), and that few organisations 
are promoting this concept (Bangladesh Social Enterprise Project, 2010b).  
The BSEP study also identified an absence of institutions educating and preparing the 
labour market for jobs in the social sector, with the number of support institutions for training 
and skills development for social sector workers being limited. Therefore, social entrepreneurs 
and their teams often have limited skills in accounting, bookkeeping and business planning. 
Limited English language is also a barrier for entrepreneurs seeking to engage with overseas 
donors and multinational companies. Respondents in the study commented that the capacity 
development initiatives undertaken by supporting institutions were insufficient to meet their 
needs.  
This study identified a lack of institutions willing to finance SE activities as the third 
barrier to growth, and that funds provided by the government were not sufficient. Yet, 
respondents complained about the unwillingness of conventional banks to finance SEs and 
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micro-credit schemes. The World Bank (2006) suggested that such businesses are either owned 
or are somehow related to the poor who are vulnerable both as creditors and consumers. 
Therefore, financing a business which focused on the lower end of the market could be 
considered risky. Even if the products of a SE are aimed at affluent customers, risk still remains 
high as the Bangladeshi market is not ready to accept such value-centred products with premium 
prices. Thus conventional banks have expressed concern about business failure and that such 
entrepreneurs are unable to supply adequate assets as collateral. In addition, micro-credit 
schemes are challenging for banks due to two reasons. First, poor peoples’ businesses are often 
not insured and second, these individuals are unable to save the money required for timely 
repayment of the loan. Therefore, banks and other financial institutions are reluctant to introduce 
micro-insurance and micro-saving for the less fortunate in society. 
Another potential problem identified by BSEP (2010b) is the lack of institutions 
working to reduce the information gap between SEs and the market by promoting network 
facilities. In the Bangladeshi context, an enterprise lacking connection to policy and business 
elites often lacks access to the social networks necessary to access new markets and relevant 
support. Wilson and Wilson (2006:9) argue that these connections are essential when searching 
for business opportunities, given that “poor people in developing countries could make excellent 
suppliers... but are often ignored by major businesses”. They also suggest that SEs have 
potential to be suppliers to multinational corporations searching for partners with a social vision, 
but due to a lack of liaison between these parties, barriers are sometimes created when forming 
partnerships and/or buyer-supplier relationships. There is a need for both private and public 
support for this through the creation of networking facilities to help connect organisations. 
However, the nature of institutional support for SEs may raise concerns over their growth.    
 
4.3.4 Accreditation and federation membership 
All of the major NGOs are members of the Association of Development Agencies in 
Bangladesh (ADAB), established in 1976 to coordinate, monitor, network and advocate through 
dialogue, round table discussion, and promotional publications and research to create an enabling 
environment for the NGO sector (ADAB, 2014). Under the umbrella of ADAB, larger NGOs 
have collectively lobbied the government for pro-NGO policies (Rahman, 2006). For instance, in 
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2005 ADAB filed a case against the five yearly renewal laws of NGOAB, which halted this 
process for five years (NGOAB, 2011).  
Previously, ADAB has also coordinated a Democracy Awareness Education Programme 
that criticised existing government policy and actions, securing a degree of legitimacy for a more 
ambitious socio economic agenda and the contribution of many smaller and more critical NGOs 
in the political sphere. In addition to institutional pressures against social mobilisation and 
political activism, there is a long standing and deep ideological unease among Bangladeshi elites 
regarding the role of NGOs in politics. Therefore, in recent years due to government intervention 
and a lack of institutional support, ADAB has adopted a less politicised and critical stance. For 
instance, as part of this process ADAB chose not to support the Gono Shahajjo Sangstha (GSS) 
in its mission to promote its landless group members as candidates for local union election. 
Similarly, it rejected an application from Proshika to promote their popular governance method 
and human rights to enable people to play a greater role in the democratic process, thus further 
isolating those organisations working for deeply rooted structural change (Rahman, 2006).      
Therefore, this policy context, involving a reassertion of the narrower aims and policy 
scope as observed during the Ershad regime of the 90s, has dented the will of many NGOs to 
pursue objectives that could be perceived by the government and supporting elites as overly 
related to social mobilisation.  
 
4.3.5 The Role of Donors 
The Bangladeshi SE sector has remained largely dependent on a range of 
western/international bilateral and multilateral donors. Many have collaborated with NGOs to 
design and implement their developmental initiatives, particularly as they have perceived NGOs 
to be a preferred alternative to the government due to their reach to the poor, relatively 
transparent approach and understanding of western cultures. Therefore, NGOs have been 
criticised by some for being overly influenced by donor policies and implementing a western-
dominated developmental discourse (Shiffman & Wu, 2003).  For instance, the growing 
influence of the concepts of micro-credit and entrepreneurship can be seen to be compatible with 
the dominance of a neoliberal policy framework. For instance, the concept of micro-credit and 
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entrepreneurship emerged in the early 1980s when there was a trend towards the privatisation of 
welfare. Donors shifted focus from projects underpinned by a more collective and interventionist 
approach that addressed inequality and development needs to one that favoured market-oriented 
micro-finance projects, where the latter emphasise individual rather than collective mechanisms 
of change (Yunus, 2003). Thus it is arguable that this new focus prioritised income generation 
for a relatively small number of entrepreneurial beneficiaries rather than creating sustainable 
employment for the majority of the poor (Ahmed et al., 2001). Accordingly, since the early 
1990s there has been a rapid growth of micro-financing institutes (MFI) (Feldman, 2003). For 
instance, Grameen Bank was one of the first to promote this ultimate ‘decentralisation and 
privatisation’ of welfare. Some studies (e.g. Rahman, 2006) argue that MFI failed to reach 
remote villages and provide loan facilities to those suffering extreme poverty. Moreover, the 
limited entrepreneurial skills and lack of support in training for MFI beneficiaries has 
contributed to the underutilisation of loans, further jeopardising their financial situation. Thus 
many NGOs, in the process of implementing donor dominated agendas, have failed to achieve 
legitimacy from local members (Rahman, 1999).  
The need for accountability to donors has further pushed NGOs to seek short-term 
easily measurable outputs (cf. Banerjee, 2008, 2014). For instance, most MFIs target lower risk 
individuals who are able to maintain weekly rates of return. While these loans yield high interest 
payment rates, they fix uniform repayment schedules regardless of the need to maintain their 
performance to donors (Feldman, 2003). Evidence suggests that many service delivery NGOs 
have also withdrawn resources from many marginal localities and programmes when they have 
failed to achieve the target coverage rates previously negotiated with donors. Furthermore, 
Shiffman and Wu (2003) argue that NGOs have tended to adopt a performance-oriented 
approach rather than a process-oriented one. This has also acted as a significant barrier to the 
growth of SEs focused on social mobilisation (Pearce, 2000).  
 
4.4 Tensions between society and SEs 
As discussed previously, SEs in Bangladesh have traditionally served as flagships for 
donor initiatives. More recently they have tended to adopt a more apolitical stance by carrying 
out service functions in close relation to national planning requirements (Lewis, 2011).  A 
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number of critics have argued that, in the process of incorporating donors’ requirements and 
government agendas, SEs have fallen behind in embracing the voices of civil society. Their quest 
for increased legitimacy with the government has adversely impacted on their ability to construct 
programmes that can alleviate social constrains in meaningful way  
It has been argued that a further contributing factor to the gap between civil society and 
NGOs is a disconnect NGO leaders with the people they profess to serve (Feldman, 2003; Lewis, 
2013). NGO leaders primarily originate from elite, urban and educated families, often having an 
educational and employment background abroad. NGO leaders share similar cultural and social 
class characteristics to those of and, arguably, donors and highly placed government officials 
tend to have a limited understanding of needs at a grassroots level in developing country contexts 
such as Bangladesh. In contrast, NGO employees who tend to come from a middle class 
background but nevertheless have affiliations with family villages, tend to have more affinity 
towards the realisation about people’s needs and interests. However, their need for economic 
security and respect for hierarchical tradition often reduces their willingness to challenge 
organisational leadership and donor interests. This results in an increasing gap between SEs and 
civil society, and could be a potential source of tension in the social sector (Lewis, 2013).   
The tension between civil society and SEs has also been fuelled by SEs stance against 
certain socio-cultural norms and values. There are examples where NGOs have been found to be 
going against the socially embedded traditions of Bangladesh. For instance, according to 
religious and traditional social values in Bangladesh, women are obligated to practice purdah, 
undertake sole responsibility for housework and child rearing, and respect the male dominated 
hierarchy in the family. NGOs have found that these values exclude women from access to 
education, health care and the labour market, resulting in some of them adopting a critical stance 
towards such social and religious values. On the one hand, NGOs’ programmes have enhanced 
women’s empowerment by providing them with greater decision-making authority. On the other 
hand, however, Ahmed et al. (2001) found that such programmes have also affected the 
emotional and even physical well-being of women in the process of coping with a situation that 
goes against societal values.  In addition, Kabeer et al. (2012) found that women’s participation 
in a micro-financing programme caused family tensions in rural villages, with men feeling 
threatened by a ‘loss of control’. 
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Furthermore, the patron-client relationship is a social norm in Bangladesh originating 
from the country’s hierarchical social structure. When Nijera Kori, a Bangladeshi NGO, 
introduced its programmes to empower landless farmers by leasing land and agricultural support 
to them, they faced protest from landowners. These landowners previously used to be the patrons 
of the landless farmers, and experienced the NGO’s programmes to be threatening to their 
position and  the traditional social class system. They therefore constrained the NGO’s activities 
through violent acts, including setting fires in the NGO’s offices and harassing staff (Feldman, 
2003).  
Such experiences demonstrates that the extent to which SEs in Bangladesh have been 
able to incorporate social institutions in their policies and activities, and thus develop capabilities 
to build leverage on their socio-political embeddedness, is open to question and a key issue 
requiring further research.      
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the evidence relating to the influence of regulatory and social 
institutions on SEs in Bangladesh. The regulatory environment of the country is shown to be 
characterised by complex monitoring practices and lack of positive support. The relationship 
between NGOs and the state has evolved along a trajectory from conflict to greater co-operation. 
The nature of this relationship has influenced the focus and type of SEs to have emerged. SEs 
were also found to be adopting operational models and projects to achieve legitimacy from the 
government and donors.  
A series of tensions are found to arise from the critical stance of many SEs towards a 
number of societal norms and values such as, treatment of women, and religious extremism. 
Overall, the chapter indicates how a number of influences from the regulatory and social 
institutions appear to have shaped SE growth. This understanding will be further developed in 
the empirical work conducted for this study.  
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Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
The choice of any research method needs to be appropriate to the phenomenon under 
investigation. This study examines how SEs in Bangladesh grow with respect to the role of their 
resources and capabilities, and how they relate to the opportunities and constraints posed by their 
institutional context. Drawing upon the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3, this 
chapter sets out the methodological dimensions for the study by adopting a qualitative multiple 
case study approach collecting data from face-to-face interviews and organisational documents.  
This chapter, therefore, presents the detailed study design, including the methods 
adopted and justification for choosing them. The chapter comprises four main sections. The first 
sets out the research philosophy and strategy adopted, the second outlines the sampling strategy, 
the third presents the overall methodology for addressing each of the research questions, and the 
final section describes the data analysis method.  
  
5.2 Research approach and strategy 
The three research questions and sub-questions of the thesis are:  
RQ1: What is the nature of SE growth in Bangladesh? 
RQ1a: What are the different types of SEs in Bangladesh? 
RQ1b: What are the forms of growth adopted by the studied SEs? 
RQ2: How does institutional context influence SE growth in Bangladesh? 
RQ3: What role do SEs’ resources and capabilities play in responding to the institutional 
influences? 
Given the complexity and multi-level nature of the research questions addressed, a 
qualitative approach has been selected as appropriate for the development of in-depth insight. A 
quantitative approach allows examination of the problem at a surface level rather than digging 
deep to find causes (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Due to the nature of the study topic, it is necessary to 
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gain an in-depth understanding of the underlying factors that shape SE growth. It was important 
to get close to participants in order to uncover their internal logics and interpret their 
understanding in real terms (cf. Yin, 2012). For instance, in order to analyse the nature of SE 
growth (RQ1), it is important to explore the views of the SE leaders/manager about how they 
seek to pursue their social and economic goals. For addressing RQ2, an understanding on the 
regulatory institutional influences is required which can appropriately explored through knowing 
the experiences of relevant actors. Similarly, due to the abstractness of the normative and 
cultural-cognitive institutions, understanding requires the discovery of respondents’ feelings and 
emotions towards these influences. Investigating the resources and capabilities in organisations 
and managerial tensions (i.e. for addressing RQ3) also necessitates micro-level analysis. 
Therefore, considering the level of analytical depth required to address all the three research 
questions this study adopts a qualitative research strategy.  
Furthermore, the study adopted a multiple case study approach is utilised to enable a 
deep understanding of the phenomenon under research and interpreted the respondents’ 
experiences and beliefs in their own terms and contexts (Gilmore & Carson, 1996). The study 
investigated the institutional environment surrounding the Bangladeshi social sector and 
examined how SEs internally organise their resources and capabilities to respond to institutional 
influences. Such issues are all considered sensitive to the context of the organisation. In this 
respect, Yin (2012) suggests that the distinctiveness of the case study is that it is  
 
“…an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon set within its real-
world context – especially, when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” (p.18) 
  
Therefore, a case study approach allowed the issues to be examined in a real-world 
context and facilitated in-depth analysis and understanding. The study selected 11 SEs, including 
deliberately contrasting cases to bring about more confidence in the findings. Multiple-case 
analysis enabled cross-case comparisons and helped to find patterns and themes to aid theoretical 
contribution (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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In short, the research approach and the strategy presented in this section are designed to 
fit the nature of the issues set out in the conceptual framework and to address the research 
questions. The next section will discuss the unit/focus of analysis, sampling techniques and other 
related issues.  
 
5.3 Unit of analysis and sampling 
The ‘organisation’ is set as the unit of analysis in this thesis. In order to select the 
appropriate cases, an online directory published by NGOAB listing all the SEs registered under 
NGOAB has been used. At stage-1 of the sampling process, categories were established for the 
selection of SEs from the directory and a list of SEs based on those categories was generated. At 
stage -2, purposeful sampling was done to ensure that SEs from all categories are selected. This 
two stage process generated an initial list of 52 SEs. Email invitations were sent to each of these 
SEs. After a number of email and telephone reminders, only three SEs provided consent to 
participate. The researcher had to use his personal connections to arrange access so that a variety 
of SEs covering all the sub categories in the NGOAB directory can be included in the sample. At 
the end, eleven SEs agreed to provide access. Table 5.1 shows the SEs included in the study in 
their respective categories according to the sampling criteria and as derived from the directory of 
NGOAB. Table-5.2 also includes a brief overview of the profile characteristics of the cases 
studied. 
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Table 5.1: Selection criteria for recruiting SEs for the study 
Criteria Explanation Number of cases 
selected 
(total:11) 
Literature source (Basis of 
stratification) 
Type of 
registration 
 
Non-governmental 
development organisation 
(NGO) 
3 NGOAB (2014); Yunus 
Centre (2013) 
Microfinance and loan 2 
Social business 6 
Geographical 
coverage 
Urban based 4 NGOAB (2014) 
Rural based 6 
Mixed 1 
Size Small (i.e. <250 employees) 4 Gauri and Galef (2005) 
Large (i.e. >250 employees) 7 
Income 
Source 
Donation  1 Gauri and Galef (2005) 
Service fees/sale of goods  2 
Mixed income from donation 
and revenue 
8 
Focus Service delivery 3 Feldman (2003) 
Microcredit and loan 2 
Social mobilisation and 
empowerment 
6 
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Table 5.2: An overview of selected cases and interviewees 
 
 
Topic/ 
Selected SE  
Bangladesh 
Protibondhi 
Foundation 
(BPF) 
Quasem 
Foundation 
Phulki Association for 
Social 
Advancement 
(ASA) 
Panther 
Social 
MIDAS 
financing 
Ltd 
Hathay 
Bunano 
BRAC 
AARONG 
Dairy 
Grameen 
Intel  
Grameen 
Telecom 
Trust 
Grameen 
Caledonian 
College of 
Nursing 
Type of 
organisation 
NGO NGO NGO Micro-finance Social 
business 
Finance Social 
business 
Social 
business 
Social 
business 
Social 
business 
Social 
business 
Geographical 
coverage 
Urban and 
rural 
Rural Urban Rural Urban Urban Rural Rural Rural Urban and 
rural 
Urban 
Size Large Large Small Large Small Large Large Large Large Large Small 
Source of 
income 
Donation Donation 
and service 
fees 
Donation 
and service 
fees 
Service fees Sale of 
goods and 
services 
Service 
fees 
Sale of 
goods 
Sale of goods Sale of 
goods 
Sale of goods Service fees 
Activities Healthcare of 
disabled 
Healthcare 
of Northern 
area 
population 
Child care 
for garments 
workers 
Microfinance 
for poverty 
reduction 
Savings 
opportunity 
for rickshaw 
pullers and 
income 
solution for 
rickshaw 
artists 
Small 
business 
financing 
Female 
employment 
in rural areas 
Creation of 
market for 
dairy 
producers in 
remote 
villages 
IT solutions 
for farmers 
Support 
services to 
social 
businesses 
Nursing 
education to 
Grameen 
Bank 
borrowers’ 
daughters 
Focus Service 
delivery 
Service 
delivery 
Social 
mobilisation 
Microfinance Social 
mobilisation 
Finance Social 
mobilisation 
Social 
mobilisation 
Social 
mobilisation 
Social 
mobilisation 
Service 
delivery 
No of 
interviewee 
Leader 
Employee 
Beneficiary 
 
 
2 
1 
4 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
2 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
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5.4 Data collection method 
Data was collected through face-to-face interviews and documentary analysis. Twenty-
five semi-structured interviews were conducted involving SE leaders/managers, government 
officers, officers from support institutions, and donors. The profiles of the respondents are 
presented in Table 5.3. The semi-structured interview was particularly appropriate for multiple 
case analysis as it facilitated both inter and intra-case comparison of the findings and produced 
‘analytic generalisations’ (Yin, 2012:18). The interview guide for the semi-structured interviews 
in this study included four main sections (a detailed interview guide can be found in Appendix 
B): A. Origin, aim and objectives; B. Opportunities for growing the organisation/How they are 
seeking to grow; C. Challenges and support needs; D. Internal governance; and E. 
Recommendations. 
 
Table 5.3: Data collection details 
Interview details Organisational documents considered 
Total interviews 31 (20 male, 11 female)  Policy documents collected from NGOAB 
 Publications and records of NGOAB  
 Publications and records of support institutes   
 SEs organisational records (i.e., annual reports, 
leaflets, etc.) 
 Media reports (i.e., newspaper articles, videos, etc.) 
 Interviews of any relevant actors on YouTube 
 Reports prepared by donors and partners of selected 
SEs 
SE leaders 12 (7 male, 5 female) 
Employees 6 (3 male, 3 female) 
Beneficiaries 9 (5 male, 4 female)  
Government 
officer 
1 (male) 
Support 
intuitions 
1 (female) 
Donors 2 (1 male, 1 female) 
 
All of these sections comprised open-ended and some close-ended questions and 
digressions into areas that related to the research questions. Some questions in these sections 
asked about the experiences of the interviewees regarding relevant issues, whereas others 
attempted to elicit the feelings and interpretations of interviewees. Yet, the list of questions was 
constantly adapted and modified to explore issues that emerged while interviewing. In a few 
cases follow-up interviews were conducted to explore issues further.  
The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder, which saved time during 
transcribing and translating, and increased accuracy. One of the interviewees did not allow this 
digital recording and his interview was recorded through note taking. Bryman and Bell (2011) 
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suggest that interviewees often end up talking about more controversial issues and express their 
feelings more comfortably when they realise that the atmosphere is informal and they know that 
their responses will not be recorded. Thus interviewees often talked comfortably about critical 
issues after the recorder was turned off and the researcher noted these points immediately after 
returning from the interview. 
In addition to these interviews, the beneficiaries of five SEs, ASA, BPF, Phulki, 
Quasem Foundation and Hathay Bunano, were interviewed as a group. The villagers were more 
comfortable participating in interviews in a group setting; for this reason, group interviews were 
conducted in this case. The topic guide used for beneficiaries’ interviews included: A. 
Background of the interviewees; B. Experience of working with a SE; and C. The local context 
and legitimacy (A detailed guide can be found in Appendix B) 
The study also involved analysis of relevant documentary sources, including 
organisational documents, media reports, publications by the government, and donors. The 
analysis of the documents involved reading through these thoroughly and identifying relevant 
information to support the data collected from interview, such as, examples, numeric figures and 
financial statements. The documents with a soft copy were uploaded on Nvivo for conducting the 
analysis in a structured manner. Those in print form were included in the Nvivo analysis by 
manually inserting notes and memos. The use of a multiple-methods approach allowed 
triangulation to take place, which enabled integration and comparison of the findings from 
different sources and issues that might otherwise have remained hidden from the researcher.   
 
5.5  The research questions and data collection 
This section sets out the specific data collection methods adopted for addressing each of 
the research questions. Organisational documents, such as annual reports and leaflets, 
contributed most of the data required to address RQ1a, while further clarification on missing 
information was also acquired during the interviews with the SE leaders and employees. Section-
A (on origin, aim and objective) and Section-D (on internal governance) of the interview guide 
for SE leaders/managers included questions that sought additional information to that. 
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The framework of SEs proposed by EMES Network (2013) was adopted in order to 
address this research question. The EMES framework points to four criteria: social mission, 
economic project, governance structure and institutional setting. In addition to the definitional 
criteria proposed by the EMES Network (2013), the current study considered ‘income source’, 
based on the SE definition suggested by Lyon and Sepulveda (2009), as a further analysis 
criteria. To this end, information on all these five criteria were collected from organisational 
documents and interviews.  
RQ1b was largely addressed using the interview data provided by SE leaders and top 
managers. The literature review suggested that hybrid SEs grow primarily by pursuing a social 
mission in combination with their economic goals (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Smith & Lewis, 
2011). Therefore, SE leaders and employees were asked about their strategies for pursuing their 
social mission and economic goals during the interview. Section-B in the interview guide 
included questions on these dimensions. Further clarification was gained from the analysis of the 
organisational documents. For instance, a number of interviewees said that they prefered to 
achieve their social goal by increasing the reach of their service and thus adopting expansion as a 
key strategy for growth. The interview evidence was supplemented by data collected from annual 
reports and data on their number of branches, employees, and benefactors. These numeric data 
confirmed that all the SE cases had actually grew through expansion of their service outlets. To 
this end, the key data to address this research question was collected from interviews of the SE 
leaders and top managers, with additional data collected from organisational documents to 
complement the findings. The views of SE leader or top managers were particularly significant 
in addressing this research question given their key role in setting the strategic direction for the 
growth of the organisation as compared to functional level employees. Thus the opinions of the 
founders, board members or chief operating officers was particularly relevant to identifying the 
nature of SEs’ growth.   
For addressing RQ2, SE leaders and top managers were interviewed to identify the 
challenges that they had experienced due to the institutional influences and also any support that 
they had received from those institutions. In this case as well, the views of leaders and top 
managers were of particular significance due to their awareness of policy and support related 
issues and the challenges experienced by their own organisation. Moreover, SE leaders had the 
most experience of communicating with the institutional actors and were often involved in the 
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same social/political networks with these actors. Section-C in the interview guide for SE 
leaders/managers included questions to address these issues.  
In total, three officers from NGOAB (the Chief of NGOAB) and Ministry of Social 
Welfare (two Secretaries) were contacted to include their views on the institutional and support 
environment surrounding SEs, although only, the Chief of NGOAB could be interviewed at the 
end as the other two officers were unwilling to participate. The key persons in the other private 
support institutions such as, Yunus Centre and Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), were also 
invited for interview and, of them, an officer from Yunus centre agreed to participate. While the 
opinions of the SE leaders aided understanding about the specific constrains faced by their own 
organisations, those of the representatives from public and private support institutions 
contributed insights on the challenges and opportunities shaping the social sector as a whole. The 
opinion of the representatives from these institutions provided insights that was relevant to 
examining how specific policies and regulatory requirements can give rise to internal tensions in 
SEs.  
Donors were also considered for interview in order to address this research question. 
Being the key sources of funds and other non-financial supports, donors can play critical role in 
shaping the challenges and opportunities faced by SEs. The demands of donors can conflict with 
those of government and also with SEs’ own goals, which can give rise to tensions within SEs. 
For this reason, the selected SEs were asked for permission to interview their donors. 
Unfortunately, however, only one SE (Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation) allowed and 
arranged access to two of their donors (UNICEF and Save the Children), while the others were 
highly resistant to this request. The interview with the donors aided the understanding of their 
work culture, preferences and experiences of the challenges and benefits faced while supporting 
the SE.  
The beneficiaries of selected SEs were also considered for interview in order to gain 
insights on the social institutions (i.e. the norms, culture and religious values in the society), their 
experiences of dealing with the SEs and their personal and social challenges. The interview with 
the beneficiary interviews allowed the study to gain insight into the tensions resulting from the 
demands originating from social institutions. While permission to interview their beneficiaries 
was sought from all eleven of the selected cases, only five (BPF, Quasem Foundation, Phulki, 
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ASA, Panther Social) agreed and made arrangements for this. Given that the villagers are often 
more comfortable talking collectively, they were interviewed in groups.  
For addressing RQ3, SE employees at the functional level along with their leaders/top 
managers were interviewed. While SE leaders are more knowledgeable about the strategic 
direction of the organisation, employees at the functional level (such as, marketing, human 
resources, accounting, and project management) have direct experience of how resources and 
capabilities are developed and mobilised within the organisation. For this reason, the insights of 
functional level employees aided the understanding of how tensions are managed at micro-level 
through the orchestration of resources and capabilities.  
In the interview guide prepared for SE leaders and employees, Section-C included 
questions on various challenges that could potentially cause tensions in SEs, and each of these 
questions was also followed by an inquiry about how those challenges were internally managed. 
This helped provide the data required to address the third research question.  
The SE leaders were asked to suggest which of their functional managers would be 
useful to interview in their organisation and also to arrange appointments accordingly. Among 
the eleven studied organisations, six SE leaders facilitated access to functional manager 
interviewees, while the others considered them to be highly focused on micro-level activities and 
thus thought that they would be able to provide sufficient insights on relevant questions.  
 
5.6 Data analysis method 
All of the 30 interviews were fully transcribed. Of these, eight were conducted in 
English and 22 were in Bengali language, with the latter being translated into English. In the 
second phase, the raw transcripts were then analysed using Nvivo software for the qualitative 
data analysis. A code guide was developed to conduct a cross-case comparison and the 
development of the coding followed a combination of inductive and deductive approaches. The 
coding guide is presented in Table 5.4. 
The first level codes were initially generated from the conceptual framework and 
literature review. The second stage involved the generation of level 2 codes that were inductively 
developed from the findings emerging from empirical data. The objective of the level 2 coding 
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was to add depth to the categories identified in the level 1 coding. The data inserted under code 
level two was compared for similarities and differences. This resulted in some of the coded data 
being discarded, while other codes were expanded. Familiar codes were pulled together into 
categories whereby each ‘slice of data’ (Shaw, 1999: 66) within a category displayed internal 
homogeneity. It was ensured that the categories identified at this level were sufficiently 
heterogeneous from each other.  
At the third stage, the analysis was deepened by associating interpretations to the 
structure that had emerged from the core categories of data identified in level 1 and 2 codes. At 
this phase a “cohesive integration of categories was made” (Shaw, 1999: 66). Therefore, level 3 
coding involved a process whereby categories were integrated and refined in order to identify the 
emerging themes (Sinkovics et al., 2008). This stage aided the identification of six operational 
types of SEs; two modes of advancing SE social goals and two modes for pursuing economic 
goals; a number of influencing institutional factors (originating from state, market, society, social 
sector, donors and family) influencing SEs growth and finally, the various resources and 
capabilities that SEs had developed and mobilised in the process of responding to institutional 
influences.   
The fourth stage involved the identification of managerial tensions, and related to this, 
comparisons of the different institutional influences (identified in level 3 coding) were made. A 
clear understanding of the relationship between different institutional influences was therefore 
developed and competing influences was identified with respect to each case. Instances of the 
presence of competing institutional pressures were searched from interviewees’ comments. SE’s 
responses to such tensions in terms of mobilising resources and capabilities were also identified 
from interview data. These tensions were then compared across the cases. This resulted in the 
identification of ten tension types found to be evident within and across the cases. 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), qualitative researchers have identified four major 
factors for determining the quality of such studies: i) external reliability, ii) internal reliability, 
iii) internal validity, and iv) external validity. External reliability refers to “the degree to which a 
study can be replicated” (Bryman & Bell, 2011:410). The initial conceptual framework, the use 
of interview guides and a well-developed coding schedule all make this study repeatable by 
future researchers. The study, however, is disadvantaged with respect to internal reliability (i.e., 
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when there exists more than one observer and members of the research team agree about what 
they see and hear (Bryman & Bell, 2011: 410)). This is because the study involves only one 
researcher and thus has not had the provision for checking inter-observer consistency, however, 
triangulation of multiple sources allowed the study to cross-check any findings derived. The 
study also has internal validity as its pre-determined conceptual framework, substantive review 
of existing theories, and constant effort to compare data with relevant theories have developed 
researcher’s knowledge about existing theories, in-depth understanding of the study 
phenomenon, and underlying theories that can explain the relationship identified from the data 
analysis, thus establishing the internal validity of the study. Finally, external validity is achieved 
when the findings of the study can be generalized to other SEs; and in the case of this thesis was 
acquired by analysing multiple cases having different characteristics in the Bangladesh social 
economy. Therefore, the data analysis process has helped to achieve a deep understanding of the 
research phenomenon. Furthermore, the selection of multiple cases, use of a pre-determined 
conceptual framework, and relevant links to existing theories have contributed to the robustness 
and quality of the research.  
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Table 5.4: The coding guide 
Topic Code level 1 
(Deductive) 
Literature source  
(for Code level 1) 
Code level 2 (Inductive) Code level 3 (Inductive) 
Background of 
the organisation 
Origin EMES Network 
(2013) 
 NGOs with fully donor 
dependency 
NGOs with some trading element 
NGOs with full-reliance on 
trading 
Social business 
Private and public ltd. Companies 
NGOs with a (conventional) 
subsidiary enterprise 
 
Social mission  
Economic project  Service delivery 
Microcredit and loan 
Social mobilisation 
Governance 
structure 
 
Institutional setting  
Income source Lyon and Sepulveda 
(2009) 
 
forms of growth 
(SE’s dual-value 
system) 
Modes of advancing 
social goal 
Austin et al. (2006); 
Battilana and 
Dorado (2010) 
No. of branches, employees & 
beneficiaries 
No. of different projects 
No. of target groups 
Conception of social impact 
Expansion 
Diversification 
Modes of pursuing 
economic goal 
Financial self sufficiency 
Sources of investment 
Sources of income 
Conception of financial sustainability 
Autonomous growth 
Partnership 
Institutional 
environment 
surrounding SEs 
Regulatory-state Scott (1995); 
Ridley-Duff and 
Bull (2011) 
NGO regulations and monitoring 
Government policy change 
Government funding 
Public support 
State regulations, policies and 
supports for NGOs and MFIs 
Customised regulation 
Appropriate support 
Customised regulations and 
supports for SEs 
Regulatory/market Industry regulations/standards 
Monitoring and implementation 
Support from private organisations 
Regulations/standards imposed 
by and supports provided by 
market actors 
Normative/State Political conflicts 
Yunus-government tension 
Government attitude towards NGOs 
Work culture 
Political embeddedness of local 
leaders 
Party political sphere 
Normative/market Competition 
Possessing business-like skills 
Protecting core knowledge 
Return on investment 
Differentiation 
Logics of competition 
Customer awareness 
Customers’ purchasing power 
Customer awareness and 
affordability 
Normative/society Traditional custom 
Trust on SEs activities 
Pre-conceptions/believes 
Religious norms 
Conservatisms in the society 
Cultural-
cognitive/state 
Power distance and patron-client 
relationship 
Network embeddedness 
Political legitimacy 
Cultural-
cognitive/society 
Social hierarchy  
Income and authority in the family 
Gender roles  
Group loyalty 
Hierarchy and gender roles 
  Resource limitations of small SEs 
Opinion of influential SEs 
Peer organisations’ behaviour 
Social exclusion 
Fair treatment 
Logics of social sector 
Donor requirements/conditions 
Funding policy 
Work culture 
Donors’ policy and work culture 
Family ethos 
Nepotism 
Trust for family members 
 
 
Family embeddedness 
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Management of 
resources and 
capabilities 
Financial resources Sunley and Pinch 
(2012); Doherty et 
al. (2014) 
Access to funding 
Tax 
Pricing 
Trading revenue 
Alternative income sources 
Challenges on working capital 
Same as level 1 
Human resources Royce (2007); 
Doherty et al. (2014) 
Staffing 
Retention 
Socialisation 
Empowering  
Same as level 1 
Communicating Bloom and Smith 
(2010) 
Persuading 
External communication 
Internal communication 
Same as level 1 
Alliance building  External alliance Same as level 1 
Internal synergistic alliance Internal synergistic alliance 
Lobbying   Collective level 
Individual level 
Engagement 
Same as level 1 
Earning generation  Integrated projects 
Un-integrated projects 
Same as level 1 
Replicating Transfer of know-how 
Income opportunity 
Same as level 1 
Marketing  Doherty et al. (2009) Advertisement 
PR activities 
Distribution 
Same as level 1 
Naming strategy 
Communications strategy 
Relationship building 
Social brand building 
Learning and skills 
development  
Bull (2007) Business-like skills 
Professional skills 
Knowledge sharing 
Experiential learning  
Same as level 1 
Networking  Lyon and Fernandez 
(2012) 
Political network 
Association membership 
Relationship building 
Same as level 1 
Innovation   Zahra et al. (2009); 
Gawell (2013) 
Project planning 
Adaption of project plan 
Organisational structure design 
Research and development 
Same as level 1 
Selecting alternative legal form Alteration 
 
5.7 Ethical considerations  
The measures discussed above helped to minimise any biases and distortion of the data 
that may have introduced by the researcher. Moreover, reducing biases was one of the most 
important ethical considerations during interviewing and data analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2011). 
The study’s data may include a few biases due to a number of reasons. Firstly, being a 
Bangladeshi the researcher has been inculcated in the cultural norms and values of his home 
country. This may raise concerns of bias arising from the conduct of interviews and their 
subsequent interpretation. Secondly, although attempts have been made to develop rapport, the 
researcher’s  status as a foreign doctoral student and an academic may have influenced 
responses. Even after making efforts to reduce this gap, on a few occasions some hesitation 
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among the interviewees was observed, which may be symptomatic of responses being influenced 
by the researcher’s status. As Miller and Glassner (2011) state, 
 
“The issue of how interviewees respond to us based on who we are – in their 
lives, as well as the social categories to which we belong, such as age, 
gender, class and race – is a practical concern as well as an epistemological 
or theoretical one...Particularly as a result of social distances, interviewees 
may not trust us, they may not understand our questions, or they may 
purposely mislead us in their responses.” (p.134) 
      
Related to this argument, Riessman (1993) claims: “the story is being told to particular 
people; it might have taken a different form if someone else were the listener” (p.11).  
 
Thirdly, the responses of the interviewees were sensitive to context as well as the status 
of the interviewee. Different interview surroundings can potentially influence an individual’s 
feelings, language and expressions. As Bryman and Bell (2011) put it, “...[the interviewees] 
interact differently in a variety of situations...if the interviewer interacts with them in a variety of 
situations the link between behaviour and context can be forged” (p.503).  
Different respondents were interviewed in a number of contexts, such as offices, in the 
field, in leisure club and coffee shop, which might have influenced their responses. Finally, 
issues may arise from the nature of the interviewees themselves. Mcneil and Chapman (2005) 
suggest that many people present themselves as ‘nice and cooperating’ and prefer, on balance, to 
agree rather than disagree, to be satisfied rather than be dissatisfied. This raises concerns that the 
opinions provided in an interview may strongly be influenced by a respondent’s concern to 
please the interviewer by providing the right response (cf. Mcneil & Chapman, 2005). During the 
interviews, such responses were apparent and therefore, needed to be interpreted with care. 
Beyond these issues, other important ethical and moral obligations were maintained during the 
study process. These involved: i) avoiding harm to participants; ii) ensuring informed consent; 
iii) respecting respondents’ privacy; and iv) avoiding deception (Bryman and Bell 2011). To 
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adhere to these ethical principles interviewees’ full consent was secured prior to conducting the 
interviews, respondents were asked about their willingness to be identified in terms of their 
name/position and the organisation’s name in the thesis. In order to respect their privacy and 
willingness to participate their permission to participate in the interview were sought though 
emails. The email included a brief outline of the research. After receiving permission to 
participate, an interview guide along with a scanned copy of the Ethical Approval Form 
authorized by the study supervisor was sent to respondents to ensure transparency. Vigilant 
investigations were made while identifying sensitive issues, such as those relating to corruption 
or nepotism, and careful language was used while writing about those in the thesis. To avoid any 
kind of deception at all phases of the study the respondents provided with a clear verbal 
description of the nature of the research verbally at the beginning of each interview. 
 
5.8 Methodological challenges and limitations  
The most significant methodological challenge experienced was in relation to gaining 
access to SEs and other key actors. Of the 52 SEs originally contacted by email only three agreed 
to participate, which resulted in the researcher having to rely mostly on his personal network. 
Even so, attention was given to including a variety of SEs and their employees at different level 
and stakeholders including beneficiaries, donors and policy support officers. With few 
exceptions, the SEs that ultimately agreed to participate were unwilling to grant permission to 
interview their donors and beneficiaries. Due to the constraints faced in arranging access, the 
findings of the study should, therefore, be used with care.  
During the interviews, some sensitive issues emerged which appeared to make the 
respondents feel uncomfortable. For instance, issues related to the conflicting relationship 
between Yunus and government came up a number of times while interviewing respondents 
from Grameen family SEs. On a number of occasions hesitations were visible among the 
beneficiaries suggesting that they felt uncomfortable to discuss issues relating to the service 
provided by their patron SEs. Although respondents’ views on these issues could have added 
significant insight to the thesis, they were not probed further on ethical grounds.  
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Yet, another methodological challenge related to the researcher’s close ties with 
Bangladeshi institutional system. Being a Bangladeshi, the researcher had his own personal 
opinions about many of the issues addressed in the study. Therefore, interpreting the views of the 
interviewees in an unbiased manner was a constant struggle. Careful efforts were made to avoid 
probing the respondents in a way that could lead them to answer the questions in a manner that 
reflected the interviewees own perspective.   
 
5.9 Summary 
The chapter has discussed and presented the justification of the chosen method in 
relation to the conceptual framework. The data was collected from multiple sources including 
face-to-face interviews, group discussions and organisational documents.  Eleven cases were 
selected using the NGOAB online directory. SEs with different registration status, geographical 
coverage, income sources, size and activities were purposefully selected to ensure representation 
and variety. The multiple case analyses enabled the study to compare the inter and intra case 
responses and thus identify and elaborate relevant patterns and categories.  
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Chapter 6: The nature of SE growth in Bangladesh - Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins by presenting the SE cases in terms of their social missions, 
economic projects, governance structure, institutional setting (EMES Network, 2013) and 
income structures (Lyon & Sepulveda, 2009). Six categories of SEs are identified based on these 
five criteria. The chapter then investigates the forms of growth of these six categories of SEs. 
Two aspects are identified as central to their adopted growth path: the means of achieving social 
goal and means of achieving their economic goal (Austin et al., 2006; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Doherty et al., 2014). Overall, the findings presented in this chapter address the following 
research questions: 
 
RQ1: What is the nature of SE growth in Bangladesh? 
RQ1a: What are the different types of SEs in Bangladesh? 
RQ1b: What are the forms of growth adopted by the studied SEs? 
 
Section 6.2 further examines the characteristics of the case study SEs and categorises 
them into six main types, and section 6.3 discusses the different forms of growth that SEs 
undertake to advance their social and economic goals. Finally, section 6.4  summarises the 
findings presented in the chapter.  
 
6.2 Overview of operational types of studied cases  
The analysis of data revealed six operational types of SEs in Bangladesh. As set out in 
Chapter 1, the studied SEs are analysed based on the five dimensions specified in the working 
definition of SE adopted by the study: social mission, economic project, governance structure, 
institutional setting and income source. The analysis of the studied cases using these five 
dimensions led to identification of six categories of SEs in Bangladesh: i) fully donor dependent 
organisations, ii) NGOs with some elements of trading, iii) NGOs with full reliance on trading, 
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iv) social business, v) private and public limited companies, and vi) NGOs with a conventional 
subsidiary enterprise and vi) cooperatives (but not included in the study).  
 
6.2.1 Fully grant dependent NGOs 
These SEs are conventional NGOs and are registered with NGOAB under the NGO Act 
of Bangladesh. They are fully dependent on external donor bodies, such as charities and other 
philanthropic donors for their income. These enterprises follow the dominant approach adapted 
by most of the older and established NGOs of Bangladesh and their survival depends heavily on 
external donations. They are mostly focused on delivering a national level policy agenda that is 
strongly attuned to the current government’s Vision 2021 developmental agenda. Their 
governance structure generally involves a board of trustees and separate management body , but 
with beneficiaries tending not to be involved in boards or in decision making. Their institutional 
setting includes both public institutions and donor bodies. Their governance structure is less 
participatory in nature compared to the new generation SEs. Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation 
(BPF) is the case that best exemplifies this category. 
 
6.2.2 NGOs with a trading element 
While SEs belonging to this category are registered as NGOs under the NGO Act of 
Bangladesh with NGOAB, they also have a significant trading element along with donations. 
The trading element acts as an additional source of income for such SEs along with donations on 
which they remain heavily reliant. They operate and function like conventional NGOs, in terms 
of being registered with and fulfilling the requirements of NGOAB. As a consequence, their 
institutional setting involves public institutions, donor bodies, and private corporations as 
partners and/or customers. Their governance structure is similar to conventional NGOs, with 
little in the way of beneficiary participation in decision making. Thus, the board does not involve 
the beneficiaries; and also there is no formal mechanism through which beneficiaries can 
communicate their problems with the governing body. Phulki and Quasem Foundation are the 
cases that best fit into this category. 
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6.2.3 NGOs with full reliance on trading 
The third type of SE consist of conventional NGOs who are largely dependent on 
trading income for their survival. Such organisations are registered as NGOs with NGOAB, 
although they are not at all reliant on  funding in the form of donations or grants from various 
bodies. Association for Social Advancement (ASA) is the SE that fit into this category. They are 
connected with public institutions in terms of their regulatory compliance, monitoring/auditing 
and with respect to non-financial forms of support, but do not receive any subsidies or grants 
from government. ASA is registered under NGOAB and the Central Bank of Bangladesh and is 
also federated to the Association of Micro Finance Institution in Bangladesh (AMFI). ASA’s 
board is composed of two groups: a governing body and a general body. Although governing 
body does not involve beneficiaries, the general body does include them and seeks to represent 
their views. The general body does not hold the decision making right, although the respective 
members can participate in discussing issues in board meetings. Therefore, the governance 
structure of ASA is moderately participatory in nature compared to most other NGOs in 
Bangladesh. 
 
6.2.4 Social business 
These are the new generation of SEs that have emerged since 2000 and particularly 
influenced by the principle of Professor Yunus’ social business model. Panther SE is the case 
fitting this category. They are registered as a Private Limited Company under the Ministry of 
Commerce, are financially self-reliant in that they earn their revenue from sales. However, unlike 
conventional for-profit firms, they have a social goal which they seek to achieve through their 
trading activities. Their social mission is to assist and mobilise the targeted disadvantaged group 
who are often not covered by conventional NGOs. The main reason for being registered as a 
private company is the absence of a proper regulatory body to recognise or to certify their 
existence at the moment in Bangladesh. Although their governing body does not involve 
beneficiaries, they invite representatives of beneficiaries to board meetings for dialogue. 
Therefore, their governance structure is of a moderately participatory nature. As per their 
memorandum of association, the investors in the enterprise are not allowed to take out any profit 
from the business, although they can take out their initial investment eventually. The 
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organisation depends on the public institutions in terms of their regulatory compliance, 
monitoring and auditing. They also are embedded in the market as they sell their products to 
corporate and non-corporate customers. 
 
6.2.5 Private and public limited corporations 
Enterprises under this classification are registered as a private or public limited company under 
the company and trading act of Bangladesh, although their prime objective is to achieve their 
social mission. The two such cases studied here are MIDAS Financing Ltd- a Public limited 
company and Hathay Bunano which is a Private limited company. Both  enterprises started as 
NGOs, eventually greater degree of independence from donations and grants through trading.  
MIDAS is registered on the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Currently they do not depend on any sorts 
of donations/charity. These SEs perform and function as conventional trading firms. Therefore, 
their institutional setting involves a combination of public and market related institutions, being 
dependent on public institutions for the regulatory issues, while they are also embedded in 
market as they sell their products/services to their target customers, with MIDAS particularly 
receiving capital from the stock market. The governing body of both the SEs does not involve 
beneficiaries; however, they allow participation of beneficiaries in their regular board meetings 
and also annual meeting. The beneficiaries are invited to present their issues and concerns, 
although they lack the right to participate in decision making. As a consequence, their 
governance structure is also characterised by moderate level of participation.  
 
6.2.6 NGOs with a (conventional) subsidiary enterprise 
The final form of enterprises represents established/registered NGOs operating in 
Bangladesh which unlike their parent enterprise, generate income through trading. Some are also 
involved in joint investment from external bodies. The cases falling under this classification are: 
BRAC Aarong Dairy, Grameen Intel Social Business Ltd, Grameen Telecom Trust and Grameen 
Calendonian College of Nursing. They are the sister projects of large NGOs, although they are 
registered as different business operations with their respective regulatory bodies (education, IT 
and agro-based business regulatory body). They are often initiated by their parent NGOs to 
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complement the support and resource needs of other sister concern projects. These NGOs were 
found to be involving beneficiaries in the governing board (as board members). As board 
members beneficiaries also hold the right to contribute to decision making (e.g. Proposals, voting 
rights) and thus have a relatively high degree of autonomy. Therefore, their governance structure 
was found to be of a high participatory nature. 
 
6.2.7 Cooperatives 
Although not included in the sample of cases studied here, the analysis of secondary 
sources indicated that the Bangladeshi social sector also includes some cooperatives. Milk Vita 
Dairy and Palli Bidyut Samity are two examples of cooperatives in Bangladesh. Palli Bidyut 
works for rural electrification and works with the Rural Electrification Board of Bangladesh (a 
government institution for rural electrification), donor bodies, consultant partners and member 
consumers. Milk Vita Dairy is also a cooperative of small dairy farmers in rural areas. The 
organisation collects milk at fair price from dairy farmers and then performs the packaging and 
marketing of the milk. Both the organisations were first established by government and also 
include target disadvantage groups as members. As a consequence, Government plays a major 
role in their decision making, although management is mostly performed by the members. This 
study excludes these cooperative since, due to the high level of involvement of the government, 
permission for access could not be arranged with these SEs. 
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Table 6. 1: Overview of the selected cases  
Type Enterprise Origin Social Mission Economic Project Governance Structure Institutional settings Income Source 
Service Delivery Microcredit/Loan Social Mobilization  
Fully grant 
dependent 
NGOs 
Bangladesh 
Protibondhi 
Foundation 
(BPF) 
1984 Advocate equal rights 
for children and 
adults with 
disabilities 
Health care and 
rehabilitation 
support for disabled 
children and 
families 
 
  NGO under NGOAB 
Family-owned NGO 
Board of Trustees 
Beneficiaries not involved in 
board and decision 
making 
Administrative unit led by 
Executive Director & 
CEO. 
Public institutions: NGOAB 
Ministry of Social Welfare  
Foreign and local donor bodies 
Donations (95%) from private 
corporations, NGOs and 
government; service fee (4%); 
trading of handicrafts made by 
disabled children (1%).  
NGOs with 
a trading 
element 
Quasem 
Foundation-
Mariam Eye 
Hospital 
1994 Support less affluent 
people of the rural 
north with 
affordable eye care 
treatment 
Provide health care 
services 
  NGO under NGOAB 
Family-owned NGO 
Board of Directors 
Beneficiaries not involved in 
board and decision 
making 
Functional team headed by 
Managing Director 
Public institutions: NGOAB 
Ministry of Social Welfare   
Foreign and local donor bodies 
Partners 
Donations from private 
corporations, NGOs and 
government (85%); service fee 
from patients (15%).  
Phulki 1991 Support socio-
economic 
conditions 
development of 
disadvantaged 
people by 
promoting women 
and child rights 
  Providing work 
based and non-
work based child 
care facilities for 
poor working 
mothers 
 
NGO under NGOAB 
Board of Directors 
Beneficiaries not involved in 
governing body but in 
general body 
Management team headed 
by Executive Director 
Public institutions: NGOAB; 
Ministry of Social Welfare  
Foreign and local donors 
Garment manufacture BGMEA 
 
Service fees from factory-based 
and in-house centres; 
consultancy of management of 
day care; donations 
NGOs with 
full 
reliance on 
trading 
Association for 
Social 
Advancement 
(ASA)  
1978 
 
Address poverty of 
rural people 
through 
microfinance 
 Primary and special 
loans 
 
 NGO MFI under NGOAB 
Board of Directors 
Beneficiaries not involved in 
board but their advice is 
sought informally 
Administrative Body 
Public institutions: NGOAB 
Association of Micro-Financing 
Institutions 
Service charges (91%); bank 
interest (4%); membership fees 
(0.5%); other sources (4%) 
such as selling of publications 
and used newspapers, earning 
through consultancy services 
Social 
business 
Panther Social 2011 Provide sustainable 
income generating 
opportunities for 
under privileged 
rickshaw pullers  
  Provide start-up 
capital to 
rickshaw pullers 
for small trade 
through branding 
rickshaws 
Market rickshaw arts 
made by small 
local artists 
SE under NGOAB 
Board of Directors. 
Beneficiaries not involved in 
board but their advice is 
sought informally 
Management team headed 
by Managing Director 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
Yunus Centre 
Market: Private corporations, 
foreign customers 
Sale of rickshaw branding 
service to corporate clients 
(65%); sale of rickshaw art 
(30%); membership fees (5%) 
Private and 
public 
limited 
company 
MIDAS 
financing Ltd 
1995 Provide value-added 
financial services to 
small and medium 
sized enterprises 
 Medium term loans 
Short term loans  
Housing loans  
Auto loans  
 Public Limited Company 
under the Company Act 
1994 
Board of Directors 
Beneficiaries are 
represented in the board 
and have decision 
making right 
Listed on Dhaka stock 
exchange 
Management team headed 
by the Managing Director 
Public institutions: Bangladesh 
Bank, Ministry of 
Commerce, Dhaka Stock 
Exchange 
Market: other financing 
institutes 
Interest on loans and lease 
finance (89%); interest on 
placement with other banks 
(7%); investment in shares 
(0.5%); other operating income 
sources (3.5%), such as, rental 
income of MIDAS centre, sale 
of application forms and sale of 
fixed assets 
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Hathay 
Bunano-
Pebble 
2004 Empower women of 
rural villages by 
creating sustainable 
employment 
opportunities and 
eradicating poverty 
  Market hand 
manufactured 
quality toys 
made by rural 
women  
100% export oriented 
company under the 
Company Act 
Family owned SE 
Board of Directors 
Operational team headed by 
CEO 
 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Customs 
Market: overseas retailers 
Trading of toys to conventional 
retailers and wholesalers in US, 
European and Australian 
markets (100%) 
NGOs with 
a 
subsidiary 
enterprise  
BRAC Aarong 
Dairy 
1998 Provide milk farmers 
access to fair price 
operated market 
and support 
sustainable income 
generation  
 
  Buying and 
marketing milk 
from remote milk 
producers  
 
SE under The Company Act  
Board of Governors  
Executive Management 
Committee  
 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
Yunus Centre 
Partners: Private corporations 
Market: local customers 
Sales of Dairy products 
Grameen Intel 
Social 
Business Ltd 
2009 Solve social problems 
using affordable 
information 
technology services 
  Providing affordable 
IT solutions to 
improve 
agricultural 
productivity 
using cost 
effective 
computer 
software   
 
SE under the Company and 
ICT Act  
Board of Directors 
Management team headed 
by CEO 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
Yunus Centre 
Partners: Private corporations 
Market: local and overseas 
customers 
Sales of software 
Grameen 
Telecom Trust 
 
2010 Provide technical and 
financial assistance 
to facilitate 
socioeconomic  
activities through 
social business 
   Sales & distribution 
of low cost 
technology 
products through 
rural women  
Manufacture & 
export 
impregnated 
mosquitos to 
Africa. 
Market treated water 
at subsidized 
rate to arsenic 
affected areas  
Market nutritious 
yogurt at 
subsidized rate 
using rural 
women as sales 
force 
Trust under the Trust Act 
1882 
Board of Directors 
Management team led by 
Managing Director 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
Yunus Centre 
Partners: Private corporations 
Market: local and overseas 
customers 
Sales/export earnings from the 
distribution of the goods 
Grameen 
Caledonian 
College of 
Nursing 
2010 Develop nursing and 
midwifery standards 
through the creation 
of employment 
opportunities for 
potential nurses 
coming from poor 
families 
Education services 
 
  Educational institute under 
UGC 
Board of Governors 
Academic & Administrative 
Committee 
Public institutions: Ministry of 
Commerce, Ministry of 
Social Welfare 
Yunus Centre 
Partners: Private corporations 
Market: local students 
Tuition fees charged to students  
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Table 6.2: Operational types of SEs 
Dimensions (EMES 
Network  2013; Lyon and 
Sepulveda 2009) 
NGOs with fully 
grant 
dependency 
NGOs with some 
trading element 
NGOS with fill 
reliance on trading 
Social business Private and public 
ltd. companies 
NGOs with 
conventional 
subsidiary 
enterprise 
Economic Project       
Continuous production None Limited degree High degree High degree High degree High degree 
Paid work Mostly paid 
employees 
Mostly paid 
employees 
Mostly paid employees Mostly paid employees Mostly paid 
employees 
Mostly paid 
employees 
Economic risk Generating 
continuous 
donation 
Generating service 
fees and donations 
Generating service 
fees/trading revenue 
Generating service 
fees/trading revenue 
Generating service 
fees/trading revenue 
Generating service 
fees/trading revenue 
Social mission       
Explicit social aim Service delivery Service delivery Micro-credit/Social 
mobilisation 
Social mobilisation Micro-credit/Social 
mobilisation 
Micro-credit/Social 
mobilisation 
Profit distribution None None None None Yes; to shareholders None 
Initiator Founder Founder Founder Founder Founder Sister concern of 
NGOs 
Governance structure       
Degree of autonomy from 
beneficiaries (i.e. target 
disadvantaged group) 
Low Low Moderate Limited Limited High 
Participative nature Low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Decision making power of 
beneficiaries (i.e. target 
disadvantaged group) 
Low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Institutional setting       
Accreditation NGOAB NGOAB Central Bank; NGOAB Dhaka City Corporation Central Bank; Dhaka 
City Corporation 
Dhaka City 
Corporation 
Federative bodies Association of 
Developmental 
Agencies in 
Bangladesh 
(ADAB) 
Association of 
Developmental 
Agencies in 
Bangladesh (ADAB) 
Association of Micro-
Financing Institutions 
of Bangladesh (AMFI) 
Yunus Centre Exporters’ 
Association; Non 
Banking Financing 
Institutions 
Association 
Yunus Centre; 
Association of 
Agro-based Traders 
Public support Subsidies/grants 
from government 
Subsidies/grants from 
government 
None None None None 
Market-based exchanges None Limited High High High High 
Donor support Heavy reliance Moderate reliance None None None None 
Income source Mostly donation Donation and service 
fees 
Service fees/trading 
revenue 
Service fees/trading 
revenue 
Service fees/trading 
revenue 
Service fees/trading 
revenue 
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In sum, the analysis of the operational models has revealed that two dimensions in the 
EMES definition of SE have shown different characteristics through their application in the 
context of Bangladeshi hybrid SEs. First, three specific types of economic projects were apparent 
among the studied cases: service delivery, micro-finance/loan and social mobilisation. The 
EMES definition does not look into the specific types of economic activities that SEs may 
accomplish and thus offers a more general explanation of the ‘economic project’ dimension. This 
study, therefore, identifies three sub-categories under this dimension that were observed in the 
studied cases.  
Second, this study has looked beyond the ‘participatory governance structure’ that is 
originally considered as one of the key characteristics of SE by the EMES Network (2013). This 
study has found in case of four operational models (except, NGOs with a conventional subsidiary 
enterprise) beneficiaries (i.e. Target disadvantaged group) are not represented in the board and 
are separated from the governance related activities. Although some SEs (e.g. Panther Social and 
ASA) invite representatives of beneficiaries to seek advice from them and to have a dialogue 
during regular and annual board meeting, they do not allow beneficiaries with a right to decision 
making. Therefore, looking beyond the participatory governance structure, the thesis has found 
SEs boards that are composed of founders, their family members and external expert advisors.  
Third, the EMES approach does not include the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms. The EMES ideal-type of SEs have shares of market resources, public grants and voluntary 
resources. The ideal-type SEs may adhere to market-based principles which drive them to trade 
goods or services through price setting. The market resources may come from private customers. 
(The EMES Network 2013: 17-20). However, the data analysis suggest that a number of studied 
SEs are registered under the Private Company Act of Bangladesh, although they have an explicit 
social aim. For instance, the SEs categorised as social businesses (e.g. Panther Social) and 
private and public limited company (e.g. Hathay Bunano and MIDAS) are private sector 
organisation as per their registration status, although they have an explicit social goal. Thus, this 
study advance the EMES approach by including the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms.  
Therefore, the current study has advanced the definition of ideal-type SEs proposed by 
the EMES Network by looking beyond the participatory governance process, by identifying three 
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sub-forms of economic projects and also by including the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms. 
 
6.3 Forms of growth of SEs: Managing the dual-value system 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, SEs have a dual bottom line i.e. having both social 
and economic goals (Austin et al., 2006; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Doherty et al., 2014). The 
following subsections discuss the means adopted by each of the six categories of SEs to achieve 
their social and economic goals and their forms of growth.  
 
6.3.1 Fully grant dependent NGOs 
Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation (BPF)  
Advancing the social goal  
The interview data shows that the founder of BPF aimed to increase the “reach” of 
their services in the capital city as well as in the remote places of Bangladesh. BPF initially 
started in a small room in Dhaka city in 1984. Gradually, its first branch served an increasing 
number of disabled children and after three years a second branch was established in another 
area of Dhaka city. Currently, BPF has seven branches serving 250 disabled children and 
employs 80 people. As the Executive Director said, 
  
“Almost every three to five years,  we opened a new branch and the number of 
children served kept on increasing...There are lots of disabled children who are still 
deprived, especially in rural areas. We think if we are able to offer our services to an 
increasing number of disabled children both in rural and urban areas, then we are 
contributing to society”. 
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The evidence shows that the primary mode of advancing social goals was to serve an 
increasing number of beneficiaries by enhancing the number of branches.  
 
Pursuing economic goals  
In order to pursue their social goal BPF had to generate income. The analysis shows 
BPF had been largely dependent on donations and subsidies. The Executive director remarked,  
 
“In order to open new branches and inducing new services, we need funds. As a 
consequence, we have to continuously look for potential donors. We also have to 
liaise with the government and keep them updated about our activities as we want to 
seek financial benefits from them.” 
 
According to the Executive Director, BPF received donations from the Commercial 
Bank of Ceylon, Job Placement Australia, and Save the Children Bangladesh on a regular basis. 
Apart from these long-term donors it had also received occasional donations and grants from 
corporations and individual philanthropists.  For instance, previous donations were received from 
Bata Corporation,  Pran Foods Ltd. and Unilever Bangladesh.  Moreover, the government pays 
the salary of ten of BPF employees, which is a form of financial support. According to BPF’s 
annual report 2012-13, the share of income sources is: donations from private corporations, 
NGOs and government (95%); service fee (4%); trading of handicrafts made by disabled 
children (1%). Therefore, BPF is mainly dependent on donations from donor agencies, 
corporations and the government for its financial sustainability. 
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6.3.2 NGOs with trading element 
Phulki 
Advancing the social goal 
 The interview with the founder of Phulki revealed that they sought to achieve their 
social goal by offering an affordable child care service to increasing number of low income 
generating mothers working in the garment and other industries. Thus, the strategy of the founder 
has been to grow the number of their independent branches and also the factory funded day care 
centres. Phulki started a day care centre for the children of working class children in the 
founder’s own garage. Gradually, the organisation entered into agreement with three garment 
factories and currently works with 40 garment factories in Dhaka city. The Founder of Phulki 
commented, 
 
“The more garment factories we can include in our project, the more working class 
mothers we can serve and the more we can contribute to the society.” 
  
The Founder has sought to grow the enterprise by transferring its core knowledge and 
thus allow other NGOs to replicate the model. Accordingly, the team had trained an organisation 
in Chittagong (the second city of Bangladesh) who are now also working with many other 
garment factories in that district. In future, there are plans to increase the number of branches 
through franchising. The Founder stated, 
 
“We want to increase our reach to all important cities in Bangladesh. If we cannot 
do it ourselves then we will find mechanisms to get it done by other entities.” 
 
Therefore, the mode adopted by Phulki to advance its social goals has been to mainly 
expand its reach. As the organisation includes more garment factories in the project, the 
increased number of branches will thus serve more working mothers.  
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Pursuing economic goals 
The day care centres in garment firms are fully funded by the factories. However, there 
are few community-based day care centres from which revenue is generated out of the fees 
charged from mothers. Since 2005 small donated amounts have also been received from the Aga 
Khan Foundation to run these independent units. The government also contributes a nominal 
amount of grant every month. According to the organisation’s annual report of 2011, the service 
fees from factory-based centres contributed 80 per cent of the income, in-house centres 15 per 
cent, consultancy of management of day care 2 per cent, and donations and grants from the 
government and other organisations 3 per cent. Although there is some reliance on service fees 
received from independent centres, Phulki mostly depends on other organisations, such as 
garment firms, donors and the government to attain its economic goals.   
 
Quasem Foundation 
Advancing the social goal  
The interview data shows that the founder of Quasem Foundation aimed to serve the 
deprived communities of the Northern parts of Bangladesh by increasing the accessibility of their 
eye care service. Quasem Foundation first started with a 20-bed hospital in Ulipur, a village in 
Northern Bangladesh. The hospital now accommodates 350 patients. Beyond this, five additional 
outdoor treatment centres are operating in Rangpur, Gaibandha, Nageshwari and Lalmonirhat. In 
2012, the organisation also introduced the first mobile eye hospital that travels through remote 
villages of Northern Bangladesh treating 100 patients a week. The Managing Director of the 
organisation said, 
 
“Now over the last few decades our hospital has grown infrastructure wise. We can 
now accommodate more patients. Our number of staff has increased; and now we 
can provide our care and service not only to the people of Ulipur but almost to 
everyone in the Northern district of Rangpur.” 
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As the account of the MD shows, therefore, the Quashem Foundation has advanced its 
social goal by increasing the number of patients and expanding the reach of healthcare services. 
  
Pursuing economic goals  
The Managing Director also described how every year the foundation received 
donations from the government of Japan, Grameen Phone, Akij Trust and BRAC. It also collects 
a nominal service fee from patients, which is an additional source of income for the organisation. 
The organisation’s annual report shows that income sources and respective shares are made up of 
donations from private corporations, NGOs and the government (85%), and service fees from 
patients (15%). The Managing Director commented, 
 
“We cannot increase our service fees because doing so would make our service less 
accessible to the poor communities. Therefore, we can only be financially 
sustainable by seeking more and more donations from foreign donors and the 
government.”   
  
The comment above confirms that the organisation had primarily depended on donor 
agencies and the government to pursue its economic goals.  
 
6.3.3 NGOs with full reliance on trading 
Association for Social Advancement (ASA) 
Advancing social goal  
The social goal of ASA is focused on increasing the number of branches in Bangladesh, 
making their micro-credits available to an increasing number of beneficiaries. As well as 
expanding nationally, they have facilitated the growth of similar organisation in India, 
Afghanistan and in a number of African countries by allowing replication of their model. ASA 
started with 10 branches, 2 in Dhaka and the rest in Rangpur division, with 0.002 million clients. 
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Currently, the organisation has 3,154 branches located across districts in the seven divisions of 
Bangladesh, employing around 20,000 staff and serving 4.94 million clients. Figure 6.1 
illustrates how ASA has growth significantly since 1978 in terms of increasing the number of 
branches. The average percentage growth is 3.14 with the highest growth rate of 9.74 percent 
occurring during 1996-1998. Furthermore, the organisation has provided technical assistance to 
other NGOs and MFIs, with a total of 54 MFIs in 17 countries. The organisation is considering 
an increase in its reach of such support services as a key strategy to advance social goals.  
 
Figure 6.1: ASA’s growth trend: number of branches (1978-2011) 
 
Source: ASA’s annual report 2011 
Pursuing economic goals 
ASA’s annual report shows that it had initially received funding from the government 
and a few donors. The founder of ASA stated that they always wanted to grow autonomously 
and by 2001, the organisation had achieved financial self-sufficiency. Currently, ASA’s sources 
of income include service charges (91%), bank interest (4%), membership fees (0.5%) and other 
sources (4%), such as selling publications and used newspapers and earning from consultancy 
services (ASA, 2011). Furthermore, all loans taken out by the organisation have been repaid and 
they no longer accept donations.  
Figure 6.1 illustrates that ASA’s growth was slow from start-up in 1978 to 1994 (3.25% 
growth rate), yet from 1994 to 1998 it had geared up significantly (11.65% change). From 1994, 
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ASA adopted a growth strategy to reduce dependence on donations and achieve financial self-
sufficiency. The founder commented that they had devoted significant resources to increasing the 
number of branches and its client base, which had enabled them to see increased revenues in the 
form of service fees. In order to enhance recovery rate, ASA strengthened its monitoring system 
by empowering branch offices and field officers in tracking potential defaulters. The founder 
further remarked, that based on experience, ASA now better understands what should be a 
realistice loan amount suitable for individual borrowers. With this mechanism, since 1995 ASA’s 
rate of recovery has been above 99 percent. Costs per taka lent were reduced to 0.05 taka in 2011 
from 1.2 taka in 2000, and at the end of 2011 the rate of repayment was 99.84 percent (ASA, 
2011). The founder of ASA commented,  
 
“We think we can achieve our organisational goals only by achieving financial self-
sufficiency, because financial self-sufficiency can not only give certainty for our 
future but also can enable us to operate as an autonomous organisation.”  
 
The founder’s comment shows that ASA sought to achieve financial self-sufficiency to 
reduce the degree of future uncertainty and also to minimise external interference, such as from 
government or large donors. As a consequence, it had focused on increasing its client base and 
increasing its recovery rate.   
 
6.3.4 Social business 
Panther SE 
Advancing the social goal 
Panther Social started a rickshaw branding project in 2012 to create an income solution 
for rickshaw pullers. Within one year, the savings project was also established for the rickshaw 
pullers whereby they can save money. Then the rickshaw art project started selling rickshaw art 
painted by traditional rickshaw artists (i.e. artists who decorate the entire rickshaw with 
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decorative painting) to national and international customers. The Founder and CEO of Panther 
Social said,  
 
“We want to target different groups of people who are usually excluded by 
conventional NGOs. For this reason, we chose rickshaw pullers and then rickshaw 
artists...As we diversified our projects we were able to cover two different groups of 
disadvantaged people yet remained within our expertise area, media and art.”   
 
The founder further commented that Panther Social aimed to target different 
disadvantaged groups in an effort to create social benefits for them by undertaking diversified 
projects using their expertise in the media and art industry. Therefore, Panther Social had sought 
to advance its social goal by creating benefits for varying groups of socially excluded people 
through the introduction of diverse projects.  
 
Pursuing economic goals 
According to its founder, Panther Social had chosen to avoid investments from external 
organisations or individuals, and avoid a reliance on donations and grants. The organisation 
received investment from its founder during inception and has subsequently relied on its own 
trading income. Panther Social’s income sources include the sale of rickshaw branding to 
corporate customers (65%), the sale of rickshaw art to overseas customers, art galleries and retail 
stores (30%), and membership fees (5%) (Panther Social Business, 2011). The CEO of Panther 
Social said, 
 
“Internally, our main objective is to grow our project in a financially sustainable 
way. We do not want to take investment or donation from outside sources, as I want 
to retain my autonomy. Panther Social is my brain child, so I don’t want external 
investors or donors to interfere.” 
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The interview data shows that Panther Social preferred to retain its autonomy which 
could be jeopardised by dependence on large external. The founder, therefore, stressed the 
importance of developing an internal synergistic financial system so that financially successful 
projects could support the others. The organisation had recently launched a TV show holding SE 
contests for young people, which generated revenue in the form of sponsorship. In addition, a 
percentage of the earnings from all these projects, after paying expenses, is given to the rickshaw 
pullers and artists themselves. Therefore, the evidence shows how Panther Social has sought to 
advance its economic goals and financial self-sufficiency while avoiding external investment 
from large investors.  
 
6.3.5 Private and public limited corporations 
 
MIDAS 
Advancing the social goal  
MIDAS sought to rapidly increase their number of branches and beneficiaries, the 
Managing Director of MIDAS expressed his commitment to the “fast expansion of MIDAS” also 
observing that while the number of small and medium sized enterprises was increasing in 
Bangladesh very rapidly, there existed a limited number of public or private institutions to 
support their growth. MIDAS started with one branch that provided loans to 16 small firms, yet 
within 18 years it has opened 16 branches and was serving 9,500 small and medium sized firms 
in 2012 (Midas Financing Ltd, 2012). The growth of this social business appears to have resulted 
in part, from a close synergy between the social and commercial aims, where social aim is 
measured on how many enterprises they financed while commercial how many branches they 
open. This was reiterated by the MD who said,  
 
“If we are adding 5-10 enterprises every month then we think we are growing. We 
also grow by adding different loan services to meet the demand of our clients...Our 
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social report informs our investors about our social achievement that is the number 
of clients served and number of new branches opened.” 
 
Pursuing economic goals  
Before 2002 MIDAS received donations. Since 2002, MIDAS wanted to reduce its 
reliance on donations and grants, so it registered as a publicly listed company. This strategy of 
becoming a publicly listed company appears to have been a strong contributing factors to the 
organisation becoming financially stable.  
Figure 6.2 shows that MIDAS’s operating revenue and total assets both have gradually 
increased during  2002-2003 after registering with the Dhaka Stock Exchange. The Managing 
Director said, 
 
“When we used to rely on donations, we had to constantly search for donors: there 
was no certainty. When we became a public listed company, the level of financial 
certainty increased. If we can offer a good dividend then investors are likely to stay 
with us.” 
 
Since 2002 MIDAS has increasingly focused more on income from service fees in order 
to become a profitable financial institution. According its annual report of 2012, the primary 
income source was interest on loans and lease finance (89%). Other income sources include 
investment in shares (0.5%) and other operating income sources (9.5%), such as rental income, 
sales of application forms and the sale of fixed assets. By 2007, the organisation had paid off all 
its previous loans and was able to purchase new assets in 2008-2009 that included the 
construction of a commercial building and the purchase of land outside Dhaka. The rental 
income from these assets created an alternative source of income and increased its operating 
revenue (Figure 6.2). Therefore, the analysis shows that MIDAS sought to grow fast by 
increasing its operating revenue and thus attracting increased investment from shareholders.   
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Figure 6.2: Total assets and operating revenue of Midas (2000-2012) 
 
Source: Annual Report 2012-13, MIDAS 
Hathay Bunano 
Advancing the social goal  
The interview with the founder and CEO of Hathay Bunano, revealed how they had 
sought to create increasing employment for females in the rural areas by expanding the number 
of production centres and also by opening those in remote villages. Hathay Bunano’s annual 
report shows that it initially started with one production centre employing 20 female workers. 
Nine years later and the organisation had opened 34 production centres and had 3,400 
employees. Sales of their hand-made toys increased in the UK market initially and then 
eventually expanded to 18 other destinations, including the USA, Australia, Malaysia, Germany, 
France and Austria. The founder said, 
 
“I personally measure success and growth on how many people I have employed and 
how many more I can employ in the future...We started with 20 girls in River Bank 
Island and now we employ 3,500 girls in our 34 rural production centres...In 2010 
we were exporting our products to UK, USA and Australia but now we are exporting 
to almost 19 countries. The more we expand internationally, the more employment 
we can create.” 
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The comment of the founder supports that Hathay Bunano had sought to advance its 
social goal by increasing the number of production centres in different remote villages and by 
creating localised job opportunities for women in rural areas. Besides local expansion, the 
organisation also aims to grow through increasing the export of its products. 
 
Pursuing economic goals  
The strategy of Hathay Bunano has been strongly influenced by the founders’ 
preference to avoid external investment or donations and thus avoid the risk of outside 
interference. Hathay Bunano generates 100% of its revenue from the export of toys and thus 
avoids the need to seek donations. She further observed that if investors’ visions misalign with 
her own then there could be a possibility of conflict. She considers that a contrasting view point 
could damage the novelty of the model, commenting,  
 
“Me and my husband did not want external people to invest in our project as their 
interference may damage the novelty of our model or they may not understand our 
priorities”. 
   
The evidence above supports that Hathay Bunano chose to advance its economic goal 
through financial self-sufficiency and to avoid the risk of external investment or donations 
undermining the organisation from its own vision and main strategic direction.  
 
6.3.6 NGOs with a (conventional) subsidiary enterprise 
BRAC Aarong Dairy  
Advancing the social goal 
 BRAC Aarong Diary is a diversification project of BRAC Micro-credit division. One 
of the reasons underlying the emergence of the organisation was to support the income of the 
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dairy farmers who had taken a loan from BRAC’s micro-credit division. The Vice-Chairman 
commented, 
 
“Overall, BRAC wants to target different disadvantaged groups in Bangladesh. One 
of BRAC’s current social visions is to target the people in remote areas suffering 
from extreme poverty. BRAC Dairy is part of that vision...we specifically included the 
borrowers of our micro-finance division to enable them to repay the loan.” 
 
BRAC, the parent organisation of BRAC Dairy, advances its social goal by introducing 
diversified projects to target different disadvantaged groups in Bangladesh. The Vice-Chairman 
remarked that BRAC has a number of projects offering social benefits in varying ways, such as 
empowering women, educating children, and providing healthcare and sanitation facilities in 
rural areas. BRAC Dairy is one such diversified project established to support the deprived small 
dairy farmers who are also BRAC’s micro-credit borrowers. The analysis shows that 
diversification is the key mode adopted by BRAC in order to advance its social goal.    
 
Pursuing economic goals  
The General Manager of BRAC Dairy said that they had purposefully avoided 
investment from external sources. The General Manager expressed concern about the risk of 
external investment leading to outside interference in terms of planning, budgeting and 
operational issues, as has been experienced in other BRAC projects. Therefore, “BRAC Dairy 
considered developing a project model that will be financially self-sufficient” (General Manager, 
BRAC Aarong Dairy). The organisation earns its income from the trading of milk produced by 
farmers and had achieved 22 percent market share in the milk and dairy product market 
(Bangladesh) in 2012. This project earns the largest amount of revenue of all of BRACs’ 
enterprises. The General Manager of BRAC Aarong Dairy said, 
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“Financial self-sufficiency retains the independence of a SE and helps to plan for a 
better future...So we are continually trying to reduce our dependency on donors.” 
 
BRAC Aarong Dairy has therefore, sought to avoid reliance on donations, although its 
parent organisation  BRAC is largely donor dependent social enterprise. The data analysis, 
therefore, shows that BRAC Aarong Dairy intended to maintain its independence by avoiding 
donations and external investment.    
 
Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB), Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing (GCCN) 
and Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT)  
Advancing the social goal 
Every year, Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) launches new software to meet the 
different support needs of farmers. Its initial project was to introduce software for fertiliser 
selection, but then gradually diversified to seed selection, pest control, harvest management and 
yield prediction. The Chief Operating Officer (COO) stated, 
 
“The more different types of software we can launch, the more different needs of 
farmers we can meet...When we are able to offer a range of software to cover all of 
the current problems faced by farmers, then we think that we have contributed 
enough” 
  
The COO said that the more constraints they could solve for the farmers, the more they 
would advance their social goal. In so doing, they were engaged in ongoing research and 
developments, and also dialogue with farmers to identify problems and needs. The organisation 
had launched six different types of software over a four-year period (Grameen Intel Social 
Business, 2012) . 
Similarly, Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing (GCCN) was established to support 
the daughters of borrowers with the Grameen Micro-financing division. The trained nurses were 
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also employed at the Grameen Eye Care Hospital. The Principal of GCCN said that the projects 
of the Grameen family were always designed to target the needs of different target groups. She 
argued, 
 
“Grameen has developed a culture of internal synergy between our different 
projects. We find this to be a key to create more social impact.” 
 
Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) has four diversified projects, including fabric and 
fashion, healthcare, dairy production, and a support institution to facilitate social business 
learning and an innovation fund. The CEO of GTT commented, 
 
“We grow as we introduce new projects. This enables us to address different 
problems related to poverty and social exclusion.” 
 
The CEO remarked that each of GTT’s projects were targeted to different disadvantaged 
groups. For instance, the Grameen Danone Shokti Doi project targeted adults and children who 
are malnourished, whereas GTT’s hospital projects targeted healthcare needs in remote villages. 
Diversification is therefore a key strategy by which the social goals of the Grameen family 
projects are advanced.      
 
Pursuing economic goals  
Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) secured a $1 million investment from Intel 
Foundation in the USA in 2007. One of their revenue generating projects with Grameen 
YukiGuni Maitake Ltd was to produce high quality mung beans and export them to Japan. It was 
a joint investment project by Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) and YukiGuni Maitake Ltd. 
GISB’s prime source of income is through the sale of software and generating revenue from the 
mung bean project. The COO of Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) commented, 
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“The overall culture of Grameen is a partnership and collaboration to increase the 
social impact on society...so following this philosophy, we select partners to not only 
support us financially but also in other ways.” 
 
In a similar vein, GCCN received investment from Glasgow Caledonian University and 
GTT had investment from Danone group, France, for the ‘Shokti’ yogurt project, Green Children 
Foundation, USA, for the Grameen Green Children Eye Care Hospital project, and from Veolia 
Water AMI, France, for the Grameen Veolia Water limited project.  
The CEO of GTT said that Grameen had investment from external organisations almost 
in every project. He also remarked that Grameen mostly sought joint investment from foreign 
corporations/organisations. Being financially involved with investors usually resulted in their 
increased commitment towards a project and thus the outcome of the collaboration was almost 
always found to be satisfactory. Therefore, the evidences from these examples show that external 
investment has been an important element for the advancement of Grameen’s economic goals.  
 
6.4 Summary of key findings 
The SEs in the categories of fully donor dependent (e.g., BPF), those with some trading 
elements (e.g., Quasem Foundation and Phulki), NGOs with full reliance on trading (e.g., ASA), 
and private and public limited companies (e.g., Hathay Bunano and MIDAS) were all found to 
advance their social goal by increasing the number of branches, beneficiaries and/or employees. 
In contrast, SEs in the categories of social business (e.g., Panther Social) and NGOs with a 
conventional subsidiary enterprises (e.g., BRAC Aarong Dairy, GTT, GCCN and GISB) were 
found to advance their social goal by targeting different groups of disadvantaged people through 
new projects.  
In line with these findings, two modes of advancing social goals have emerged: 
expansion and diversification. SEs adopting expansion as a mode of growth focus on enhancing 
reach by increasing the number of branches, beneficiaries and employees. SEs adopting 
diversification as a mode prefer to increase the number of target beneficiary groups by 
introducing new businesses or organisational units (Table 6.3).  
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In terms of pursuing economic goals, SEs in the category of fully donor dependent (e.g., 
BPF), those with some trading element (e.g., Quasem Foundation and Phulki), public limited 
companies (e.g., MIDAS), and NGOs with conventional subsidiary enterprises (e.g., GTT, 
GCCN and GISB)  all  prefer income and/or investment from the government or other external 
organisations. These SEs, therefore, prioritised partnerships with other organisations as a 
relatively easy and pragmatic means to achieve their economic goals. The commitment and 
support of the partner organisation may also benefit the project with partners’ insights and know-
how. In contrast, SEs in the category of social business (e.g., Panther Social), NGOs with full 
reliance on trading (e.g., ASA) and private limited companies (e.g., Hathay Bunano) and BRAC 
Aarong Dairy from the NGOs with a subsidiary enterprise group, all achieved their economic 
goals by being relatively autonomous of government and large donors. They intentionally avoid 
external donations or investment in order to retain independence in decision making and to 
protect their particular model and vision of change. 
In line with these findings, two main modes of pursuing economic goals have emerged: 
autonomous growth and partnership. SEs preferring autonomous growth pursue their economic 
goals independently through financial self-sufficiency achieved by trading in goods or services, 
and  intentionally not pursuing donations and investments from external organisations in order to 
maintain their relative autonomy. In contrast, SEs that prefer partnerships seek financial support 
from external organisations in the form of donations or investments. They believe that such a 
partnership bring in other non-financial benefits,  such as sharing know-how and other resources. 
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Table 6.3: Expansion and diversification profile of studied SEs  
SE Age  Measure of scales Scale in 1st year Current status (at time of 
research, 2013) 
Association for 
Social 
Advancement 
(ASA) 
35 Number of branches 10 3,154 
Number of beneficiaries served 2000 4940000 
Number of employees 60 20,226 
Number/Type of business/project 1/Microfinance 1/Microfinance 
Grameen 
Telecom Trust 
(GTT) 
3 Number of branches 1 1 
Number of beneficiaries served 500 6000 
Number of employees 6 18 
Number/Type of business/project 1 5 
BRAC Dairy 15 Number of branches 1 processing plant & 30 chilling 
& collection centres 
1 processing plant & 101 chilling 
& collection centres 
Number of beneficiaries served 15000 40000 
Number of employees 400 1,500 
Number/Type of business/project 1 2  
MIDAS 18 Number of branches 1 16 
Number of beneficiaries served 10 9500 
Number of employees 20 200 
Number/Type of business/project 1 1 
Hathay 
Bunano 
9 Number of branches 1 34 
Number of employees 20 3800 
Number/Type of business/project 1 1 
Grameen Intel 
Social Business 
(GISB) 
4 Number of branches 1 2 
Number of beneficiaries served 8 989 
Number of employees 8 20 
Number/Type of business/project 1 3 
Grameen 
Caledonian 
College of 
Nursing 
(GCCN) 
3 Number of branches 1 1 
Number of beneficiaries served 38 138 
Number of employees 9 37 
Number/Type of business/project 1 2 
Phulki 22 Number of branches 1 32 
Number of beneficiaries served 5 400 
Number of employees 3 120 
Number/Type of business/project 1 1 
Panther Social 2 Number of branches 1 1 
Number of beneficiaries served 50 80 
Number of employees 3 5 
Number/Type of business/project 1 3 
Bangladesh 
Prothibondhi 
Foundation 
(BPF) 
29 Number of branches 1 7 
Number of beneficiaries served 8 250 
Number of employees 4 80 
Number/Type of business/project 1 1 
Quasem 
Foundation 
58 Number of branches 1 6 
Number of beneficiaries served 50 350 
Number of employees 27 110 
Number/Type of business/project 1 1 
 
Three different types of partnerships have emerged from the data presented above. 
These are: i) non-commercial (donations/grants), ii) commercial, and iii) joint investment 
relationships (Table 6.4). 
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Non-commercial partnership 
BPF, Quasem Foundation and Phulki receive donations from the government and a 
number of international and national organisations on a regular basis. The relationships involved 
are mainly voluntary and non-commercial. For instance, every year Quashem Foundation 
receives donations from the government of Japan, Grameen Phone, Akij Trust and BRAC. 
Similarly, BPF receives a donation from the Commercial Bank of Ceylon, Job Placement 
Australia, and Save the Children Bangladesh on an ongoing basis. Both SEs have some income 
generating activities that support a certain percentage of their expenses. Phulki also receives a 
fixed amount every year from the Aga Khan Foundation, a charity organisation. BPF earns 
revenue (consisting of 1% income share) from the sale of handicrafts made by disabled children 
to different local retail outlets and from the sale of poultry products produced in its poultry farms 
in villages run by the parents of disabled children. Similarly, Quashem Foundation earns revenue 
from the nominal fees (15% of its total income) it accepts from patients. Therefore, in both cases 
financial survival primarily depends on an ability to cultivate financial exchange relationships.  
A number of non-commercial partnerships were found to provide other forms of support 
to the SE. For instance, Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) is in partnership with e-kutir, an 
IT related SE in India, which involves taking up the responsibility to distribute GISB’s software 
in India. Quasem Foundation was in partnership with Sightsavers, an international eye care 
charity, involves them sending a team of eye surgeons to treat Quashem Foundation patients 
every six months. This important support for Quasem Foundation’s social mission also yielded 
financial benefit as it has saves the foundation’s operational cost in terms of patient care and 
support.  
Therefore, it can be inferred that this kind of relationship is non-commercial involving 
the exchange of donation/grants or non-financial support from government and/or other for-
profit and non-profit organisations. The relationship is non-commercial, altruistic and non-
obligatory. Success in advancing economic goals in these cases has been largely dependent on 
their ability to cultivate and sustain long-term relationships with the government and other 
organisations.  
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Commercial partnership 
The case of Phulki best exemplifies this type of partnership, whereby the mode of 
relationship is primarily commercial, involving financial exchange in the form of service fees 
and is governed through appropriate commercial contracts. Hence Phulki have an agreement 
with garment firms to provide day care services in factory premises, with the garment firms fully 
funding their activities in exchange for their services    
      
Joint investment relationship  
GTT, GCCN, GISB and MIDAS  had equity investment from external organisations or 
individuals. For instance, MIDAS had been receiving investment from shareholders since it 
became a public limited company in 2002, which has been  a key mode for pursuing its 
economic goals. Grameen Intel Social Business has a $1 million investment from the Intel 
Foundation. Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing started its nursing institution with the 
support of investment from Glasgow Caledonian University. GTT’s healthcare project has an 
investment from Green Children Foundation, USA, the water project has a financial and 
technical partnership with Veolia Water AMI, France, and the ‘Shakti Doi’ project has 
investment from Danone Group.  
 
Table 6.4: Forms of partnership adopted by the studied cases 
Cases Form of partnership 
Phulki Commercial: Contracts with garment manufacturers who fund their activities 
Quashem 
Foundation 
Non-commercial: Receive donations from other NGOs and funds from government; 
Sightsavers for eye surgeons 
BPF Non-commercial: Receive donations from other NGOs and a subsidy from government 
Grameen 
Caledonian 
College of 
Nursing 
Joint investment projects: Joint investment from Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
Grameen 
Telecom Trust 
Joint investment projects: with Danone group, France, for the ‘Shokti’ yogurt project; 
with Green Children Foundation, USA, for the Grameen Green Children’s Eye Care 
Hospital project; with Veolia Water AMI, France, for Grameen Veolia Water Limited’s 
project etc.  
Grameen Intel 
Social Business 
Joint investment : with Intel Foundation 
Non-commercial: E-kutir, India for development and distribution of software  
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The above examples show that investment from external organisations has been a key 
mode for pursuing economic goals in these four SEs. This form of relationship is generally 
characterised by a high level of commitment and involvement of the joint venture partners in 
decision making and resource sharing.   
The analysis shows how approaches to supporting and advancing social goals varied 
across the SE cases, with some emphasising on expansion and other diversification.  Six SEs 
focused on expansions as their main mode of advancing their social goals, while five SEs chose 
to do so primarily by diversifying into new organisational units targeting different disadvantaged 
groups. The modes of pursuing their economic goals can also be characterised in terms of 
whether SEs emphasised relative autonomy from government and other influential actors or 
grow through engaging in partnership with such influential actors. Autonomous growth was 
prioritised by four SEs and partnership was preferred by seven of them. These two modes of 
advancing the social goal and two modes of pursuing economic goals are put into two 
continuums in Figure 6. 3. 
 
Figure 6. 3: Forms of growth in SEs  
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the first research question concerning the nature of growth 
of SEs in Bangladesh. The analysis identified six operational models based on the analysis of the 
five factors set out in the working definition of SEs in Chapter 2. Each of these models is 
characteristic of different types of hybrid SEs, although all exhibit a co-existence of social and 
economic goals, multiple income sources, involvement of various stakeholder bodies in the 
governing board, and membership in pluralistic institutions. The second part of the chapter has 
analysed how the SEs cases managed their dual-value system to achieve both their social and and 
economic mission. This analysis has led to the identification of four forms of growth apparent in 
the studied SEs.  
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Chapter 7: Tensions experienced by the SE cases and how they are 
managed - Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the experience of the SE cases in relation to the multiple logics 
of their operation contexts. It focus on how the SE cases sought to respond to and balance the 
tensions between different logics. It also illuminates how the SEs had developed and mobilised 
their resources and capabilities in order to respond to those tensions. The analysis builds on the 
SE categories identified in Chapter 6 to examine how the nature of the tensions, their experience 
and management responses varied across the categories of SEs in Bangladesh.  
The next section (7.2) - (7.7) presents managerial tensions faced within individual cases. 
The cases are arranged in terms of the categories of SEs presented in Chapter 6 to analyse 
whether the tensions and management responses varied across categories. Section 7.8 presents a 
summary of the findings analysed in this chapter.    
 
7.2 Fully grant dependent NGOs 
Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation (BPF) the one case in this study representing SEs 
that are fully dependent on donations or grants from donors and the government. The data 
analysis showed that BPF experienced influences from the state, donors, society and family, 
which resulted in five different types of tensions in the organisation. The following subsections 
highlight the tensions experienced by BPF and how they have responded. See also summary in 
Table 7.1. 
    
Tension: Complying with state regulatory requirements while meeting donors’ 
expectations (BPF) 
This tension results from the requirement to comply with the state regulatory 
requirements while also needing to meet the expectations of donors. The Executive Director of 
the BPF said that since the early 1990s, when the stories of NGO malpractices started to arise in 
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the media, NGOAB demanded more accountability. According to the changed requirements, 
BPF had to undergo routine auditing every six months and also surprise inspection visits from 
government officials in order to check their accounts and operational activities. Therefore, the 
organisation had to improve its record-keeping and maintain more detailed accounts to show 
how the funds from donors were spent. The Executive Director said, 
 
“The situation demanded us to be more professional. Every six months our 
accounting division undergoes rigorous monitoring by NGOAB appointed auditors. 
Previously only the large expenses needed to be reported to the NGOAB, while now 
we have to keep record of every penny we spend from our donations.” 
 
The fund approval process  also became cumbersome, with NGOAB asking for a range 
of documentations from SEs as well as from donors. In this regard, a secretary at the Ministry of 
Social Welfare commented, 
 
“NGOs have been under greater scrutiny since early 1990s, although the monitoring 
has become more rigorous recently. We need to clearly know why an NGO gets 
funds, where the funds from donor are being spent and what impact it has created. 
Recently, a number of NGOs have used funds from overseas Bangladeshis for 
terrorist training. Therefore, we now ask for some additional documents from 
donors, such as an authorisation from their respective public body showing the 
validity and trustworthiness of the project.”  
 
The above comment indicates how the fund approval process, documentation 
requirements, and overall scrutiny on NGOs have become more rigorous, with greater 
documentation and accountability  now required from the donors’ side. This tightening 
requirement for compliance with state regulations, has therefore, required BPF to persuade their 
donors to provide additional documents and supports. The Executive Director remarked that 
donors were initially reluctant to make the extra effort to submit extra information, and were 
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critical of the lengthy procedure of fund approval and the potential to delay the start of projects. 
The Executive Director said, 
 
“When we informed our donors about the changed regulation regarding fund 
approval, they felt annoyed. We informed them that now we need additional 
documents from them, such as approval from their public authorities, a report on 
their expected visions and targets. This increased the complexity on their part in 
terms of arranging these documents. Our donors’ way of work and interaction are 
influenced by the Western work culture, which is often less bureaucratic than that of 
ours. The donors felt a discomfort with the increased need for documentation that 
may potentially delay the project’s start and operating activities.”    
 
The comment above shows that the donors’ work culture is Western-influenced and 
more efficient, which created greater difficulty for BPF in their attempt to convince them. 
Nevertheless, being registered under NGOAB, BPF was pressured to comply with the 
regulations and thus had no choice but to persuade donors of this need. The Executive Director 
remarked on the tensions experienced as a result of the challenge it posed to donors preferred 
way of working and the new monitoring system.    
 
Response to address tension     
The regulatory changes required BPF to develop professional skills in bookkeeping and 
report writing. Skills which the organisation was not previously overly concerned to develop. As 
a result, BPF had to create a separate accounts division and hire a chartered accountant to lead 
the accounts team. The organisation also hired an accountancy auditing and consulting firm to 
train existing employees and to conduct an internal audit of records. They also sought training 
support from other resourceful NGOs/ developmental organisations such as, UNICEF and Save 
the Children. The Executive Director further said,  
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Table 7.1: SEs’ managerial tensions and responses - BPF 
Tension Institutional factors Impact Response Strategy 
Complying with 
state regulatory 
requirements 
while meeting 
donors’ 
expectations 
State regulations:  
Strict regulations for 
NGOs; 
Increased monitoring and 
enforcement from 
government;   
Enhanced need for 
documentation  
Donors’ work culture:  
Donors’ work culture is 
more efficient; 
 
Financial resources:  
Increased time and 
documentation 
needed for fund 
approval and 
release 
Human resources: 
Employees initially 
lacked professional 
skills 
Skill development: 
Trained existing employees on record 
keeping, report writing, project planning 
and measuring the social impact 
Alliance building: 
Sought training support from Save the 
Children and UNICEF; 
Hired external auditor 
Staffing: 
Recruited experienced chartered 
accountant  
Communicating: 
Informed donors about new state 
procedures and SEs obligations towards 
them 
Highlighted the positive changes followed 
by the regulatory compliance  
Forced 
adoption/coercive 
compliance 
Maintaining 
apolitical image 
while achieving 
political 
legitimacy 
Party political sphere: 
Political resentment 
between parties 
Political legitimacy: 
Legitimacy from local 
political leaders is 
important for 
accessing resources 
and support 
Social capital: 
Need to maintain 
positive relations 
with both political 
parties 
Communicating: 
Maintain an apolitical image in external and 
internal communications 
Formal memo circulation among the 
employees and parents urging avoidance 
of any sort of political discussion and 
bullying based on political inclination 
Gained cooperation from local leaders by 
involving them in the project  
 
 
Adapt 
Respecting 
traditional norms 
and custom while 
meeting donors’ 
expectations 
Hierarchy and gender 
roles: 
Conservatism about 
female’s role in 
income generation  
Donors’ work culture 
Donors strictly ask for 
project designed to 
empower women 
Knowledge 
resources: 
Needed to develop 
learning on 
traditional customs 
and ways to align 
those with projects 
 
 
Communicating: 
Employees make home visits to convince 
disable children’s parents and partners 
about the benefit of the project 
Convinced donors by sharing experiential 
knowledge to inform them about the 
means of working in rural areas 
Innovation: 
Adapted the project plan according to social 
tradition in order to increase legitimacy  
 
Influence and 
(finally) adapt 
Balancing family 
values and 
donors’ norms 
Family embeddedness: 
Social goal is developed 
around the challenges 
faced by family 
members 
In-group members 
influence decision 
making and 
operational activities 
Donors’ work culture: 
Western work culture 
raises questions about 
nepotism 
Human resources: 
More autonomy and 
interference by 
board members 
from family 
The quality of human 
resources may be 
sacrificed to 
employ members of 
the family 
Staffing: 
Included two external advisers for increased 
transparency 
Skill development: 
Trained employees recruited from family to 
upgrade skills level 
Communicating: 
Convinced donors that family members on 
the board are qualified for the positions 
Convinced donors that employees recruited 
from the family are recruited for 
increased control and harmony 
Adapt 
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“We had to convince our donors that the regulatory changes were for our good and 
we needed their support in order to fully comply with these changes. We highlighted 
to the donors how the new regulations had inspired us to take measures to enhance 
our professional skills. We had to convince them by saying that our current efforts 
could be beneficial to them because the newly acquired skills and the increased 
accountability may also promote greater transparency and efficiency in the overall 
project management.”   
 
 The evidence, shows how BPF was able to persuade the donors to cooperate with the 
changes needed in order to fully comply with the new regulatory requirement of the government. 
They also needed to made improvements in term of their own skills needed to comply with a 
more stringent monitoring system.   
The analysis shows that BPF was pressured to comply with the state regulations by 
improving  professionalism and accountability process and how these were presented to NGOAB 
officers. It was, therefore, a situation of forced adoption. A number of resources and capabilities 
needed to be developed and mobilised by BPF in order to manage the tension arising from state 
imposed regulatory changes. The analysis reveals that BPF had to adopt the regulatory changes 
by persuading donors for increased cooperation, by recruiting accounting expertise for 
systematic record keeping, by building alliance with a consultancy firm for internal auditing and 
also by developing the professional skills needed for report writing and planning.  
 
Tension: Maintaining an apolitical image while achieving political legitimacy (BPF) 
The analysis shows that BPF sought to avoid any direct or indirect involvement in the 
party political sphere. There were evidence of a severe tension caused by the relationship 
between the two main political parties in Bangladesh. In this respect, BPF’s Executive Director 
highlighted that an affiliation with a particular political party could create antagonistic 
relationships with the opposite party and thus place the organisation in jeopardy when the 
government changed. Therefore, the organisation has avoided becoming over-involved in party 
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politics. However, achieving legitimacy with government and rural political leaders was also 
considered important, as the Executive Director remarked, 
 
“Being an NGO we have a high level of dealings with government. Also, without the 
support of rural leaders we cannot operate smoothly in our village-based branches. 
However, we are not interested in supporting a particular political party as this will 
make us vulnerable to getting into conflict with opposition leaders...we still need to 
confirm with our national and local political space to get their continual support. We 
also want to ensure that this support does not end with a change in government.” 
 
 The Executive Director was of the view that support from local political leaders was 
necessary for access to resources and also for the smooth operation of the project. Their approval 
was seen as necessary to help build awareness and persuade more individuals to use the service. 
Therefore, although BPF has sought to maintain a politically neutral image, it also faces pressure 
to achieve legitimacy from local allies representing the ruling political party.  
The Executive Director further highlighted that since 1996, the Awami League 
government had focused on disability issues and has become more supportive towards 
organisations working to resolve these issues, leading to BPF having increased access to state 
resources. The government has agreed to pay the salaries of 10 BPF employees since 2000, 
which has resulted in increased interactions and a stronger exchange relationship between BPF 
and the government. As a result, while there was a need to maintain a politically neutral image, 
there was also a necessity to maintain a positive relationship with the government and rural 
political representatives. Therefore, BPF has had to craft appropriate responses by managing 
both the issues concurrently, which resulted in a tension for them.   
 
Response to address tension 
In order to manage the tensions described above BPF explicitly chose to maintain an 
apolitical image in its external and internal communications. For instance the researcher was 
shown an internal memo that directed the employees and the parents of disabled children to 
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avoid any sort of political discussion and bullying based on individuals political inclination. The 
Executive Director also remarked about their external communication techniques,  
 
“All our board members, including me avoid the expression of  political viewpoints 
in public and endorsement of any political party. Although our Chairman was one of 
the founding members of Awami League [the current ruling party], he purposefully 
avoids participation in any party political activities. However, we accept the 
invitation to any disability related meetings, seminars and social events organised by 
any political party.”      
 
The above comment, therefore, reflects that BPF purposefully avoids politically inclined 
activities or discussions. At the same time, the Executive Director pointed out the importance of 
legitimacy and support from local political representatives in order to smoothly operate BPF’s 
rural centres. Hence, she remarked that BPF often invites local leaders as a spokespersons for 
awareness creation.  The local representatives are consulted before the start of any new project 
and are also encouraged to get involved through providing financial and logistic support.   
The data analysis, therefore, shows that BPF has achieved legitimacy from all the 
political parties by maintaining relationships through social interactions and participation, while 
avoiding showing any politically biased image in public or even internally. They persuaded local 
political leaders by encouraging them to engagement with and support their rural projects.  It is 
therefore evident that BPF has adapted its response in order to minimise tensions. The 
organisation has become involved with local political leaders through persuasion, while 
maintained a neutral image through careful crafting of all its external and internal 
communications.   
 
Tension: Respecting traditional norms and customs while meeting donors’ 
expectations (BPF) 
This tension emerged when BPF was attempting to implement a new project which was 
being driven by donors but which challenged some of the traditional customs and practices in the 
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society. BPF introduced a community-based rehabilitation programme (CBRP) in the year 2002 
in partnership with Job Placement, a for-profit human resource consultancy firm based in 
Australia. The aim of CBRP is to rehabilitate disabled children in their own communities and 
with their families. Under this programme, BPF provides loans (without interest) to the mothers 
of disabled children in order to purchase cattle and thus generate money from selling milk. The 
purpose of this initiative is to allow families with a disabled child to generate income to be spent 
on the child’s education, healthcare and food. The funds come from Job Placement, which aims 
to empower female members in the family in the belief that women are more responsible and 
caring towards children than men. Therefore, an important condition associated with the 
donation is that loans are given to the mother instead of the father.  
The Executive Director said that many fathers did not appreciate the idea as men 
traditionally held the responsibility for cattle farming and selling milk, and did not accept that 
their wives could fulfil such a role. For this reason, many of them prevented their wives from 
becoming involved in the project. In this respect, one of the mothers involved said, 
 
“My husband was furious when he knew that I would be the principal borrower and 
not him. When he came to know that BPF does not trust him, his ego was hurt. He 
prevented me from getting involved as he found BPF’s policy to be offensive. He also 
believed that I am not capable of managing the loan and my inexperience could push 
the family towards more agony.” 
 
The above comment reflects the high degree of resistance from the husbands regarding 
the loan condition set by the donors. On the one hand, BPF was obligated to meet the donor’s 
condition yet, on the other hand, the beneficiaries were not ready to accept the policy. The 
Executive Director said that BPF faced ‘intense pressure’ as ‘Western ideology’ was not well 
accepted by remote village communities.   
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Response to address the tension 
The Executive Director believed at first that they should make home visits to resolve the 
issue and persuade the husbands of their obligation to donors in selecting women as the loan 
recipients. However, this course of action did not yield favourable results so some form of 
compromise was necessary. Thus BPF decided to sanction the loan in the mother’s name so that 
she remained responsible for repayment but that father be included in the project as a partner and 
was responsible for the farming activities and milk sales. In this way, mothers were able to keep 
track of the income and ensure timely repayment, and the fathers did not feel completely 
excluded.  
According to the Executive Director, the donors were sufficiently convinced by the 
experience and they have been educated to realise that operating in remote villages with strong 
social norms sometimes necessitated such adaptive compromises. The Executive Director said,  
 
“We had to convince our donors that we cannot work in rural areas without 
respecting their cultural values because a rural community is highly embedded in 
their norms. It creates a great amount of stress if someone urges them to change such 
ways, so we had to adapt”.    
 
The data analysis shows how BPF initially attempted to influence villagers to accept the 
requirement of the new programme. However, on the basis of their early experience of 
implementation they were compelled to adapt the programme to fit cultural values. The tension 
was managed through innovating a newly adapted way of executing the programme and 
persuading donors.  
 
Tension: Balancing family ethos and donors’ expectations (BPF) 
BPF is a family owned NGO that has three generations of family members on its board. 
The organisation was started by Prof. Zaman (a renowned academic of the University of Dhaka 
and child psychologist) and after her retirement her daughter and now her grandchildren play the 
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role of directors. The organisation has been unwilling since its inception to accept external 
people onto the board for fear of loss of autonomy. The Chairman (who is also the eldest 
daughter of the founder) said, 
 
“My mother never wanted outside people to join our board as she thought BPF is 
her own brain child and her own creation, and that outsiders will not understand the 
emotions attached to this organisation. She decided to start this organisation after 
our brother’s suicide who was disabled. So, my mother always tried to find my 
brother in every child she served. Thus we all, my mother, me and now my daughter, 
have the same emotional values attached to the organisation. We want our 
organisation to hold onto those as it grows.”    
 
The above quote, makes clear the motivation and family values attached to the 
organisation, and that involvement of external individuals was rejection on grounds of the threat 
posed to goals associated with the organisation. 
 Further to this, BPF also engages the founder’s family members in key positions to 
look after accounting and logistics. The Chairman expressed her view that the involvement of 
family members in the key positions ensured greater internal harmony and trustworthiness. 
However, a number of the donor organisations had raised a question about the high involvement 
of family members on the board and in key managerial positions. In this respect, the Executive 
Director remarked that these donors had mainly raised the issue of ‘nepotism’ and a ‘lack of 
transparency’ and questioned the founder’s rigidity in not allowing external individuals onto the 
board and into other key positions. BPF had to comply with donors’ expectations as it was fully 
reliant on donations, while they were also committed to their family ethos. Hence, both 
Executive Director and Chairman said that BPF had experienced tension in responding to 
donors’ objections while also retaining their family ethos.  
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Response to address tension 
In order to address this issue, BPF appointed two external experts as advisers to the 
board. The Executive Director said, 
 
“Though the advisers do not have the right to make decisions, their presence in 
board meetings reflects that we are transparent. This has strengthened the regard 
that donors hold for us.” 
 
The Executive Director further highlighted that the introduction of the external advisor 
who were learned and reputable enhanced the efficiency of their decision making. At the same 
time, allowed BPF to maintain control and autonomy of the family led enterprise. Further to this, 
BPF convinced the donors that family members on the board are qualified for the position as 
they have specialised knowledge on disability. They also persuaded the donors to accept that 
family members were recruited to key positions in order to promote control and harmony in 
decision making. In this respect, the Executive Director said, 
 
“Having family members in key managerial positions increased the harmony in our 
organisation. We know that a number of NGOs have failed due to internal conflicts. 
We retain the harmony in our organisation through involving family members who 
share same values.”  
 
The evidence, therefore, suggests that in order to address this tension BPF adapted its 
board composition to satisfy donor expectations and attempted to influence them through 
persuasion.  
 
148 | P a g e  
 
7.3 NGOs with a trading element 
The NGOs fitting into this category are Phulki and the Quasem Foundation. These two 
NGOs have trading elements and thus they have interaction with the market and, being registered 
as NGOs under NGOAB they are also embedded in state and society. The analysis shows how 
these institutions played key roles in shaping their growth, while also imposed competing logics 
on both the organisations, resulting in a number of tensions which are discussed below (Table 
7.2).   
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (Quasem Foundation) 
Quasem Foundation (QF) started their organisation with a mission to provide affordable 
eye care services to the poor in Northern Bangladesh, which has long been a deprived area. Since 
2002, two of their long-term donors stopped providing donations to the organisation. To 
compensate for the lost financial resources, QF needed to increase its service fees by 5 percent in 
its eye hospitals. In this respect, the Managing Director stated, 
 
“While poverty is on the rise in Northern Bangladesh, such an increase in service 
charge may make our services less affordable for villagers. However, we had no 
other choice as we thought if we had to close one hospital, the social loss would be 
even more”.  
 
The evidence shows how QF was pressured to increase its service fees due to the loss of 
donation sources, despite their concern that doing so would make QF’s service less affordable to 
people in extreme poverty. Hence QF experienced a particular tension with respect to balancing 
its economic and social goals. 
 
Response to address tension 
The Managing Director said that they had to increase the service fee as they had no other choice 
if they were to financially survive. However, Quasem Foundation also decided to attempt to 
compensate the lost social benefits by introducing a mobile eye clinic. This new project enabled 
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the organisation to reach remote rural areas and make its services more accessible to deprived 
people. Eventually, a new source of revenue generation was identified and a commercial eye 
hospital was established in the capital city. The profit from this commercial venture was 
reinvested in other social projects. The Managing Director further relayed how the current 
government’s Vision 2020 programme had also opened a new door of opportunity for Quasem 
Foundation. The government now asks for increased participation from NGOs, especially in the 
health care and education sectors and, in line with this the Secretary of the Ministry of Social 
Welfare commented,  
 
“We seek more and more participation of NGOs in the health and education sectors 
as these are the key areas of development according to Vision 2020. The government 
is willing to support, both financially and non-financially, any hardworking NGOs 
working in these areas”.  
 
The Managing Director said that they had made “wise utilisation” of this new vision of 
government and due to its contribution in the healthcare sector in Northern Bangladesh 
government funding has been secured. The organisation currently receives a fixed amount 
donation every year from the government, as well as some initial funding during the introduction 
of the mobile eye clinic project. The local authority has also helped by building a road leading to 
the hospital, improving its alternative source of income in order to prevent future financial 
burdens.   
In addition, the foundation has sought non-financial benefits by developing alliances 
with other developmental organisations and conventional corporations. The Managing Director 
remarked that the alliances would help to “reduce pressure on cash flow”. For instance, a 
partnership with Sightsavers contributes by sending a team of eye surgeons for free to operate on 
patients. The Managing Director said,  
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“Our sources of funding are shrinking; two of our donors have pulled out. We now 
focus more on non-financial benefits from donors. If they can offer us knowledge or 
technical support, then I think that has a financial value as well.” 
 
The evidence shows that the non-financial supports received from the alliance partners 
yielded in indirect financial savings for Quasem Foundation. In addition, the new earning 
generation initiatives have also helped to compensate for the loss of financial resources due to 
cuts in funding from donors. Thus QF was able to create a new balance between both social and 
economic goals by finding alternative sources of income and also by compensating for lost social 
benefit.  
This example illustrates how QF has been able to adapt its social programme in 
response to changes in its financial situation. At the same time, it has utilised the new 
opportunity created by the government’s Vision 2020 programme and also introduced new 
income generating projects. Therefore, QF used their alliance building, earning generation and 
innovation capability to address this tension. 
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Table 7.2: SEs’ tensions and responses – Quasem Foundation and Phulki 
Tension Institutional factors Impact Response Strategy 
QUASEM FOUNDATION    
Balancing social 
and economic 
goals 
Donors’ policy:  
Reduced funding from 
donors  
Consumers’ ability:  
Increasing poverty in 
Northern parts of 
Bangladesh 
State policy: 
Vision 2020 encourages 
contributions by NGOs in 
the healthcare sector 
Financial resources:  
Increased pressure to 
maintain financial 
sustainability and 
generate more 
revenue  
 
Earning generation: 
Started a new commercial eye hospital in the 
capital city to generate revenue to support 
their rural subsidized projects  
Alliance building: 
Partnership with Sightsavers who sent a team 
of Eye Surgeons (free) to operate patients   
Innovation: 
Introduced mobile eye clinic to reach 
marginally poor and remote areas   
Relationship building: 
Building long-term relationships with donors 
to ensure certainty of continual support 
Adapt 
Maintaining 
apolitical image 
while achieving 
political legitimacy 
Party political sphere: 
Political resentment between 
parties 
Pressure from local leaders 
on the founder to 
represent their party in 
the national election  
Political legitimacy: 
Legitimacy from local 
political leaders is 
important for accessing 
resources and support 
Social capital: 
Need to maintain 
political network 
with both parties 
and good 
relationships with 
local leaders 
Communicating: 
Maintain an apolitical image in external and 
internal communication 
The founder convinced local leaders about his 
unwillingness to participate in the election 
and noted his lack of experience in politics  
Increased interaction with Ministry of Social 
Welfare and public institutions during 
meeting by sharing ideas and advice  
Reflect upon the contributions to Northern 
villages to achieve legitimacy   
Adapt 
PHULKI     
Attaining 
organisational goal 
while influencing 
social norms 
 
 
 
Requirements/standards 
imposed by market actors:  
Rising pressure from foreign 
buyers to provide 
childcare facilities to 
workers 
Rising pressure from buyers 
on the government to 
implement childcare 
provision in garments 
State regulations: 
Amendments in national 
labour law in 1996 
which requires garment 
factories to provide 
childcare facilities  
Since 2000, government 
emphasises 
implementation of this 
law 
Conservatism in society: 
Bringing children to work is 
not a social practice in 
Bangladeshi’s working 
class community 
Mistrust towards day care 
centres 
Garment owners were 
initially unwilling to 
introduce childcare 
Financial resource: 
Financial 
sustainability 
becomes 
troublesome if 
garment owners do 
not fund the 
project and if 
workers are 
unwilling to use 
the service 
Earning generation: 
Sought increased funding support from 
government to further subsidise service 
fees since 2000 
Asked for a subsidised service charge from 
working mothers  
Communicating: 
Had dialogue with mothers to convince them 
to use the day care service 
Convinced existing mothers to spread positive 
word of mouth 
Relationship building: 
Started open door policy that allows mothers 
to visit and spend a day/hours with Phulki 
Selected representative mothers to 
communicate to other mothers and convey 
their problems/view to Phulki 
Alliance building:  
Build partnerships with garment firms by 
drawing upon the rising emphasis of the 
state on implementing childcare provision 
in garments firms 
Used the reference of existing partnerships to 
encourage other garment owners  
Networking and relationship building: 
Maintain relationships with government 
officers and keep them updated about 
Phulki’s activities  
 
Proactive 
adoption  and 
influence 
Fulfilling social 
obligations while 
protecting 
knowledge 
resources 
Requirements/standards 
imposed by market 
actors: Garment firms 
increasingly introducing 
day care centres to 
comply with buyers’ 
codes 
Competitive logics: 
Protecting core know-how 
Knowledge 
resources: 
Need to transfer 
know-how to other 
organisations in 
order to benefit an 
increasing number 
of working women  
Replicating: 
Trained a few other organisations outside 
Dhaka city and transferred the key know-
how of managing such NGOs 
Earning generation: 
The replication was conducted as a test; as 
Phulki plans to franchise its model in 
return for a franchising fee in order to see a 
return while also increasing social benefits 
Proactive 
adoption 
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Tension: Maintaining an apolitical image while achieving political legitimacy (Quasem 
Foundation) 
The Managing Director emphasised the importance attached by QF to maintaining an 
apolitical image and to prevent being made a victim of change in the government regime. 
However, he pointed out the need for support and legitimacy from local political leaders, noting 
that on a number of occasions QF had to utilise its relationships with local leaders to seek 
permission for activities, logistical support, protection from local influential thugs, and to 
encourage villagers to use its services. The MD also remarked that, due to the popularity of the 
founder of Quasem Foundation, both the political parties had requested that he contest the 
general election as their party nominee. However, he refused these offers as he was unwilling to 
embrace a particular political party. The founder had previously established that endorsing a 
particular political party was “unwise” and could jeopardise the organisation’s activities if the 
opposition party formed a new government. Although this issue had always been a challenge, QF 
has been able to manage the tension by securing benefits from rural political leaders without 
espousing their party.   
 
Response to address tension 
On the one hand, QF’s Managing Director refused any party’s invitation in order to 
communicate externally that the organisation holds a neutral political image. On the other hand, 
they maintained continuous interactions with the Ministry of Social Welfare and other public 
institutions. The MD remarked that they always engaged in meetings held by the Ministry by 
sharing ideas and advice, and regularly reflected upon contributions to the Northern villages in 
such meetings. They invited government bureaucrats and local political leaders to visit current 
projects and the MD believed that these measures had helped the organisation to maintain an 
apolitical image while also securing political support and legitimacy. The evidence, therefore, 
shows that QF side-stepped the invitations from political parties, while they adapted to the 
expectations of government officials and local leaders by maintaining regular communication 
and building relationships with them.     
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Tension: Attaining organisational goal while influencing social norms (Phulki) 
This tension emerged from an attempt by Phulki to a new opportunity arising from 
changes to the market and state regulatory environment, which necessitated a transformation in 
the mentality of society, especially that of the potential beneficiaries (i.e. female garment 
workers). Since 2000 there has been rising pressure from foreign buyers on Bangladeshi garment 
manufacturers to provide childcare facilities to workers. International developmental 
organisations have also increasingly pressurised the government to enforce national laws that 
require factories to provide child care provision. In 1996, the government amended the National 
Labour Law, which required garment manufacturers to provide child care facilities to their 
workers. However, until recently government has tended not attach priority to the proper 
implementation and enforcement of this provision in the law. With rising pressure from key 
foreign buyers, international developmental organisations and labour agencies, the government 
gives greater emphasis to the enforcement of this law, which also created an opportunity for 
Phulki to grow. The founder reported that from 2002 to 2003, Phulki established partnerships 
with five garment factories, which doubled its number of branches from four to ten.  
In addition, Phulki identified its role to the government by supporting garment factories 
in their implementation of child care provision as per the national labour law. The organisation 
started to receive regular funds from the government which strengthened its financial situation 
even further. New sources of finance enabled Phulki to further subsidise the service charge in its 
independent day care centres.  
The founder remarked that while there was this rising opportunity for economic growth, 
Phulki’s social goals were still at stake as it continued to experience difficulties in persuading 
garment workers and other mothers (in independent centres) to use its services. Bringing children 
to work and using day care provision is not common practice in Bangladeshi society. The 
interviewee – a representative of the mothers’ committee – informed me that initially the mothers 
were doubtful about how Phulki would take care of the children and they needed to be reassured 
that they would not be abused. The interviewee further remarked that, because of their suspicions 
the mothers used to spy on Phulki’s activities through windows and using other secret methods. 
In addition, some mothers used to spread negativity about the organisation.   
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In this respect, the founder commented that being the first of its kind, Phulki has faced 
considerable scepticism from parents. She said, 
 
“After waiting for ten years, we finally could see the light at the end of the tunnel 
when garment firms started to contact us. While there was rising opportunity for 
growth, we were still facing challenges in convincing mothers that it is safe to put 
their children in the day care centre...we knew if we could not get over this challenge 
then our NGO would close soon”. 
 
The evidence, therefore, shows although Phulki was able to utilise the changing trend in 
the garment industry related regulation from government, it had to first address conservatism 
among the women workers regarding the trustworthiness of their child care services. Therefore, 
Phulki faced tensions in attending to the rising market opportunity, while also dealing with the 
suspicion and resistance to change of its targeted beneficiaries.    
 
Response to address tension 
The founder pointed out a number of means that they adopted to persuade the mothers 
of the trustworthiness and value of their child care service. They had dialogue with mothers by 
responding to queries, educating them about Phulki’s activities and getting them involved in the 
process of encouraging their co-workers to enrol their children. To gain further confidence, they 
started an open door policy whereby they allowed any mother to visit and spend a day or a 
couple of hours with Phulki to see how the children were taken care of. This step enabled Phulki 
to benefit from positive word of mouth messages being spread by the parents who visited the 
centres. In every branch they selected a representative (usually a mother or the land-lord) who is 
a local person and presents the views/problems of other mothers and local people, as well as 
passing on Phulki’s responses to the respective body. In this way, Phulki used an in-group 
member to help legitimise the organisation to other workers. Through its open door policy, the 
organisation also created a bonding with the mothers which further encouraged spread of a 
positive word of mouth message about the service. 
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At the same time, Phulki built its legitimacy and reputation with the government and 
also the ongoing  support of a number of garment firms, using their networking skills to maintain 
relationships with government officers and keeping them updated about Phulki’s activities. The 
organisation formed initial alliances with a small number of garment firms and then became 
involved in an increasing number of partnerships based on the references of existing garment 
owners.  
This example illustrates how Phulki was able to utilise a rising opportunity in the 
garment sector and the possibility of state funding through networking and alliance building 
skills. They achieved legitimacy from key beneficiaries (i.e. mothers) whom they influenced 
through persuasion and relationship building.  
 
Tension: Fulfilling social obligation while protecting knowledge resources (Phulki) 
With the recent Rana Plaza accident, garment owners have become increasingly 
involved in partnerships with NGOs to manage their day care centres. The founder of Phulki 
said, 
 
“NGOs like ours are now growing very fast. As we have operated in this sector for 
long time, we are often invited for advice and training. As an NGO we feel the social 
obligation is to train them, but from competitive point of view this is not wise. 
Training new NGOs means creating competitors who may prevent our opportunity 
from growing.” 
 
 The founder said that being the first of its kind, Phulki holds considerable experiential 
knowledge of the area and that a number of emerging NGOs were seek to take advantage of their 
know-how support. It would be consistent with Phulki’s social mission for them to share their 
expertise with other NGOs through training etc, so that they too can offer the child care service 
to an increasing number of garment workers. However, the founder was also aware of the fact 
that competitive logic contradicts these actions as transferring know-how means transferring core 
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knowledge: “Sharing knowledge will create similar NGOs who will also compete in the garment 
industry and making partnerships with firms” (Phulki founder). The founder, therefore, 
identified the particular tension faced when attempting to balance social obligations while 
concurrently protecting their knowledge assets.  
 
Response to address tension     
In order to address this tension, Phulki decided to franchise its model as it was 
replicable and not overly complex. The founder stated,  
 
“Our operations are mainly Dhaka based. So, we decided to train NGOs in 
Chittagong [the second largest city in Bangladesh]. In doing so, we could avoid 
creating competitors in Dhaka city. However, with the rising trend of labour code 
compliance by factories since 2012, the demand for our service started to increase. 
In such a situation, we wanted to grow economically without forgetting our 
inclinations towards social goals. We realised that we alone cannot serve 3500 
garments factories in Dhaka city. Thus we decided to franchise our model in return 
of a nominal royalty fee. This strategy created a new source of income for us, while 
safeguarding our key know-how. Also, we were able to contribute to the society by 
stimulating the growth of similar NGOs like us.”  
 
The above quote reflects how Phulki’s strategy has enabled them to retain some control 
over the franchisees while also creating a new source of revenue from the franchising fee. The 
strategy will also enable rapid expansion of social benefits thus fulfilling the organisation’s 
social mission.   This example, therefore, illustrates how Phulki has been able to respond to a 
rising opportunity for social and economic growth through replicating their model via 
franchising.   
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7.4 NGOs with full reliance on trading 
Of the eleven SE cases, ASA is the one that best fits in this category being fully reliant 
on service fees (Table 7.3). However, the data analysis shows that it has also been heavily 
influenced by the regulatory and policy institutions of the state. ASA have also had to cultivate 
and maintain strong relationships with local communities and the beneficiaries of their rural 
centres. The institutional influences faced by ASA and the tensions arising from these are 
discussed below.  
 
Tension: Convincing two groups of peer organisations to agree on the same goal (ASA) 
The  analysis suggests that up until 2006 there was an absence of customised regulations 
to govern micro-financing institutions in Bangladesh, as well as confusion regarding the 
appropriate authority (NGOAB or the Finance Ministry) responsible for monitoring such 
organisations. As a result some opportunistic MFIs were found to be exploiting the loopholes for 
malpractices. The founder of ASA exemplified how a number of small MFIs were accused by 
NGOAB of receiving large amounts of donor fund, the majority share of which was exploited by 
the founders for personal benefits. Some MFIs were also accused of asking high interest charges 
from the poor, thus putting them into further jeopardy. The founder pointed explained how the 
confusion as to the responsible authority for monitoring MFIs’ activities had further contributed 
to the spread of  such malpractices. Being one of the largest and earliest MFIs, ASA felt the need 
for a customised law and the establishment of a specific monitoring body to govern the sector. In 
order for such regulatory change to occur, a combined action from ASA and other MFIs, both 
small and large, was required.  
In this respect, the founder commented that a tension was created when attempting to 
persuade other MFIs of the need for such major change. The small MFIs resisted the change 
because of their fear that this would require more professionalism, more reporting and increased 
transparency from their side. He remarked that a number of MFIs, especially the small ones, 
were either resource constrained or reluctant to undertake such action. Convincing the small 
MFIs was therefore a challenge while being able to present a unified case this was also a 
prerequisite to approaching government for any regulatory change. The founder said,  
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“After discussing with a number of small MFIs, we [ASA and other similar large 
MFIs] understood their bottlenecks and the reasons for their resistance. They feared 
the change as they believed that they would be unable to implement any new 
regulatory requirements due to their lack of resources. We realised that if we are 
convince these small MFIs, first we have to agree amongst ourselves to support them 
with our combined efforts. We cannot welcome any such change that restricts the 
growth of our peers. Unlike commercial organisations we don’t look at them as our 
competitors and rule them out of the field.”   
 
The above quote shows that convincing the small MFIs required resourceful MFIs to 
assist them to comply with any future regulatory changes. As a consequence, ASA together with 
a few other large organisation had to persuade similar resourceful organisations to support the 
small ones to implement the changes needed by any future regulatory change. A number of large 
MFIs refused to do so on the grounds of competitive logics, lack of resource or just lack of 
willingness.  The tension, therefore, revolved around the need to convince the small MFIs of the 
need for regulatory change while also persuading the large MFIs to support the small ones.  
 
Response to address tension 
ASA’s founder networked with other large MFIs to form the Association of Micro-
Financing Institutions (AMFI). The association aimed to persuade a considerable number of 
MFIs of the need for the regulatory change, and to collectively lobby the government for a 
customised MFI act and specialised monitoring body and also appropriate support to the resource 
constraint MFIs to help them implement the new regulatory requirements. The association 
persuaded a group of  other MFIs of the benefits of a customised law and the initial members 
arranged seminars, meetings and conducted research to highlight the problem to other MFIs. 
When they had successfully persuaded sufficient number of MFIs, they started to collectively 
lobby the government. This process took three years from forming the association to convincing 
other MFIs and the government to develop the Micro-Financing Act and  MFI regulatory body. 
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Following the introduction of the regulatory change, the association provided a range of support 
measures to the small MFIs to assist them in implementing the new requirements as well as other 
advice.  
The analysis, therefore, shows how ASA was able to influence other MFIs and the 
government at a collective level through the creation of a new MFI association. The tension was 
addressed mainly by collectively persuading and communicating with other MFIs and then 
lobbying the government.   
 
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (ASA) 
Working in parallel with the government to reduce poverty has been the primary trigger 
behind ASA’s inception and is also the main mission for continued growth. The founder 
described how ASA’s innovative model had enabled them to secure a significant loan during the 
start-up phase from the Palli Kormo Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) (a public institution established 
to finance micro-finance institutions). Also important during ASA’s early years, were donations 
from the Bangladeshi government. The founder pointed out that with a downturn in government 
funding since 1999, ASA had continually devoted its efforts to becoming more financially 
sustainable. The founder said that although there were times when they had felt the need to 
increase service fees from loan beneficiaries to enhance their financial return, they had chosen 
not due to the increased difficulty, this should cause for level for the borrowers who were already 
burdened with the loan amount. The founder pointed out that the situation was “extremely 
problematic” for ASA, highlighting the tension around balancing economic goals while not 
burdening the poor beneficiaries with increased service fees. 
 
Response to address tensions     
The founder explained how instead of burdening borrowers ASA had introduced 
techniques to increase the repayment rate within a stipulated timeframe. For instance, ASA’s 
operational model, developed from 20 years of industry experience, included mechanisms for 
careful evaluation of the motivation and the ability of borrowers on which the loan amount is 
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decided. Before sanctioning any loan amount, a loan officer would perform a home visit and 
evaluate each client based on their assets, idea and previous experience in business, and then 
decide on the loan amount. The organisation trained loan officers to collect information from 
home visits and apply the mechanism in their decision process. All branches were empowered to 
customise an approach that was sensitive to the context of the respective area. According to the 
organisation’s annual report, this model had reduced the default rate from 5 percent to 0.02 
percent within a five-year period.  The founder claimed that within two years of the start of their 
loan model they had successfully achieved one of the highest repayment rates in the sector. He 
argued that their loan model was “innovative and suited to the conditions and needs of the 
borrowers”.  One of the beneficiaries of ASA said,  
 
“I had a fear about micro-credit. I took a loan from another organisation, which I 
could not repay on time. As a result, the organisation took away my cow, which was 
my main source of earning...I trust ASA as they constantly monitor how am I doing in 
my business and support me in times of need. For instance, last year one of my 
suppliers supplied damaged goods. The supplier was influential and I could not get 
my money back. ASA helped me to get my money back. So, I know they not only care 
about their money but also about my business success”.   
 
The comment of the beneficiary shows that ASA not only provides loans to individuals 
but also supports them through various means in order to make their ventures successful, 
resulting in on time repayments of loans. According to the founder, since the introduction of this 
method in 2000 the financial sustainability of the organisation has significantly increased.  
Further to this, ASA has created an alternative source of earning generation from the 
training and consultations provided to other MFIs through consultancy fees. The founder said 
that within the context of rapid growth in the micro-credit sector, ASA’s innovative model has 
been appreciated by many emerging MFIs, with many requesting ASA’s support in terms of 
know-how and advice. ASA facilitated the replication of their loan model by training a number 
of national and international MFI institutions, which has also allowed them to contribute further 
towards their mission to create social benefits. 
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The founder further remarked that ASA has been successful in cutting costs by means of 
decentralisation and the empowerment of employees. As a decentralized institution, each branch 
acts as its own cost and profit centre, which encourages the efficient use of resources. Each 
branch prepares its own annual work plan with fiscal targets and cash flow projections. After the 
money comes in from daily collections (i.e. savings, insurance premiums and loan instalments; at 
approximately noon each day), the branch calculates how much it needs for daily accounts or 
expenditures and then deposits the rest in the bank. When a branch needs more money, if 
collection is not enough, it draws money from its bank account. If the branch is unable to cover 
all of its payments from its own receipts then it can request money from the headquarters or from 
other branches in the district, depending on which has the most surplus. Thus, each branch 
competes to increase its own economic efficiency which then contributes to the overall financial 
sustainability of the organisation.  
According to the founder a further cost cutting was achieved through delegating 
additional responsibilities to employees. For instance, ASA’s branch offices do not have 
accountants or cashiers. Loan Officers (LO) are responsible for maintaining daily accounts and 
rotate to perform the role of cashier, with branch accounting and transactional accounts being 
maintained by the branch manager. The founder remarked that although ASA has to pay 
employees extra for undertaking additional responsibilities, the strategy still costs them less than 
hiring an additional employee for the task.  
The evidence shows how ASA has adapted its loan policy and organisational structure 
to balance its social and economic goals. ASA had also created an alternative source of income 
for greater economic efficiency, while contributing to their social goal by promoting the 
replication of their model. Therefore, these capabilities have been important in underpinning 
their growth towards financial independence from large donors.  
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Table 7.3: SEs’ tensions and responses - ASA 
Tension Institutional factors Impact Response Strategy 
Convincing two 
groups of  peer 
organisations to 
agree to same goal 
Customised regulation:  
Absence of customised 
regulations to govern 
MFIs 
Confusion regarding the 
authority responsible for 
monitoring MFIs 
Peer organisation 
behaviour:  
Small MFIs are resistant to 
change 
Large MFIs are reluctant to 
support the small ones to 
implement regulatory 
changes 
Professional Skills:  
Absence of a 
customised law 
results in a lack of 
transparency, 
accountability and 
professionalism 
 
Networking: 
ASA, along with other influential MFIs, 
formed an association (AMFI) to 
network with other MFIs  
Lobbying: 
AMFI lobbied the government for the 
introduction of a new customised MFI 
Act    
Communicating: 
ASA and AMFI held joint seminars, 
meetings and research projects to 
communicate to peer MFIs  the benefits 
of legal change 
Persuaded large MFIs to support small 
ones to develop skills needed 
Skills development: 
Developed appropriate skills to integrate 
with new regulatory requirements 
through external links 
Influence  
Balancing social 
and economic goals 
State funding and support: 
Reduced funding support 
from government 
Donors’ policy: 
Reduced funding support 
from donors 
Consumer ability: 
Poor borrowers cannot repay 
loans on time 
Financial resources: 
Financial self-
sufficiency needs to 
be achieved through 
increased reliance 
on service fees  
  
Innovation:  
Introduced techniques to achieve better 
repayment rate without burdening 
borrowers   
Empowered field employees to decide on 
various aspects of a loan 
Decentralised branches to customise 
strategies according to the requirements 
of the community to avoid unnecessary 
burdens on beneficiaries  
Earning generation: 
Training and consultation of other MFIs 
in return of consultations fee 
Replication:  
Promoted the replication of their model  
Adapt 
 
 
7.5 Social business 
Panther Social was originally built on the social business concept promoted by Yunus, 
although it is registered as a private limited company (Table 7.4) and thus is embedded in the 
private sector. The organisation is financially self-reliant and has a revenue model that is close to 
that of  a conventional enterprise. The organisation is enacted in market as it sells its products to 
corporate clients and individual customers. Panther Social has close interaction with the 
rickshaw puller and rickshaw artist communities as the organisation’s operational model is 
designed to serve their ability. The organisation is thus embeddedness in pluralistic institutional 
domains, resulting in a number of tensions which are discussed below.  
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Tension: Maintaining an independent status while avoiding conflict with government 
(Panther Social) 
The analysis shows a number of challenges originating from the state regulatory and 
policy environment in relation to social businesses. For instance, the founder and CEO of 
Panther Social explained that there was a lack of “customised regulation” that is attuned to the 
needs of social businesses in Bangladesh. Confusions was evident among the public officers in 
relation to taxation requirements, operational models and the support needs of social businesses, 
with the former Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare commenting,  
 
“Whether you call it social business or SE, the concept is not yet clear for people like 
us. We are very much familiar with NGOs and so we are well-equipped and 
knowledgeable to support the NGO sector. At the moment, there is no law that 
differentiates NGOs from social businesses. If there were a customised regulation, 
only then would we be able to offer them [social businesses] ready-made support.” 
  
The above comment suggests that public officers often have a limited understanding of 
social business, and that the absence of customised regulations could be one of the reasons 
underpinning this ambiguity. The evidence from data further shows that there is limited public 
support available to social businesses compared to their NGO counterparts. In this respect, the 
Executive Director of the Yunus Centre, a support organisation for social businesses, 
commented, 
 
“Unfortunately, there is no separate law for social businesses. As a result, NGOAB 
officers treat social businesses as NGOs...tensions started when the social business 
concept emerged in Bangladesh and NGOAB was not equipped to support their 
needs. At present, we are the only support institution providing training, information, 
advice and other non-financial assistance to the social businesses”.  
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This comment by the Executive Director of the Yunus Centre supports that the absence 
of a customised law is a key tension between public institutions and social businesses. The CEO 
of Panther Social explained that when they first applied to NGOAB for registration as a social 
business, the limited understanding of social businesses by NGOAB officers created confusion 
and delayed the process. The founder/CEO of Panther Social said,  
 
“After two months with our application they [NGOAB] asked for documents showing 
our funding arrangement and list of potential donors. This means they had no idea 
about what we were trying to do. We told them that we do not have donors and that 
we will be financially self-reliant. Then they became confused as to whether we 
should be exempted from tax or not. They then sent our proposal for approval from 
the Finance Ministry. After about six months of waiting, I became impatient and 
withdrew the application from NGOAB and resubmitted to get it registered as a 
private firm”. 
 
The interview evidence further confirmed the impact of the confluctual relationship 
between the government and Yunus and other social businesses. The founder of Panther Social 
said that being registered as a social business could jeopardise the organisation’s political image, 
making it more prone to scrutiny from government and challenges with respect to accessing 
public sector support. The stance of government was described as “prejudiced” and 
“unsympathetic” by the founder. He said that even before starting the venture they experienced 
difficulties in finding the most aappropriate legal form. The founder emphasised the importance 
of maintaining an apolitical image and that registering as a social business could negatively 
influence this due the ongoing tension between Yunus and the government. Given these issues, 
Panther Social withdrew their application to NGOAB and registered under the Private Company 
Act, which ensured easier access to conventional finance, but also avoided the extensive scrutiny 
of NGOAB.  
Nevertheless, Panther Social were required to pay taxes as a private/commercial 
enterprise and were prevented from seeking donations or grants. The founder further stated that 
registering as a private limited company had created confusion among their employees about the 
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actual identity of the organisation, which was also was one of the causes of ongoing 
dissatisfaction amongst them. For instance, being registered as a private company, meant that 
employees had to pay income tax at a rate applicable to a conventional for-profit firm, whereas 
those working in NGOs pay income tax at a subsidised rate. Therefore, while Panther Social 
wanted to achieve an independent status without involving into any conflict with the government 
by registering as a private firm, the organisation faced a number of managerial tensions due to 
regulatory context. 
 
Response to address tensions  
Initially, when NGOAB delayed the organisation’s registration the founder used his 
political connections to expedite the process, further explaining to NGOAB their operations and 
business model. Finally, when all attempts failed they withdrew the application from the 
NGOAB and registered as a private company.  
To avoid confusion regarding multiple identities different communications strategies 
were designed for various stakeholders. For instance, in internal memorandums they are stated to 
be a social business, thus reflecting to the board and to employees that their primary goal is to 
achieve the set social mission. All the employees were provided with mandatory three day 
training after recruitment to aid a better understanding about the nature of social business. The 
founder explained that they had to revise their pay scale twice in last two years in order to 
address the ongoing dissatisfaction among employees regarding the income tax issue. The annual 
report reveals that in current date they paid a higher salary than average NGOs.  
The organisation presents the image as a private firm in their external communication. 
For example, they are a member of Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and 
Industries (FBCCI), a trade organization that plays pivotal role in a consultative and advisory 
capacity, safeguarding the interest of the private sector. Representatives from Panther Social 
attend the meeting and events organised by the association, also participating in the annual fair 
organised by FBCCI every year since 2012 in order to promote their organisation to the 
customers and investors. 
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Table 7.4: SEs’ tensions and responses– Panther Social 
Tension Institutional factors Impact  Response Strategy 
Maintaining an 
independent status 
while avoiding 
conflict with 
government 
Customised regulation:  
Absence of customised 
regulation for social 
business 
Level of understanding of 
social business by 
regulator (NGOAB) 
Party political sphere:  
Tension between Yunus & 
the government 
 
Financial resources:  
Registration under the 
Private Company Act 
requires them to pay 
tax as a 
private/commercial 
enterprise & prevents 
them seeking 
donations & grants. 
Human resources: 
Confusion among 
employees about the 
identity of the 
organisation 
Employees required to 
pay income tax at rate 
same as private firms 
Networking: 
Used political networks to expedite the 
registration process held by the 
NGOAB  
Alteration: 
Withdrew application from NGOAB and 
registered as a private company 
Revised the salary scale of employees and 
designed salary package paying more 
than conventional NGOs 
Communication: 
Crafted appropriate communication 
strategy to reflect multiple 
organisational identities to different 
stakeholders  
  
 
Side stepping 
Balancing 
economic and 
social goals  
 
 
Competitive logics: 
Market logic emphasis on 
unique selling 
proposition 
Consumer awareness: 
Customers lack awareness 
about rickshaw 
branding & rickshaw art 
Social exclusion and 
fairness: 
Rickshaw pullers & 
rickshaw artists are 
excluded by 
conventional NGOs as 
beneficiaries 
 
Financial resources: 
Generate revenue 
through trading is the 
most viable source of 
financial development 
Human resources: 
Need to develop 
business-like skills to 
generate revenue 
from trading 
  
Earned Income Generation: 
Income generation through an inclusive 
business model 
Utilised the hereditary knowledge of the 
beneficiaries at the same time as 
creating an income opportunity for 
them 
Innovation: 
Established a design unit to produce 
creative and colourful ideas for 
rickshaw advertisements 
Empowered rickshaw artists to restore 
their creativity and learn from their 
ancestors 
Learning: 
Recruited graduates from design 
institutes and business schools to 
develop the ideas and sell those to 
customers 
Leveraged knowledge gained from year-
long experiences in the media industry 
Alliance building: 
Formed partnerships to overcome know-
how shortage (e.g. with Bamyan 
Media) 
Collaborated with Yunus Centre around 
knowledge sharing 
Marketing: 
Advertise in social media 
PR activities 
Offer customised rickshaw art for gifts 
with greeting messages 
Formed partnership with international 
retail stores and art galleries for the 
distribution of rickshaw art 
Online sales through self-maintained 
website 
Painted 25 rickshaws with company’s 
own branding to prove the viability of 
the project to corporate clients. 
Adapt 
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The evidence therefore, shows that Panther Social side-stepped being a victim of 
NGOAB bureaucracy, confusion and scrutiny by changing their registration status. The new 
status created tensions related to multiple identities and also employee dissatisfaction, which 
were addressed respectively by designing an appropriate communications strategy customised 
for each stakeholder group and by revising the salary scale to be more attuned to the expectations 
of the employees.     
 
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (Panther Social) 
Being registered as a private company restricted Panther Social from seeking any 
donations or grants, which meant that generating revenue through trading was the most viable 
source. On the one hand, the company wanted to create a social business model to benefit 
rickshaw pullers and artists, as these individuals are excluded from support by most NGOs. On 
the other hand, they knew that customers lacked an awareness of rickshaw branding and 
rickshaw art. The founder said, 
 
“We wanted to create a sustainable income solution for rickshaw pullers and 
rickshaw artists. However, we also knew that challenges were ahead of us as we 
wanted to establish rickshaw branding and rickshaw art as unique products to a 
customer group who have no pre-existing idea about these”. 
  
The founder further pointed out that one of the pre-requisites to operate successfully in 
the market is developing a unique selling proposition, which requires creation of awareness 
among potential local and international customers about how their art works are different from 
those sold in conventional art galleries. He commented,  
 
“Positioning our differentiated product was a difficult task, especially in the national 
market, with target consumers being limitedly concerned about issues such as, 
ethical consumerism, fair treatment and social exclusion. Although I agree that the 
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potential international customers mostly hold a higher degree of awareness and 
concern about these issues, they tend to have less knowledge about what rickshaw art 
means, about the skills involved and the emotions attached to making them. So, 
creating awareness and establishing our uniqueness was also a difficult task in the 
international market.” 
  
Panther Social therefore experienced challenges in adhering to their core social mission, 
while designing a unique selling proposition attuned to market conditions, with potential 
consumers having limited awareness for appreciation of the uniqueness of the product.  
 
Responses to address tensions   
The founder pointed out a number of strategies used to establish their market 
proposition based on their social mission. The founder pointed out an early need to develop 
business-like skills to achieve this goal, highlighting that Panther Social achieved these skills by 
recruiting graduates from design institutes and business schools in order to produce the ideas to 
sell. The organisation also leveraged managerial knowledge of the founder gained from the year-
long experience in the media industry. Alliances were developed to overcome know-how 
shortage with Egyptian company Bamyan Media and with Yunus Centre. 
The founder explained that their marketing activities included a range of tools, arguing 
that some of these were “unique” and were much “appreciated” by their stakeholders. They 
advertise on social media, conducted PR activities and offered customised rickshaw art for gifts 
with greeting messages. In order to distribute the rickshaw art pieces partnerships have been 
formed with international retail stores and art galleries. They also conduct online sales through a 
self-maintained website. The founder said that there is a “stigma” associated with rickshaws as 
cheap vehicles used by people at the lower end of society. Therefore,  for this reason potential 
corporate clients felt that advertising on a rickshaw could seriously devalue their brand image. 
This concern was allayed by developing a unique marketing technique: the organisation painted 
25 of Panther Social’s own rickshaws to advertise the founder’s other businesses. These 
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rickshaws were painted with company logos and bright colours to attract both media and public 
attention, and to encourage corporate clients to do the same.  
The evidence from this case shows how Panther Social adapted their response to 
influences from the market and the society by developing and applying business-like skills and 
an appropriate communication strategy. At the same time, they designed an inclusive business 
model to create a sustainable income solution for rickshaw pullers and rickshaw artists who were 
excluded from the support provided by traditional NGOs.    
 
7.6 Private and public limited corporations 
Hathay Bunano is a private limited company listed under the Private Company Act of 
Bangladesh and MIDAS is a public limited company listed under the Dhaka and Chittagong 
stock exchange (Table 7. 5). Thus they are obligated to comply with their respective regulatory 
bodies. Both SEs have exchange relationships in the market: Hathay Bunano sells toys to 
conventional retailers and MIDAS offers finance to SMEs and collects investments from the 
capital market. They are both particularly involved in close relationships with beneficiaries.   
 
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (MIDAS) 
MIDAS was initially registered as an NGO under  NGOAB, but its operational model is different 
from conventional NGOs because it is a non-banking financial institution with a social goal. The 
Managing Director explained how the absence of customised regulation and monitoring to 
govern their organisation had led to difficulties in dealing with NGOAB. Also, in 1993 USAID, 
a large donor, stopped supporting MIDAS  prompting them to request a loan from a conventional 
bank to save the organisation. This was refused since conventional bank’s loan facilities were 
only provided to non-banking financial institutes (NBFI). Therefore, in response to all of these 
challenges and opportunities, MIDAS decided to transfer their registration from NGO to NBFI 
upon approval from Bangladesh Bank, which enabled them to receive a loan. In 2002, they were 
listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange and the Chittagong Stock Exchange in 2004 to access 
capital from the market. The MD claimed that all of these changes made the organisation 
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increasingly financially self-reliant, although a new range of tensions had also been created in 
the process. The Managing Director said, 
 
“Investors always pressured for more return on their investment during annual 
meetings. I don’t blame them because this is how the capital market works. However, 
we are here to accomplish our social goal and that is our priority. Therefore, we 
cannot just increase the interest rate and burden our borrowers”. 
 
The above comment shows that MIDAS had to satisfy investors who were focused 
primarily on economic returns, while also advancing its social goal requires a good relationship 
of care and consideration with their beneficiaries. The MD described how they had experienced 
an ongoing tension in balancing their social and economic goals. In order to increase financial 
return and satisfy investors, MIDAS faces pressure to increase its interest rates according to the 
overall market rate. Due to social obligations, however, the organisation is unable to impose an 
interest that is in line with market rates for SMEs. Hence MIDAS faced the challenge of 
optimising economic returns while also advancing its social goal.     
 
Response to address tensions  
The MD said that they had been holding regular discussions on an annual basis with key 
investors and representatives from loan beneficiaries to set an interest rate that was aligned as far 
as possible with the demands of both parties, using persuasion to minimise any compromise 
involved. They also had created alternative revenue generation sources to avoid burdening loan 
beneficiaries with an increased interest rate. For instance, recently they invested in constructing a 
multi-storey commercial building and rented the floors to a number of organisations. In the same 
building, some floors were rented to beneficiary SMEs at a subsidised rate, providing a facility 
foro the beneficiaries while also creating an additional revenue source.  
The analysis therefore shows how MIDAS had been able to adapt their registration 
status and revenue generation sources to resolve some of the tensions experienced, using 
persuasion and earning generation capabilities to manage this. 
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Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (Hathay Bunano) 
The absence of clear policy guidance and appropriate regulation with respect to SEs in 
Bangladesh resulted in Hathay Bunano being initially registered as an NGO under the NGOAB, 
even though its operational model differs considerably from that of a traditional NGO. 
Therefore, the organisation experienced delays and non-cooperation on the part of NGOAB and 
public support institutions, since the public officers involved lacked understanding of Hathay 
Bunano’s activities and support needs. In 2010, Hathay Bunano was registered as an export-
oriented private limited company under the Private Company Act. The Founder of Hathay 
Bunano said, 
 
“In this country everything [institutional support] is ok as long as it involves a 
clearly prescribed process...as soon as you are a millimetre away from the system, 
everything goes haywire. The system here is not set up to cope with a need for 
flexibility; here, to bring in a change is a huge process involving lots of controversies 
and so many people to oppose it.” 
 
The founder claimed that while Hathay Bunano’s change in legal status had resolved the 
tensions they were having in dealing with the NGOAB, it created a new set of challenges such as 
having to pay more tax. The founder commented that, on the one hand, they had to behave like a 
commercial enterprise and develop business-like skills to compete with conventional low cost 
international toy producers. On the other hand, they also had to stay true to their social goal to 
create employment for rural women and pay them a fair salary. As a result, managing a smooth 
flow of working capital has always been a challenge for the organisation and has caused tensions 
around balancing social and economic goals.  
 
Response to address tensions   
The founder described how Hathay Bunano had to develop a range of business-like 
skills to enhance their economic efficiency and reduce pressure on their working cash flow, 
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although they had to do this without sacrificing the social mission. For instance, the founder 
commented about developing and promoting what they saw as their unique selling proposition, 
 
“We turned our weakness into our strength. We know we cannot compete with 
conventional toy producers if we take a rational cost-focused business approach. We 
focus on our differentiated position and only approach the buyers that value ethical 
consumerism.” 
 
The above comment reflects how Hathay Bunano had positioned their social orientation 
as a unique selling proposition in order to compete with conventional low-cost toy producers and 
by capitalising on their basic idea of hand crotcheted and knitted toys that reflected the 
Bangladeshi heritage. Eventually, along with a team of designers she became involved in co-
designing with the buyers. Thus Hathay Bunano developed the innovation capabilities needed to 
create joint value for both buyers and themselves. 
The founder further described how Hathay Bunano was able to minimise its production 
cost through application of a working model based on a low-cost, labour intensive, electricity-
saving and low technology production process Thus, the firm also benefits from the low cost of 
machineries maintenance and low utility bills. They leverage the natural sewing ability of village 
women using needles and crochet and thus save on the cost of training workers.  
The organisation has made further cost savings through building alliance with external 
agencies for training and other non-financial support. For instance, they provide administrative 
training to workers with support from multinational corporations, national and international 
organizations, and their own initiatives. In the year 2012, IT related training was implemented 
through a partnership arrangement with a Netherlands based state organisation Project Under 
Manager (PUM), whereby Hathay Bunano paid only for the living costs of the PUM trainers. 
These trainers assisted in setting up an oracle database and taught IT workers how to transfer 
production processes into complex databases. 
The founder claimed that Hathay Bunano’s distribution system was designed with a 
view to achieving cost efficiency while maintaining control. At the local level, this involved 
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utilising rural transport methods, such as vans, boats and cow carts to carry products from remote 
villages to district centres from where they were transported to the headquarters via conventional 
transport, such as trucks and lorries. For international distribution, Hathay Bunano established its 
own warehouse in the UK and in Malaysia under the name ‘Pebble Child UK Ltd.’ and ‘MDXE 
Trading Company Ltd’, controlling distribution in their European and Australasia markets, 
respectively. The founder claimed that the regional warehouse enabled the organisation to 
establish better control of international distribution, in a cost efficient manner. Achieving 
legitimacy of their brand with retailers in target markets has also been important, in this respect 
Hathay Bunano have establish partnerships with well-known wholesalers in each of their 
international markets.  
The founder stated that while it was important for Hathay Bunano to perform different 
functional activities in a cost efficient manner, they also needed to concentrate on increasing the 
sales to enhance economic efficiency and social value. Thus she claimed that their marketing 
activities were described as being similar to those conducted by conventional exporters. For 
instance, they created direct contact with the buyers through targeted electronic marketing and 
participating in fairs and summits. After initial contact, their representatives makes a formal 
presentation to the buyers to inform them about the organisation’s mission, values and products. 
They started with their brand name ‘Pebble’ which they have made well-known in retail circles 
by approaching retailers directly and leveraging their social value creating image. With regards 
to their branding strategy, the founder said,  
 
“We sell our product through John Lewis. I did not agree to sell under their private 
label. I negotiated for ‘Pebble’. I made them believe that the socially responsible 
image of ‘Pebble’ can give them more benefit.” 
 
They achieve good prices for their products based on the differentiated position of the 
brand and the founder further said, 
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“We did not want to be a mere supplier of toys. We wanted to create our own identity 
different from any other Chinese toy contract manufacturer.” 
 
The organisation also focused on relationship building with buyers and, based on long-
term relationships and trust were able to agree on 50 percent of the quoted value being paid in 
advance to reduce pressure on their working capital.  
Hathay Bunano therefore has been able to avoid being a victim of confusion and non-cooperation 
which they had initially experienced in their early dealings with the public officers by 
withdrawing its registration from the NGOAB and registering as a private limited company. The 
tensions following this change were managed through increasing sales income by developing a 
range of business-like capabilities, including marketing the organisation’s differentiated position 
and building strong relationship with buyers in overseas market.  A number of strategies were 
also adopted by the organisation to reduce production, training and distribution cost.   
175 | P a g e  
 
Table 7. 5: SEs’ tensions and responses – MIDAS Financing Ltd and Hathay Bunano 
Tension Institutional factors Impact  Responses Strategy 
MIDAS     
Balancing social 
and economic 
goals 
Customised regulation:  
Absence of customised 
regulation 
Support provided by 
market actors:  
Loan facilities for non-
banking financial 
institutions, but not for 
NGOs 
Competitive logics: 
Pressure from investors to 
provide higher return on 
their investment 
Financial resources:  
Easy access to finance 
from conventional 
financial 
institutions & 
capital market 
Market rate dividend 
could create 
pressure on 
working capital 
 
Alteration: 
Withdrew registration from the NGOAB and 
register as a non-banking financial institution 
under the central bank 
Communication: 
Dialogue with investors and loan beneficiaries to 
set an interest rate aligned with the demands of 
both the parties 
Earning generation: 
Created alternative revenue generation sources 
Revenue generation through inclusive ventures 
Adapt 
Hathay Bunano     
Balancing social 
and economic 
goals 
 
Customised regulation:  
Absence of customised 
regulation 
Competitive logics: 
Competition from low cost 
toy producers  
Social exclusion and 
fairness: 
Paying fair wages to 
workers 
Financial resources:  
Constrain on working 
capital 
Human resources: 
Limited business-like 
skills among 
workforce 
 
Alteration: 
Currently registered as a 100% export oriented 
firm, although was registered as an NGO until 2010 
Relationship building: 
Long-term relationships with buyers enable 
agreement on 50% of the quoted value paid in 
advance to reduce the pressure on working capital   
Innovation: 
Co-designing with buyers  
Capitalised on their basic idea of hand crotched and 
knitted toys originating from Bangladeshi 
heritage 
Continuous new design offering  
Distribution: 
Utilise locally available transport to  carry products 
from remote villages to district centres 
Own warehouse in the UK and Malaysia to control 
distribution 
Partnership with well-known wholesalers in each 
international market to legitimate the brand to 
retailers 
Marketing & Branding: 
Social media advertisements, electronic mail 
advertisements, participating in fairs 
Built the ‘Pebble’ brand 
Adapt 
Attaining 
organisational 
goal while 
respecting the 
conservatisms in 
society 
Religious values:  
Restriction against female 
employment 
Hierarchy and gender 
role: 
Social believe that males 
are superior and should 
earn more than females 
Social exclusion and 
fairness: 
Paying fair wages to 
workers 
Human resources: 
Convincing husbands 
to let their wives 
work 
 
Communicating: 
Persuaded husbands through home visits to allow 
their wives to work 
Allowed flexible work schedule such that wives 
can support their husbands during crop harvesting 
time 
Relationship building:  
Selected one of the villagers as a supervisor to 
make home visits and build rapport with 
husbands 
Used husbands as distribution support 
Human resource management: 
Adapted working conditions, including child care, 
allowing ethnic attire in the workplace and a 
change in salary structure 
Networking: 
Created good relationships with local community 
and leaders 
Adapt 
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Tension: Attaining organisational goal while respecting the societal norms (Hathay 
Bunano) 
In rural Bangladesh, the social norm prescribes strict gender roles with women being 
subordinate to their husbands and expected to stay at home to take care of the children and do the 
housework. Hence female employment outside the home is seen as negative in rural areas and 
Hathay Bunano founder described how they had experienced particular difficulties in 
encouraging rural women to take the opportunity to work in its branches. The husbands initially 
prevented their wives from going to the production centres as they believed this would 
undermine their wives’ duty towards their children and the housework. Also, the founder thought 
that perhaps the husbands did so as they believed that letting their wives take employment would 
also undermine their male authority in the family. She added that the existing social norms was 
that the husband should earn more than the wife, which may have caused many husbands in rural 
areas to become envious of their wives and created barriers to their  employment opportunities. 
In this respect, the founder highlighted a further dilemma: on the one hand, Hathay Bunano’s 
social mission is to pay a fair salary to workers, yet, on the other hand, paying women employees 
more than their husbands earned would create tension for both the workers and their families and 
the organisation.   
The founder also stated both local people and religious leaders had also criticised the 
women who went out to work at the production centres, causing some women to drop out after 
starting work According to the founder, one of their production centre located in Teknaf had 
even experienced severe protest from the locals resulting in vandalism at the production centre 
on two occasions. Although Hathay Bunano attempted to persuade local people of the value of 
their activity, they eventually had to close the branch in Teknaf. The founder pointed out,  
 
“Our social goal is to empower rural women. To achieve this goal we were going 
against social and religious traditions. We were definitely not appreciated by local 
people.” 
 
Achieving a balance between respecting social and religious customs has therefore 
posed a particular challenge for Hathay Bunano, given the tensions between their social mission 
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to support women in rural areas, and the social norm which prescribes adherence to strict gender 
roles.  
 
Response to address tensions   
Hathay Bunano managed this tension by drawing on their persuasion and relationship 
building skills to encourage husbands (through home visits) to allow their wives to work. They 
also allowed flexible work schedules so that the wives could support their husbands during the 
harvesting season. Also, relationships were developed to build capabilities in order to create a 
bond with employees and their families, including by selecting one of the village members as 
supervisors who would make home visits to interested females and build rapport with their 
husbands. Hathay Bunano also used workers’ husbands by employing them in distribution 
function. 
The founder commented that they had also adapted their human resource management 
policies and working conditions to be compatible with social norms and the needs of workers, 
allowing them to bring their children to work and providing day care facilities. Recently, they 
opened pre-schools near 8 of the production centres. They also allow the hijab (religious attire) 
and the observance of prayer times in the workplace. The organisation has also designed the 
salary structure in a way that respects this social hierarchy as explained by the Founder, 
 
“Our salary structure is flexible. When we start an operation in an area, we first find 
the average income of males in that area and then determine our workers’ salary 
structure in a way that they earn a bit less than their husbands...You may think that 
we are promoting inequality in society, and that instead of challenging it we are 
supporting it, but I think our strategy reduces a lot of challenges for our workers. 
There are certain systems that are embedded in our cultural values. If we try to 
challenge these then we are in danger of deviating from our mission. Men in our 
society are egoistic and I don’t think their values can be changed overnight. I think 
that by respecting the tradition I can at least create female empowerment, while not 
doing it this way I may achieve nothing. So, we decided that by paying the females 
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less than their husbands they would not face such challenges and become obstacles 
to their employment.” 
 
To ensure the cooperation of local people and community leaders, Hathay Bunano 
therefore  used its networking and relationship building capabilities to build trust. The founder 
said that these relationships with the local community and economy were also developed by 
renting local houses and seeking their assistance when setting up the production centres. They 
purchased all of their supplies from local vendors to make people realise that the organisation is 
good for local businesses as well. In this way, they attempted to become “in-group members” of 
the village i.e. becoming more embedded in the local community and economy in order to secure 
their co-operation.  
The founder stated that they were also involved in dialogue with the community and 
religious leaders to highlight the benefits of the organisation and encourage individuals to spread 
positive words. Local leaders are highly respected by villagers and their opinions have been 
important in terms of legitimising the organisation within the local communities.  
The example above reflects how Hathay Bunano has sought to influence the husbands 
of their female employees (or beneficiaries) and the communities where they operate by using 
their persuasion and relationship building skills. At the same time, the organisation has also 
adapted its human resource management policies and actions sp that traditional social and 
religious norms are respected in the working practices of the production centres.   
 
7.7 NGOs with conventional subsidiary enterprises 
BRAC Aarong Dairy, Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing (GCCN), Grameen 
Telecom Trust (GTT) and Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) are the cases that best fit into 
this category (Table 7.6). These SEs were found to be driven more by market opportunities 
linked to their perception of social norms, rather than necessarily being driven by public policy. 
They focus exploiting a market gap to address the needs of their target disadvantaged group and 
are thus embedded in both markets and society. However, they also have exchange relationships 
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with public institutions in order to meet regulatory requirements and to gain access to public 
support.   
 
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals (BRAC Aarong Dairy) 
As discussed previously, there is a lack of customised regulation for SEs that are reliant 
on trading income. BRAC Aarong Dairy is a subsidiary enterprise of BRAC, which is a 
conventional NGO and is registered under NGOAB. However, BRAC Aarong Dairy’s 
operational model is different to that of its parent organisation, according to BRAC’s annual 
report. BRAC Aarong Dairy’s General Manager explained that registering under the NGOAB 
could have created confusion, given that most of their income came from trading activities. In 
contrast, there are a number of state support facilities and incentives available for agro-based 
firms. Therefore, to avoid conflict with NGOAB and to gain access to the support available for 
the agro-based firms, they registered under the Private Company Act of Bangladesh as a 
producer and distributor of agro and dairy-based products. As the General Manager explained,  
 
“The policies for NGOs in Bangladesh are very clear and supportive. Also, the 
policies for the dairy sector are fairly supportive for growth in the sector, but there is 
no clear policy to support the SE sector...Thus to avoid complexity in seeking support 
we have registered ourselves as a private company and not as a SE.” 
  
The above comment shows that BRAC Aarong Dairy registered as a conventional for-
profit dairy firm in order to access the state benefits available to agro-based firms and also to 
avoid NGOAB’s non-cooperative attitude towards SEs. The General Manager described how, 
being an agro-based private, firm BRAC Aarong Dairy had experienced both opportunities and 
challenges. While the company has received agro-based financial support from the state 
contributing towards their working capital, it has also had to pay tax. Registering as a private 
firm has also propelled them into direct competition with conventional dairy producers, as the 
General Manager commented,  
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“We cannot charge a low price like Pran [the main competitor in dairy sector] or 
make catchy ads like them. We are bound by our values and thus we have to give a 
fair price...we need to make customers realise our distinct stance.” 
 
Both the interview evidence and annual report suggest that due to BRAC’s commitment 
to paying a fair price to dairy farmers, BRAC Aarong Dairy’s retail price has always been higher 
than that of conventional dairy producers. Both the General Manager of BRAC Aarong Dairy 
and the Vice-Chairman of BRAC confirmed a number of tensions: that selling the product at 
premium price had limited their market share, and there was a limited awareness of the ethical 
dimensions of products/services in Bangladesh. As a result, the company has always faced the 
challenge of how to pay fair prices to dairy farmers while maintaining a healthy working capital 
account in order to sustain their business. Moreover, competing in the conventional market 
requires business-like skills and, as BRAC has traditionally operated as an NGO, developing 
such skills was a particular challenge in the early days. Therefore, BRAC Aarong Dairy has 
experienced particular tension in balancing its social and economic goals.  
 
Response to address tensions   
The General Manager described how innovation related capabilities had been key to 
enabling BRAC Aarong Dairy to compete with conventional dairy producers helping it to 
become the first company to introduce a low fat yogurt in Bangladesh. This idea was originated 
from one of their brand executives when they undertook a market survey to understand the 
potential of the product. Within two months the staff produced a market surveillance report and 
the results looked promising. The board approved the product and BRAC Aarong formally 
initiated the project in June 2013, launching BRAC Aarong Lite Yogurt in Bangladesh in three 
flavours: plain, chocolate and strawberry. Both the General Manager and the Vice-Chairman 
were of the view that their product variety was one of the key factors helping them to increase 
their market share.   
The company also developed marketing and branding capabilities to position the brand 
in a differentiated position in the minds of consumers. Their marketing activities included sales 
181 | P a g e  
 
promotions, advertisements and sponsorship. The Brand Manager remarked that the name 
‘BRAC Aarong Dairy’ reflected their efforts to establish a “social brand”. The project was 
initially named ‘BRAC Dairy’, which was later changed to ‘BRAC Aarong Dairy’ in order to 
enjoy spill over effects from the parent company’s other reputed SE ‘Aarong’. Their branding 
strategy has involved social PR campaigns, such as health campaigns in villages to promote the 
importance of milk, and informative and testimonial-based advertisements showing the product 
sourcing and production process and using milk farmers to explain how they have benefitted 
from the organisation. The company has sought to create a bond with customers in order to 
develop trust and loyalty. The Brand Manager of BRAC Aarong Dairy remarked, 
 
“We think we create a bonding with customers by making them realise the value of 
ethical sourcing and responsible consumption through our communications tools.”              
 
The Vice Chairman of BRAC claimed that they had saved costs by creating a 
“synergistic” alliance with their own subsidiary enterprises and that using BRAC’s existing 
establishments as collection points at thirty remote places had made possible significant savings 
in distribution costs. He further argued that this asset sharing enabled them to reach dairy farmers 
from distant villages, as well as saving the distribution cost. A further example of internal 
synergy relates to support provided by BRAC microfinance division when microcredit borrowers 
were included in the dairy project. The Vice Chairman argued that this “synergistic” alliance 
with subsidiary enterprises had helped the different parts of the organisation support each other 
and advance shared social and economic goals.  
The interviewee responses show how BRAC Aarong Dairy has developed a number of 
capabilities in order to balance its social and economic goals. Unlike their conventional 
counterparts, they have not exploited the dairy farmers for greater economic return. They 
adhered to their commitment to paying farmers a fair price while maintaining a healthy economic 
return by reducing operating costs through internal alliance and asset sharing. They have also 
used their capabilities to innovate, conduct marketing and branding to differentiate their product 
from those of their competitors.  
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The analysis shows that BRAC Aarong Dairy has avoided negative influence of 
NGOABs lack of understanding and non-cooperation of NGOAB officers regarding being a SE 
with trading revenue. The organisation has accordingly adapted its resources and capabilities to 
manage the subsequent tensions involving  balancing their economic and social goals. An 
innovative approach to marketing and branding, and internal alliance development has helped 
them to compete in conventional markets while also advancing social goals.   
 
Tension: Maintaining an independent status while avoiding conflict with government  
As discussed previously, tension exists in the relationship between Yunus and the 
current government, and the leaders of Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing (GCCN), 
Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) and Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) have all confirmed 
this:. For instance, the CEO of GTT commented: 
  
“...the relationship between the current government and Yunus, you know how it is. 
Getting access to state support is not as easy for us as it is for similar organisations, 
such as BRAC or ASA...it’s not that we have not approached them for help before, 
however, all we got were intentional delays in the process and deliberate attempts to 
prevent our projects from starting. They are all predetermined that Grameen is a 
brain child of Yunus, so we will not let them go so easily.”  
 
This comment indicates that due to their operating under the Grameen banner and have 
Yunus as one of their influential board members GTT, GCCN, GISB, have all experienced 
challenges in seeking support from state institutions. This non-cooperation of public institutions 
is the outcome of the long-standing tensions between Yunus and the current government. The 
Principal of GCCN also said, “Being a member of the Grameen family has automatically 
constrained our access to state support”, and the COO of GISB  argued,  
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“I believe that we are the only one who has introduced ICT in the agro sector; we 
are providing support to the farmers that no government has ever done. I think we 
are just advancing the digital Bangladesh vision of the government and nothing else. 
Still, we are not privileged enough to get state support and not to mention [silence] 
you know why.”  
 
The above comment reflects how all three SEs have experienced tensions in the pursuit 
of political legitimacy due to their affiliation with Yunus. For the same reason, acquiring 
resources and support from the state has been a constant challenge for all three, as COO, GTT 
explained: 
  
“No organisation can grow alone; they need support either from the state or market 
or from both. In order to grow we have to pursue our organisational goal, so we had 
to find alternative means to get our necessary support. However, we also cannot 
deny the fact that we exist in the Bangladeshi political sphere where without 
government legitimacy we cannot do our business smoothly.”  
 
Therefore, the evidence suggests how the citizenship in the context of Bangladeshi 
politics has required all three SEs to achieve political legitimacy. However, they can only expect 
limited support from the state even though this seems vital for their growth. Therefore, these 
three SEs, have strived for a level of political legitimacy, they have also sought to develop 
alternative sources of support so that they could ‘side-step’ being overly dependent on exchange 
relationships with public institutions.  
  
Response to address tensions   
Although these cases are social business, all are registered under the Private Company 
Act in their respective sectors. For instance, GCCN is registered as a Higher Educational 
Institute under the University Grants Commission; GTT as a Private Commercial 
Association/Trust under the Commerce Ministry; and GISB as an IT firm under the Private 
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Company Act. All of the leaders interviewed said that one of the prime reasons underlying this 
action was to disguise their affiliation with Yunus. As the social business concept was first 
promoted in Bangladesh by Prof Yunus, registering as a social business would have made them 
“more vulnerable to the governments’ increased scrutiny and meddling” in the words of CEO of 
GTT. Hence all three organisations have minimised tensions regarding their political legitimacy 
by adopting ‘alteration’ as a strategy. 
The Principal of GCCN explained how her organisation had built “alliances with sister 
concern and projects to complement the resource and support needs of each other”. She said 
that GCCN has a “synergistic” relationship with the Grameen Micro-Financing division and 
Grameen Eye Care Hospital. GCCN provides nursing education to the daughters of ‘Grameen 
Micro-Finance borrowers’ to increase their family income and enable them to repay loans on 
time. They also supply qualified nurses to Grameen Eye Care Hospital, as there is a nurse 
shortage in most rural areas. The Principal of GCCN commented that the college prevents 
Grameen’s hospital from suffering from this crisis by supplying their own graduates, which  in 
turn, helps graduates gain employment in their profession and also provides their families with a 
sure source of income.      
The CEO of GTT said that they collaborate with the Yunus Centre, a social business 
support institution of the Grameen family. GTT and Yunus Centre combined their support for 
other social business units running under the Grameen banner, providing advice and searching 
for partners able to provide financial and non-financial support. They introduced the ‘Social 
Innovation Fund’ to support potential social business projects of the Grameen family and of 
others. They also jointly hold a ‘Social Business Learning Lab’ to create awareness about the 
concept in academia and corporations; and the ‘Social Business Design Lab’ to provide advice 
on potential models and to help the search for partners. The evidence shows that GCCN and 
GTT both had minimised tensions related to support needs by using their internal alliance 
building capabilities. 
All three SEs had formed external collaborations to help address their support needs. 
For instance, Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing developed a partnership with Glasgow 
Caledonian University in the UK which has contributed both know-how and financial support. 
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The Nursing and Midwifery Department of Glasgow Caledonian University is one of the 
investors in GCCN and have also provided support in curriculum design and training.  
Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) had formed an alliance with Intel Corporation 
USA to develop software and share knowledge (GISB 2013), also shares the distribution network 
of e-Kutir-India to sell software to Indian farmers.   
Similarly, GTT’s annual report evidence their partnerships with multiple international 
organisations (Danone Group, France; Green Children Foundation, USA; Veolia Water, France; 
BASF, Germany) thus enabling financial and non-financial support for Grameen family projects:  
 
“...it’s not that we have to rely on them [state institutions]. There are ample 
opportunities out in the world. There are organisations and individuals who are 
willing to help our innovative projects. Corporations, foreign NGOs and even 
foreign governments now want to get involved with Bangladeshi social businesses. 
So, we just had to broaden our look and seek support from outside Bangladesh.” 
(CEO of GTT)  
 
The analysis demonstrates how GTT, GCCN and GISB have all sought to avoid the 
tensions associated with public support by seeking support from non-state and international 
organisations. They have developed alliances with external corporations and NGOs as a means to 
side-step support from state institutions.  
All three SEs have taken steps to avoid being negatively influenced by the Yunus-
government tension. In so doing, they have adopted an alternative legal form, while also 
developing an internal support systems through synergistic alliances with sister projects and 
other partnerships with external entities. 
    
Tension: Balancing economic and social goals (Grameen Intel Social Business) 
The financial sustainability of Grameen Intel Social Business depends on its ability to 
increase sales of its software, although this has always been a challenge for GISB as COO of 
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GISB explained how farmers tend to have strong emotional ties with and trust of the learning 
been passed from ancestors, which means they want to rely on the traditional methods of 
predicting yields, identifying appropriate fertiliser, and scheduling plantation and harvesting 
activities. The majority of farmers were unwilling to risk their land and effort, lack of trust 
particularly during the harvesting season, based on GISB’s software analysis results. Therefore, 
GISB’s sales growth was not as expected and it was realised that they might have to increase the 
price and consultation fees in order for the organisation to keep pace financially. The COO 
highlighted the dilemma: 
 
“We could not just increase our price like commercial software firms because doing 
so would have undermined our social obligation to the farmers and might also 
reduce the sale even more.” 
 
The above comment indicates how the social obligations of Grameen Intel Social 
Business limited their ability to transfer more of the financial burden of the organisation on to 
customers (i.e. the farmers). However, in order to sustain the business it was pressurised to do so, 
thus causing a tension between the organisations social and economic goals.  
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Table 7.6: SEs’ tensions and responses - BRAC Aarong Dairy, Grameen Caledonian 
College of Nursing (GCCN), Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) and Grameen Intel (GI) 
Tension Institutional factors Impact Response Strategy 
BRAC Aarong Diary 
Balancing social 
and economic goals 
 
Customised regulation:  
Lack of customised 
regulation for SEs 
Support and funding: 
Agro-sector offers incentives 
Competitive logics: 
Competing with 
conventional dairy 
producers 
Consumer awareness: 
Limited influence of ethical 
consumerism in 
Bangladesh 
 
Financial resources:  
Selling the product at 
a premium price 
limits market 
share 
Tax benefits for 
registering as an 
agro-based 
business 
Human resources: 
Need to develop 
business like skills 
 
Alteration: 
Registered under the Private Company Act of 
Bangladesh as a producer and distributor of 
agro and dairy-based products  
Innovation: 
Introduced low fat yogurt for the first time in 
Bangladesh 
Marketing:  
Marketing activities to promote a 
differentiated position from conventional 
dairy brands  
Activities include sales promotions, 
advertisements & sponsorships 
Branding: 
Informative & testimonial ads 
Social PR campaign 
Relationship building with customers 
Brand name synergistic with parent SE 
Internal synergistic alliance:  
Support the BRAC microfinance division 
Use BRAC’s existing establishment as 
collection points  
Side stepping 
GCCN, GISB and GTT 
Maintaining an 
independent status 
while avoiding 
conflict with 
government 
 
 
 
Party political sphere:  
Tension between the 
government and 
Professor Yunus 
 
 
Financial 
resources:  
Lack of support 
from the state 
 
Alteration:  
GCCN: Registered as a Higher Educational 
Institute under UGC  
GTT: Registered as Private Commercial 
Association/Trust under the 
          Commerce Ministry 
GI: Registered as an IT firm under the Private 
Company Act 
Internal synergistic alliance:  
GCCN: Grameen Microfinance & Grameen Eye 
Care Hospital 
GTT: Yunus Centre 
GI: Grameen Yukuguni Maitaki Ltd. 
External alliance building: 
GCCN: Glasgow Caledonian University 
GTT:  Danone Group, France, Green Children 
Foundation, USA, Veolia Water, France, BASF, 
Germany 
GI: Intel Corporation, USA & e-Kutir, India 
Side stepping 
Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB)    
Balancing 
economic & social 
goals 
 
Competitive logics: 
Offering differentiated 
product and making 
profit 
 
Conservatism in 
society: 
Farmers more prone to 
using traditional methods 
of farming & fear of 
technology 
Financial 
resources: 
Social obligation 
challenges 
optimum 
financial return 
Human Resources: 
Developing 
business-like 
capability while 
adhering to the 
social constrains 
of farmers 
Innovation: 
Established R&D unit to monitor the changing 
needs of farmers, climate change factors from field 
research and to develop software 
Empowered employees to encourage innovation 
from the field  
Learning: 
Sent programmers to receive training from Intel 
Corporation in Silicon Valley 
Branding: 
Informative advertisements and demonstrations 
Testimonial advertisements 
Naming strategy reflecting community affinity & 
emotional values of the farmers 
Communicating: 
Home visits to encourage farmers to use the result 
of the software  
Financing selected farmers to demonstrate potential 
of success to others 
Adapt  
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Response to address tensions   
Instead of increasing the price of the software and burdening farmers, GISB applied 
various strategies to increase sales. The COO of the organisation explained that convincing 
farmers of the benefits of their product was closely related to increasing the sales, which meant 
that they needed to make more use of persuasion techniques. The COO said that GISB made 
home visits to explain to farmers the benefits of the software. They also organised formal group 
meetings with existing and potential farmers in order to explain, train and advise. GISB even 
purchased small piece of land in villages where they would employ a few farmers to pioneer the 
use of their software to cultivate. The success of the farmers’ proved the credibility of the 
software to other potential farmers and also made a case for GISB to always use alternative 
techniques in order to continually increase sales rather than increasing the price of the software.  
The marketing manager at GISB said that they also used different marketing and 
branding techniques to influence farmers, including road-shows and demos of the software 
where the marketing team, along with a programmer, demonstrated the software and discussed 
its benefits. They also broadcast testimonials of current operators and users over the radio, and 
the marketing manager pointed out that the name of the brand ‘Mrittikā’ was also carefully 
decided to reflect its affinity with rural culture. Mrittikā comes from the folk version of Bengali 
language that means ‘soil’, which is often regarded as ‘the mother’ by farmers. The “name 
Mrittikā has a sentiment attached to it” and relationship building was a key marketing strategy:  
 
“In all our communications we promote that we want to do good by the farmers 
because we care about their future. We are not trying to sell our product as a 
commercial company and we know farmers fear the use of technology. We want to 
eliminate that fear through proper explanation and communicating our social 
vision”. (Marketing Manager, GISB) 
 
GISB also focused on innovation to make the software more useful and thereby more in 
demand. The COO pointed out that their R&D unit were involved in dialogues with farmers and 
field officers in order to integrate their experiences into future product development. The unit 
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identified the changing needs of farmers and climate change factors likely to affect crop yields, 
and then developed the software accordingly.  
GISB’s COO highlighted the role of learning as a key mechanism that contributed 
towards continual product development. This included sending programmers to receive training 
from Intel Corporation in Silicon Valley, which enabled them to update the products on a regular 
basis and to make products more customised for farmers.  
Overall, the analysis shows how Grameen Intel Social Business was able to use its 
communication, marketing and branding, innovation and learning skills to increase sales while 
keeping the price of their software affordable for farmers. They were also able to increase 
farmers’ take-up their product by using persuasion, marketing, branding and relationship 
building. At the same time, the organisation has adapted its business-like skills in order to align 
the organisational goals with the local traditions.    
 
7.8 Summary 
The analysis in this chapter shows how SEs have responded to the conflicting 
demands/logics imposed on them by different institutional actors in order to access resources 
and/or to achieve legitimacy, which directly or indirectly affected the functioning of their dual-
value system (i.e. their social and economic goals). These conflicting pressures gave rise to a 
number of managerial tensions. Addressing and resolving these tensions has involved the 
development and mobilisation of appropriate resources and capabilities. 
The findings further show that the tensions varied to a certain degree depending on the 
type of SE. While a number of tensions were found to be prevalent in most categories, others 
were apparent only in particular categories or cases. For instance, balancing the social and 
economic goals was a common tension found in five SE categories (except the 100% donor 
dependent NGOs) because all the SEs fitting into these categories experienced the pressure to 
increase their income through trading activities, which was often in tension with their social 
obligations. On the other hand, meeting donors’ requirements and aligning these with the 
pressures from other institutional actors posed a particular challenge for the donor dependent SEs 
such as, BPF and Quasem Foundation. The family-owned SEs experienced tension between their 
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family ethos and demands from other institutional actors, such as with respect to recruiting 
external expertise. Similarly, Yunus-influenced social businesses faced tensions arising from the 
long-standing conflict between Professor Yunus and the current government. A more detail 
discussion of this interplay of institutional influences, the resulting tensions as experienced by 
the SE cases and their management of resources and capabilities is continued in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 8: The interplay of institutional influences and SEs’ management 
functions - Findings 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter builds upon the evidence presented in the previous chapter, which can be 
distilled into four main findings for the study as a whole. Drawing upon these key findings and 
the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3, this chapter analyses further the interplay 
between the institutional influences, SEs’ dual-value system and how SEs’ orchestrate their 
resources and capabilities in responding to such influences. Building upon the work of (Scott, 
1995, 2008), the regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions existing in state, 
market and society and their influence on SE growth are examined in this chapter. The evidence 
from the cases presented in the previous chapter showed that SEs experienced a number of 
tensions due to multiple institutional factors, also affecting how they address their social and 
economic missions. Therefore, the following research questions will be answered in this chapter:  
 
RQ2: How does the national institutional context influence SE growth in Bangladesh?    
RQ3: What role do SEs’ resources and capabilities play in responding to the institutional 
influences? 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 presents the findings regarding the 
institutional influences and their role in shaping SEs’ growth. Section 8.3 highlights the 
managerial tensions experienced SEs, while section 8.4 analyses the resources and capabilities 
deployed to address those tensions. Finally, Section 8.5 presents the different growth strategies 
that SEs have pursued in response to the tensions they face.  
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8.2 Institutional influences on SE growth 
The analysis presented in the previous chapter shows how a number of institutional 
influences relating to the state, market, society, third sector, donors and family have positively or 
negatively affected the growth of the studied SEs in Bangladesh.    
 
State regulations, policies and supports for NGOs and MFIs 
The evidence shows how changes in state regulations and policies have had a 
significant, although varying impact on all SE categories, also shaping the SE sectors and the 
patterns of their growth. For instance, the implementation of a more stringent regulation and 
monitoring system had influenced the NGO and the MFI sector both positively and negatively. 
The findings show that due to the change in regulations, NGOs in Bangladesh experienced 
increased scrutiny by NGOAB. This regulatory change had a specific influence on the fully 
donor dependent NGOs and the conventional NGOs with some trading elements. The fund 
approval process became more complex and time consuming, with a greater need for 
documentation, record keeping and accountability for both NGOs and donors. As a result, the 
studied NGOs were compelled to enhance their professional capabilities by developing skills in 
record keeping, report writing, and planning and budgeting. Therefore, the evidence shows that 
the change in regulations had resulted in increased professionalism, transparency and 
accountability among the NGOs.  
Another example of a supportive policy creating opportunities for the SEs was the 
emergence of the Vision 2020 programme undertaken by the Bangladeshi government which 
builds on the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. The findings show how the 
government’s Vision 2020 programme created the opportunity for Quasem Foundation to seek 
increased government funding and support. Similarly, the Awami League government’s 
increased focus on disability issues had created the opportunity for BPF to seek financial and 
non-financial resources from the state. To give another example, the government’s focus on 
implementing the child care provision in the National Labour Laws had contributed to a rapid 
increase in the number of Phulki’s branches. Therefore, the evidence suggests how supportive 
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government policy can create new opportunities for collaboration with government, increased 
access to state resources, and new opportunities for growth.  
However, the evidence also shows that changes in the state regulatory and policy 
environment can create challenges for SEs, restricting their growth. For instance, the changes 
related to the increased monitoring regime of NGOAB created difficulties for some NGOs in that 
they have experienced problems in persuading donors to fulfil their obligations with the new 
requirements. This regulatory change created tension in the relationship between NGOs and their 
donors, with NGOs experiencing delays in funding approval for projects due to the increased 
bureaucracy and related confusion.  Therefore, although more stringent regulations aided the 
development of professional skills among NGOs, it also increased operational complexity, 
delays and a need for organisations to address the tensions caused by the need to comply with 
state regulatory requirements while also meeting donors’ expectations.  
 
Customised regulation and support for SEs 
The findings shows that while some supportive policy has facilitated SE growth, the 
lack of appropriate regulation and policy towards the SE sector has also challenged the growth 
potential of a new generation of SEs. For instance, ASA, Panther Social, BRAC Aarong Diary, 
GTT, GISB, GCCN, Midas and Hathay Bunano all experienced a significant challenge when 
registering under the NGOAB. Interviewees from these SEs pointed out the confusion and non-
cooperation of NGOAB officers in regard to the new type of SEs that are heavily reliant on 
trading income.  
The findings show how these SEs have had to find an alternative legal form to register 
under in order to avoid being victims of this ambiguity created by public institutions. 
Subsequently, they had to compete with conventional for-profit firms after registering as 
companies and had to develop more business-like skills. Overall, these SEs have sought 
resources mostly from the market and thus adopted a more entrepreneurial growth path 
compared to NGOs. The evidences from the cases presented in the previous chapter, therefore, 
reflects that the absence of customised regulation challenged SEs’ access to support and 
resources, while also stimulating them to develop entrepreneurial capabilities.    
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The Party political sphere and need for political legitimacy 
A number of tensions were found to emanate from the political sphere of Bangladesh. 
Interviewees confirmed that a range of issues shape the country’s political environment, 
including  the resentment and rivalry between the two main political parties, frequent changes of 
government, and the Yunus-government conflict. The analysis shows these issues have 
challenged SEs’ ability to access resources and support from the state and local public 
institutions. Dealing with such tensions while also building legitimacy in the national and local 
political sphere has posed a particular challenge for some SEs.  For instance, interview evidence 
supports that due to the long-standing tension between Yunus and the current government, 
Panther Social and all the Grameen family SEs’ experienced deliberate attempts by state 
institutions (i.e. NGOAB and the Ministry of Social Welfare) to delay their registration, limit 
their access to public support and generally be non-cooperative towards these SEs. In order to 
build political legitimacy, these SEs sought to minimise the risk of conflict with the government, 
disguising their actual identity by registering as private companies while simultaneously 
developing internal and external alliances to compensate their limited access the state resources 
and thereby meeting their supports needs. Therefore, while the challenges emanating from the 
political sphere had clearly created tensions for some SEs in terms of achieving political 
legitimacy and accessing public resources, this had also encouraged them to adopt a more 
independent growth path rather than relying heavily on state support.   
Another example of dealing with the tensions arising from political sphere while 
maintaining legitimacy is how BPF and Quasem foundation developed their contacts with both 
the dominant political parties. Both the organisations had involved local political leaders in their 
projects in various ways, notwithstanding the political affiliations of these leaders. They often 
attended relevant meetings and events organised by all the political parties, providing their 
opinion and advice. Therefore, maintaining a political network was also confirmed to be a vital 
strategy for dealing with tensions emanating from the party political sphere.  
Within such a politicised environment, SEs of all six categories have strived to maintain 
a ‘apolitical’ image as possible in order to avoid their organisations’ growth being negatively 
affected by changes in government. This apolitical stance of SEs reduced the risk of internal 
environment being adversely impacted by political biases, which interviewees confirmed had 
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been vital for their ‘internal harmony’. The SEs cases were found to have developed and utilised 
different entrepreneurial solutions to maintain an apolitical image while had also achieved 
political legitimacy. For instance, BPF circulated a formal memorandum in its office urging 
employees to avoid any politically inclined discussion or bullying. Similarly, the Managing 
Director of Quasem Foundation refused to represent any particular party in the national election 
at the request of local political leaders. Overall, the influences originating from the party political 
sphere have driven some SEs to develop and utilise particular entrepreneurial capabilities in the 
process of dealing with the resulting tensions.   
 
Donors’ policy and work culture 
The findings show that the funding policies and work cultures of donors had created 
opportunities and challenges for SE growth.  Donors played a vital role for these NGOs with full 
donor dependency (BPF) and NGOs with trading income (Quasem Foundation and Phulki). On 
the one hand, the more efficient and westernised work culture of the donors stimulated these SEs 
to develop a culture of accountability and performance. On the other hand, these organisations 
experienced tensions in meeting donors’ expectations while also adhering to state regulations. 
For instance, BPF experienced tensions in aligning the competing demands of donors’ work 
culture and the highly bureaucratic regulatory practices and work culture of state institutions. In 
addition, donors’ advocacy of female empowerment was found to conflict with the social norms 
of beneficiaries notably in the case of BPF’s CBR programme. These SEs were found to have 
applied a range of techniques, such as, adaptation of the project and persuasion of the donors to 
meet the expectations of key stakeholders and to balance competing logics.   
 
Market-related challenges and opportunities 
The analysis shows that the changes in the regulations/standards developed and imposed 
by the actors in the market can create opportunities and barriers for the SE sector and can 
influence the patterns of growth. For instance, the findings show how Western garment retailers’ 
pressure to implement child care provision in factory premises facilitated the growth of Phulki. 
In order to comply with the buyers’ code, a number of garment firms proactively approached 
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Phulki for a partnership. In this case, a renewed focus of western buyers has seen the 
enforcement of codes and National Labour Laws acting as a driver for the growth of Phulki.  
The evidence further shows how the support provided by private sector institutions 
(such as, private banks and financial institutions) can shape the patterns of growth of SEs. For 
instance, MIDAS faced difficulty in accessing loan finance from conventional banks when 
registered as an NGO. As there was no customised regulation or policy in the financial sector to 
encourage private banks to finance social ventures so the banks were often reluctant, which 
influenced MIDAS to register as Non-Banking Financial Institution (NBFI). This change in 
registration status enabled MIDAS to secure a loan from a commercial bank, since the banking 
sector had specific loan packages designed for NBFIs. This example shows how regulatory 
factors related to organisational form can strongly influence the willingness and ability of private 
institutions to provide appropriate support can also play a role in shaping SE growth. 
 
Logics of competition 
One of the most dominant market norms is the logics of competition.  Panther Social, 
BRAC Aarong Diary, GTT, GISB, GCCN, Midas and Hathay Bunano  all compete with 
conventional for-profit firms and thus are obligated to  adhere to the competitive norms of 
consumer markets. The logic of the market required them to pursue competitive advantage 
through the development of business-like capabilities. For instance, all of these SEs tend to 
differentiate their products through various marketing and branding techniques, and through the 
development of unique selling propositions by means of R&D and innovation. 
The evidence further shows that competitive logics exist in the capital market, where the 
level of return on investment (ROI) determines the willingness of investors to invest in a 
particular company share. Thus public limited companies have to compete to meet the ROI level 
expected by investors by offering a healthy dividend. For the same reason, MIDAS had 
experienced pressure from its investors for a higher degree of ROI, which they needed to comply 
with in order to continue accessing funds from the capital market. This pressure led the 
organisation to seek alternative ways of generating a higher level of income but without 
compromising their social goal. In order to meet the expectations of investors, MIDAS had to 
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introduced different integrated and un-integrated projects to reduce pressure on its working 
capital. Overall, the findings show how these SEs were developing different entrepreneurial 
capabilities to address the challenges posed by the demands of their market contexts and related 
key actors.    
   
Consumer awareness and affordability of SE products/services  
The evidence shows how consumer awareness and understanding of SE products and 
services, as well as their affordability affect their prospects for growth. For instance, due to the 
limited awareness of Bangladeshi consumers of ethical issues, BRAC Aarong Dairy experienced 
difficulties in differentiating their brand and justify a higher price than conventional dairy 
brands, although a higher profit margin was necessary. Therefore in order to maintain their 
commitment to paying a fair price to the dairy farmers. Thus they had to use their branding 
capabilities to develop consumer awareness of the ethical dimensions associated with their 
product in order to stimulate demand. A similar challenge faced Panther Social in their initial 
attempt to sell their rickshaw branding to corporations and rickshaw art to consumers. Both 
consumer groups had limited awareness of their service and products and thus Panther Social had 
to adopt innovative marketing strategies to popularise their service/product.  
There were a number of examples where the price of SE products/services posed 
particular challenge. For instance, Quasem Foundation and Grameen Intel Social Business 
experienced pressure to increase the price of their service/product, although they could not do so 
considering the limited ability of their target beneficiaries to afford this (i.e. they were also the 
consumers of their service/product) and had to find alternative strategies to enhance their 
economic efficiency without burdening beneficiaries.  These examples suggest that since the 
target consumers of a number of SEs are mainly disadvantaged groups, so their limited 
purchasing power can be the cause of tensions within those SEs.  
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Social institutions and norms-challenges posed for SEs 
The analysis shows how a number of social norms and institutions can create particular 
challenges for SEs, particularly with respect to conservative religious values and other traditional 
customs and beliefs. Particularly, Islamic religious norms were found to have influenced some 
SEs by their restrictions on female employment and their appearance in front of unknown males. 
For instance, Hathay Bunano was in a challenging position when attempting to persuade the 
husbands of their workers to allow the wives to work. Moreover, they experienced resistance 
from local religious leaders on the grounds of disrespecting Islamic rules. This dominant 
institution in rural Bangladeshi society significantly challenged the growth of Hathay Bunano,  
resulting in the close of one unit due to opposition from local religious leaders.  
A number of other influential social norms prevalent in rural Bangladesh related to 
certain beliefs and social practices created scepticism and resistance among beneficiary groups 
and other people in the community. These social norms were found to be a source of 
conservatism and resistance to change, creating barriers to the regular operations of some SEs. 
Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB), Phulki and Panther Social experienced difficulties in 
persuading their beneficiaries/customers to accept their products and service. These 
beneficiary/customers possessed some pre-existing beliefs originating from their ancestors, 
social traditions and experiences, which contributed to a lack of trust in the SEs. For instance, 
farmer communities initially refused to use GISB’s software as they believed that the farming 
methods which had been passed down from their previous generations were more promising and 
trustworthy. Similarly, working mothers were reluctant to use Phulki’s childcare service because 
of their suspicion that day care centres might not take proper care of their children.  
The evidence suggests that, on the one hand, religious requirements and social norms 
had slowed the growth of these SEs. On the other hand, these SEs were able to adopt different 
innovative means to win over the communities and minimise the challenges. For instance, 
Hathay Bunano had adapted their working practices to suit religious requirements and the needs 
of female workers/beneficiaries. They also applied a number of innovative means to 
communicate with and to persuade the villagers. Similarly, addressing the challenges required 
Phulki and Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB) to gain the trust of beneficiary/customers by 
communicating, persuading, marketing and relationship building. All of the SE cases that had 
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experienced particular challenges arising from social and religious norms were also found to 
have been stimulated to develop entrepreneurial capabilities. These examples show that although 
conservatisms within the society impose challenges to SE growth, SEs had been able to 
developed entrepreneurial capabilities in the process of addressing the tensions.  
 
Hierarchy and gender roles 
The analysis shows traditional social norms and related gender roles to be prominent in 
rural Bangladeshi society, creating a number of challenges for SEs operating in rural areas. For 
instance, during their early days, Hathay Bunano experienced resistance to encourage females to 
work outside home and to generate income, since this was seen as undermining male authority 
within the family. Similarly, BPF experienced tension when implementing the CBR programme 
as their initial plan to exclude husbands from the entire project and to provide wives with the 
sole authority to receive and manage the loan amount also undermined the culture of gender 
roles and family hierarchy.  
Although challenging the growth of SEs, these experiences also stimulated both BPF 
and Hathay Bunano to adapt their project plans by using innovative techniques. For instance, 
BPF redesigned their loan policy by involving both husband and wife in the project, while 
Hathay Bunano used villagers’ ‘in-group’ members (such as, other female workers, religious and 
community leaders) to represent the organisation and persuade the husbands on their behalf. 
These further demonstrate how SEs were able to learn from the initial negative experience and 
develop and utilise different entrepreneurial capabilities to adapt their projects to the cultural 
traditions.  
 
Peer organisations’ behaviour 
The analysis shows how challenges and opportunities relating to growth can emanate 
from the behaviour of peer organisations in the social sector. For instance, ASA had experienced 
tension in reconciling the interests of small and large MFIs in regard to lobbying the government 
for the development of a customised regulation for the MFI sector and establishment of 
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responsible authority for the implementation of the new law. While the small MFIs initially 
resisted the change fearing lacked of skills and resources needed to be compliant, the large MFIs 
were reluctant to provide support to the small MFIs. This tension resulted in the establishment of 
a collective body (i.e. MFI Association) that played a vital role in persuading these two groups to 
support the change. This led to ASA and other influential MFIs putting their case for better 
regulations to the government and also establishment of the AMFI to facilitate future collective 
actions pursued for the benefit of the sector as a whole. This example, therefore, shows that the 
behaviour of peer organisations can be an important factor in shaping SE growth.  
 
Logics of the social sector 
The evidence shows that SEs were influenced by the logics originating from the third 
sector, in which norms of justice and fairness are often given primary significance. Being 
embedded in the third sector, evidence shows that SEs examined tended to adhere to these norms 
although, at the same times had to adapt these principles to suit the social traditions of their 
targeted groups and communities. For instance, Hathay Bunano faced dilemma of whether to pay 
a fair wage to (female) workers  or design a salary scale based on social tradition (i.e. less than 
the average income of males in the village). The norms of justice urged them to pay an 
equivalent salary, whereas respecting the social hierarchy required them to take the latter option. 
Another such example is BRAC Aarong Dairy, who struggled to sell their product as 
they had to charge higher price than the conventional dairy producers. They were able to adhere 
to their commitment towards justice by finding alternative means to increase sale of their product 
such as, developing branding and marketing capabilities and thereby continuing to pay a fair 
price to the farmers. These examples demonstrates how the SE cases were able to maintain their 
commitment to the norms of the third sector and find creative means to balance these ideals with 
the pressures originating from other institutional domains.  
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Family embeddedness 
Some of the cases, notably Bangladesh Prothibondi Foundation and Quasem 
Foundation, were family-owned and subject to the particular dynamics that often affect such 
enterprises. The evidence from these cases shows how the close familiar relationships involved 
can be positive, i.e. in terms of nurturing trust and co-operations, but also some disadvantages in 
terms of seeking external investments. The interviewees claimed that their family culture was a 
strength in that it promoted internal harmony and focus in decision making, resulting in greater 
internal efficiency and commitment to their social mission. However, these SEs also experienced 
accusations from external entities of nepotism and a lack of transparency, which created tensions 
in their relationships with other agencies.  
To conclude this section, the analysis shows how SEs in Bangladesh are embedded in 
multiple institutional domains, including state, market, society, third sector, donor agencies and 
family structures. The effects of each of these institutional domains have been individually 
explored, including with respect to how SEs have been able to respond with respect to accessing 
resources and building their legitimacy with key external actors. Their embeddedness in multiple 
institutions reflects their hybrid nature and that their patterns of growth could be affected, both 
positively and negatively, by the way they respond to these institutional pressures (Table 8.1).  
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Table 8.1: Institutional factors and their influence on SE growth 
Institutional factors Type of institution  
(as of Scott 1995)  
Positive effect on growth Negative effect on growth Example cases 
State     
State regulations, 
policies and 
supports for NGOs 
and MFIs 
Regulatory institution Increased professionalism  
Opportunities for incentives and collaboration 
with government followed by policy change  
Stimulated greater degree of independence 
from state and large donors  
Increased complexity and delays in fund 
and project approval 
NGO-donor relationship tension  
BPF, Quasem Foundation, 
ASA 
Customised 
regulations and 
support 
Regulatory institution SEs change legal status and develop own 
support system  
Confusion and limited cooperation by 
public officers  
Challenges in accessing public support  
BRAC Aarong Dairy, 
GISB, GCCN, GTT, 
Panther Social, ASA 
Party political 
sphere 
Normative institution An apolitical stance by SEs contribute to 
internal harmony  
SEs with political network get better success 
for lobbying and political legitimacy  
Those without political network develop 
entrepreneurial capabilities to avoid seeking 
support from public institutions  
Tension in maintaining an apolitical image 
while maintaining a political network for 
getting access to public resources and 
supports  
BPF, Quasem Foundation, 
Phulki, GISB, GCCN, GTT 
and Panther Social 
Donor agencies     
Donors’ policy and 
work culture 
Normative institution Stimulated a culture of accountability and 
performance  
Reduced funding stimulated finding alternation 
sources of earning generation 
Tension in aligning donors’ expectations 
with the regulatory requirements and the 
bureaucratic work culture of public 
institutions  
Challenges to maintain financial 
sustainability 
BPF and Quasem 
Foundation 
Market     
Requirements/ 
standards imposed 
and supports 
provided by market 
actors 
Regulatory institution Changes in market regulations created new 
opportunities for growth  
 
Absence of support from private sector 
influenced SEs to change the form of 
registration 
Phulki and MIDAS 
Competitive logics Normative institution Stimulated development and nurturing of more 
entrepreneurial capabilities  
Tension in balancing social and economic 
goals  
BRAC Aarong Dairy, 
GISB, Hathay Bunano, 
Panther Social, GTT, 
GCCN, ASA, Phulki, 
MIDAS 
Consumer 
awareness and 
ability 
 
 
Normative institution Stimulated SEs to develop marketing and 
branding capabilities  
Created challenges in selling the product Panther Social, ASA, GISB 
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Society     
Conservatisms in 
society  
Normative institution Stimulated SEs to adopt creative ways to 
influence societal rules and/or adapt 
accordingly    
Hindered the adaptation of SE services by 
beneficiaries  
Hathay Bunano, Phulki, 
GISB 
Hierarchy and 
gender roles  
Cultural-cognitive 
institution 
Stimulated the development of communication 
and adaptation skills of SEs 
Created challenges in persuading 
beneficiaries to adopt SEs’ services 
Hathay Bunano, BPF 
Social sector     
Peer organisations’ 
behaviour 
Normative institution Stimulated the establishment of an association 
to encourage collective actions 
Created challenges and delays in putting 
forward the agenda of customised 
regulations to the government 
ASA 
Logics of the social 
sector 
Normative institution Stimulated the SEs to find innovative ways 
adjust the logics of social sector with other 
competing logics 
Tension in aligning the norms of justice 
with social tradition 
Hathay Bunano 
Family     
Family 
embeddedness 
Cultural-cognitive 
institution 
Greater harmony and efficiency in decision 
making 
Experienced allegation on the grounds of 
practicing nepotism 
BPF and Quasem 
Foundation 
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8.3 Management of institutional tensions within SEs 
The evidence presented in Chapter 7 shows that the SEs cases had experienced 
influences from multiple institutional domains (cf. Battilana & Lee, 2014; Ridley-Duff & Bull, 
2011), often creating competing pressures. Responding to each of the influences and managing 
those concurrently were important in terms of achieving legitimacy with key stakeholders and 
accessing resources. As a consequence, a range of tensions were  experienced by the SEs in 
terms of responding to competing logics originating from different institutions and balancing the 
social and economic missions (cf. Doherty et al., 2014). This study has identified ten different 
management tensions faced by SEs, which are summarised below. 
 
Tension: Balancing social and economic goals  
This tension is created when the advancing economic goal requires some actions that 
may jeopardise the social goals (cf. Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014). This is one of 
the prominent tensions found in all five categories of SEs, and, in particular to those categories 
that had some degree of reliance on trading activity. SEs had used different entrepreneurial 
capabilities (cf. Bloom & Chatterji, 2009) to find alternative ways to achieve economic goals 
without burdening beneficiaries. A range of capabilities such as earned income generation 
(mostly the generation of revenue from alternative sources), innovation, marketing, social brand 
building, relationship development, and alliance building were used by SEs to increase their 
economic return. Mobilising these capabilities minimised the possibility of slipping into a 
situation whereby they deviated too much from their social goals. 
 
Tension: Complying with state regulatory requirements while meeting donors’ 
expectations  
This tension was created when state regulatory requirements and norms conflicted with 
the expectations of donors, and was found to be particularly prominent amongst the donor-
dependent organisations. Being fully reliant on donations (such as, BPF), such SEs had to attend 
to donors’ norms and requirements, while being registered under NGOAB also made them 
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accountable to the state regulatory domain. The analysis shows how a change in the regulatory 
requirements led to a need to provide greater documentation of its financial activity and 
accounts. The new regulations also required the donors to submit documents and also made the 
fund approval process more lengthy and cumbersome. In contrast to the highly bureaucratic work 
culture of the state regulatory domain, donors preferred a more efficient and outcome oriented 
working style. To this end, SEs faced a tension in balancing state regulatory requirements while 
also meeting donors’ expectations. As a result, the SEs were compelled to develop better 
professional skills related to regulators, such as account keeping, report writing, and measuring 
output to confirm the expectations of both state and donors.  
    
Tension: Maintaining an apolitical image while achieving political legitimacy 
This tension arose from the ongoing rivalry and conflict between the two main political 
parties in Bangladesh. The findings show that embracing a particular political party can make a 
SE more vulnerable to changes of government regime. As a politically neutral image was found 
to be an important strategy among all six types of SEs in Bangladesh. SEs, however, found that 
while maintaining such an apolitical image was important, it was also critical to achieving 
political legitimacy in both national and local political spheres in order to gain support. In some 
cases maintaining political neutrality also extended to how they managed their work cultures. For 
instance, in order to maintain internal harmony, BPF required its employees and beneficiaries to 
avoid politically biased discussions, decisions and bullying. Similarly, the founder of Quasem 
Foundation refused to participate in national elections by representing any particular political 
party in order to maintain their politically neutral image. At the same time both the organisations 
participated in meetings, seminars or other related events organised by the government or the 
opposition parties and had maintained networks with the leaders of both ruling and opposition 
parties. They had engaged with the government by providing regular updates about the progress 
of different projects, by involving local political leaders in their projects and also by providing 
advice and logistics support to the respective ministries and secretariats.  
Therefore, these SEs were able to apply their communications capabilities to portray a 
politically neutral image in their interactions with external and internal stakeholders, also 
applying their networking, persuading, and relationship building capabilities to maintain 
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constructive political linkages involving local leaders in their operations and seek co-operation 
from the government and local leaders. 
    
Tension: Respecting traditional norms and customs while meeting donors’ 
expectations  
This tension was more apparent in the donor dependent SEs, notably BPF. As these 
organisations were embedded both in donor agency and social structures, they were subject to 
contrasting norms and expectations presiding in both institutional spheres. For instance, BPF 
experienced a tension as a result of wanting to exclude husbands from their CBR programme and 
make the wives the principle loan recipient. This project was designed based on a funding 
condition of donors, however, this was also found to undermine the traditional family hierarchy 
and gender roles in the rural Bangladeshi society. Hence, the donors needed to be persuaded by 
BPF of the need to include husbands in the programme.  
Therefore, on the one hand, SEs had used their persuasion capability to convince donors 
of the importance of respecting social norms and customs for the success of the project. On the 
other hand, they made efforts to integrate social norms in the project plan and to make the project 
more suited to the specific social context and the needs of beneficiaries.  
 
Tension: Balancing family ethos and donors’ expectations/requirements  
The analysis of the previous chapter shows that the tension arising between the family 
ethos and the expectations and requirements of donors was particularly prominent in those SEs 
that were family-owned. These enterprises had boards composed of family members and family 
members (two generations) were heavily involved in key strategic and managerial positions. 
However, donors had been critical of this high involvement of family members in decision 
making and management, raising questions as to the extent to which a need for transparency and 
good management was being compromised by family nepotism. The family-owned SEs preferred 
to rely on family members’ in key positions due to the importance they attached to harmony and 
trust as a key strength of their organisational cultures. Therefore, such SEs faced tensions in 
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balancing their family ethos with donors’ expectations and requirements. To minimise such 
tensions, they used persuasion to convince donors of the benefits of family involvement. At the 
same time, they also invested in skills development and related training to upgrade the 
competence of family members, and also included external advisers on the board for increased 
transparency. In this way there were able to allay the concerns of donors while also retaining 
their family ethos.  
         
Tension: Attaining organisational goals while influencing social norms  
The analysis shows how the norms and beliefs in Bangladeshi society have challenged 
the advancement of SEs’ goals. This tension was found to be evident particularly in the case of 
Phulki, which is an NGO with some trading elements. In this case mothers (i.e. female garment 
workers), who were the key beneficiaries targeted by Phulki were suspicious of the child-care 
facility offered by Phulki which also discouraged the garment factory owners to introduce the 
provision of child care in their premises. This situation limited Phulki’s potential to make the 
alliances with garment firms needed for them to deliver child care service. This tension 
challenged the overall viability of Phulki’s dependent on working mothers being willing to use 
the day care facility as well as cooperation of the factory owners.  Responding to this tension 
required Phulki to persuade the mothers by spreading positive word-of-mouth messages about 
the day care service using their existing beneficiaries (i.e. mothers who already were satisfied 
with the service). Phulki engaged in dialogue with the mothers to take on board their views and 
respond to their concerns, building a positive relationship with them. At the same time, the 
organisation increasingly built alliances with garment firms through referrals from their existing 
alliance partner firms. They also developed a constructive network with government officials and 
sought public funding drawing upon their role in the implementation of the childcare provision 
required by national labour law. Therefore, Phulki was able to respond a resistance to change 
resulting from existing societal norms in order to advance their organisational goal. 
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Tension: Fulfilling social obligations while protecting knowledge resources  
The evidence shows how SEs had attempted to advance their social goal through 
replication of the operational model. While they were aware of the fact that sharing their model 
and experiences would involve revealing their knowledge to potential competitors, they were 
motivated to allow replication due to their commitment to creating social good. This tension was 
particularly prominently in the case of Phulki, whose social mission was to provide affordable 
childcare facilities to working class mothers. During the period of data collection, their service 
was only offered to the garment factories in Dhaka city, although they were aiming to spread 
their service beyond the capital city. Given their limited capacity a physical expansion beyond 
Dhaka city was not feasible for Phulki, creating the need for a mechanism to allow replication of 
their model by other interested NGOs who could extend the service beyond Phulki’s current 
geographical scope.  In order for replication to take place, Phulki had to transfer their core 
knowledge to other NGOs which they found to be conflicting with the logic of competition that 
requires the protection of key knowledge assets. In this respect, the founder of Phulki explained 
how they had to compete with other similar NGOs to increase the number of beneficiaries, 
revenue and to maximise support from relevant institutional actors. To this end, they experienced 
tension when deciding whether to pursue their social missions by facilitating replication or 
retaining their knowledge assets to maintain their competitiveness in the market. Phulki 
responded to this tension through franchising, which, on the one hand, allowed them to utilise the 
replicability of their model to generate alternative sources of revenue and on the other hand, to 
advance their social contribution.    
   
Tension: Differences between peer organisations undermining collective action 
The evidence shows how tensions can arise when SEs attempt to make ambitious 
institutional changes that require collective action by peer organisations which may be divided 
due their varied levels of willingness and capacity to stimulate and implement changes. Hence, 
this tension arises from the need the interests of different groups and persuading them to 
participate in collective actions. This was mainly evident in the case of ASA, and influential SEs 
that wanted to influence the government to introduce a regulation and a monitoring body that 
was suited to the needs of the MFI sector in Bangladesh. This required support from peer 
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organisations to impose collective pressure on the government and also a willingness to comply 
with the new regulatory regime. Having limited resources the small MFIs were disinclined to 
support such change that could later prove difficult for them to adapt to. Hence, ASA had to 
persuade peer organisations, especially the small ones, to support their initiative and to help them 
adapt to the new regulatory regime. This also involved convincing the large MFIs of the need to 
support the small ones by providing them with appropriate resources and advice. ASA, along 
with a number of other influential MFIs established the Association of Micro Finance Institute 
(AMFI) to lead this collective action. The association members were able to persuade both small 
and large MFIs to co-operate with the lobbying and implementation process. After this initial 
phase of persuading peer organisations to support the initiative, ASA along with their peers, 
lobbied the government to develop and implement the new MFI act. The entire process lasted 
three years, reflecting the high degree of tension and debate involved in creating the change. 
Once the new regulatory regime was introduced, this posed a further challenge for ASA in terms 
of complying with its requirements, for which they were compelled to seek external advice and 
support from consultancy firms to develop these skills.  
           
Tension: Maintaining an independent status while avoiding conflict with government  
The long-standing conflict between Professor Yunus and the current government was 
found to be a particular challenge for four SEs, Panther Social, Grameen Caledonian College of 
Nursing (GCCN), Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) and Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB). 
Due to the conflict between Yunus and the current government, these organisations were unable 
to register as social businesses, despite their  operational model being built on the ‘social 
business’ concept promoted by Prof. Yunus, and had to register as private companies instead. 
This tension was addressed by disguising their actual business structure externally, particularly 
from the state, while internally they maintained an independent status like a typical social 
business. To minimise this tension, therefore, the SEs were found to be customising messages for 
different stakeholders. While externally they were registered as private companies, their internal 
memorandum showed that they operated as social businesses and that employees identified with 
this model. Moreover, in order to advance their organisational goals, GTT, GISB and GCCN 
were found to be heavily reliant on internal synergistic alliances as well as external alliance 
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development as key means by which to avoid the need for support from the state. In this way, 
these SEs were able to maintain their status as social businesses, which were largely independent 
of the state, as well as large donors while externally maintaining the image of a conventional 
private firm to avoid conflict with the government.  
    
Tension: Attaining organisational goals while respecting traditional customs 
The analysis shows how some of the SE cases experienced resistance to their activities 
due to the conservative social norms of beneficiaries and their communities, resulting into a need 
for adaption of the projects. A similar tension was highlighted previously, where SEs had been 
able to influence social norms in their own favour. However, in this case the social norms were  
more dominant and thus harder to influence or adjust to. Hence, SEs had to integrate some of the 
customary practices in their operational model to show their respect for local traditions and 
achieve social legitimacy, even though this action created a tension with their social and 
economic activities. For instance, such tension were experienced by Hathay Bunano as they 
attempted to encourage female employment and allow them earn an income similar to their 
husbands. However, the participation of women in any work outside the home was against the 
religious and social norms, and earning a salary similar to that of the husband was also taken to 
be undermining the family hierarchy and husband’s authority. Hathay Bunano addressed this 
problem by persuading the husbands to allow their wives to work by varying means such as, 
relationship building and communicating. They also adapted a number of aspects of their project 
to suit the social context, such as adjusting the working condition to religious requirements and 
revising the women salaries to align with the social customs i.e. setting a salary rate that was 
lower than the average income of the males in that village.  
The analysis presented above shows that SEs had experienced tensions due to pressures 
emanating from different institutional domains that imposed competing demands on them. SEs 
had to respond to each of these pressures simultaneously in order to continue to access supported 
resources. They had to design responses according to the nature and relative importance of the 
institutional domain to the SEs, the varying magnitude of the institutional pressures and their 
impact on the organisations’ goals. SEs were found to have applied a range of responses to 
address the tensions experienced, including following a dominant logic or coerced compliance, 
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making a necessary adaptation, reflexively influencing a particular institutional pressure and/or 
side-stepping pressures. The implementation of such responses in each case required the 
development and mobilisation of a distinct set of resources and capabilities. 
     
8.4 Capabilities development in SEs 
SEs were found to have developed and applied a range of capabilities to manage the 
tensions highlighted in the previous section. A number of capabilities have already been 
identified in previous studies, such as communicating, alliance building, lobbying, earning 
generation, replicating (Bloom & Smith, 2010), marketing (Doherty et al., 2009), learning and 
skills development (Bull, 2007), networking and relationship development (Lyon & Fernandez, 
2012) and innovation (Gawell, 2013; Zahra et al., 2009). The analysis shows three distinct 
capabilities that can be conceptualised in a different way to those already identified in previous 
studies: i) alteration, ii) internal synergistic alliance building, and iii) social brand building. 
These capabilities are further discussed below. 
 
Alteration 
This capability refers to the ability to explore and implement alternative options when 
the most immediately preferred option is difficult to adopt or inappropriate due a tension with 
external institutional factors. For instance, the findings indicate that seven of the SEs cases had 
registered as private companies, despite having operational and profit models that were similar to 
social businesses, i.e. in the cases of MIDAS, Hathay Bunano, Panther Social, Grameen Telecom 
Trust (GTT), Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing (GCCN), Grameen Intel Social Business 
(GISB), and BRAC Aarong Dairy. The findings show that there was an absence of custom made 
policies and regulations for SEs with trading activities, and that registering under the NGOAB 
would have made them face lack of a cooperative attitude and limited support from public 
officers. In addition, the ongoing tension between Yunus and the government also discouraged 
Panther Social, GTT, GCCN, GISB to register as social businesses, given their need to disguise 
their ‘real identity’ to save their organisations from excessive government scrutiny. These SEs 
therefore adopted an alternative legal form to minimise such tensions.   
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Internal (synergistic) alliance building  
This capability refers to the ability to create synergistic organisational subsidiaries in a 
way that one unit fulfils the resource and the support needs of the other. This capability allows 
SEs to develop their own internal support system whereby one unit complements and advances 
the activities/goals of the other. The higher the degree of attainment of this capability, the lower 
is an SE’s reliance on external support institutions. The findings show that four SEs, BRAC 
Aarong Dairy, GTT, GCCN and GISB, had developed such a synergistic internal system. The 
interviewees of the Grameem family SEs used the word ‘synergistic alliance’ to refer to this 
arrangement between sister concern projects that complemented the support needs of each other. 
For instance, Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) conducted activities to support (both financially 
and non-financially) the projects of the Grameen family as well as other SEs. Similarly, BRAC 
Aarong Dairy and Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing were both established to support the 
resource requirements of BRAC Micro-financing division, Grameen Micro-financing division 
and Grameen Eye Care Hospital, respectively. The absence of appropriate public support 
institutions for SEs was a key motivator of such internal synergistic alliances.  
 
Social brand building 
Although all of the SE cases had some promotional/marketing aspects to their activities, 
only three SEs, Grameen Intel Social Business (GISB), Hathay Bunano and BRAC Aarong 
Dairy, had actively taken initiatives to develop a brand name and identity for their products. The 
founder of Hathay Bunano and the Vice Chairman of BRAC Aarong Dairy also claimed that 
their brands were different from conventional brands and should be regarded as distinct ‘social 
brands’.  Their branding strategies were forced to involve three main aspects: i) the naming 
strategy, ii) the communications strategy, and iii) the relationship building strategy. All three SEs 
made a strong link between their products and their value-centred socially oriented image and 
communicated this to the target customers/beneficiaries to differentiate their position from 
typical commercial brands. Their brand names were carefully chosen to reflect their social 
orientation and embeddedness within particular communities. The advertisements were designed 
to inform customers/beneficiaries about the ethical dimension of their products and testimonials 
used to demonstrate social impact. They used community oriented, traditional promotional tools, 
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such as road shows and jattra (a traditional stage drama popular in villages). They conducted PR 
activities to create awareness about their products as well as other relevant social issues. In order 
to gain trust and create relationships with stakeholders they drew upon their social value creation 
ability and marketing abilities.  
Therefore, the study has explored and developed the concept of ‘Social Brand’ in the 
context of Bangladesh, showing how the concepts socially oriented values associated with the 
product/service, communicates its differentiated position to customers, and develops 
relationships with stakeholders to draw upon its social value creation ability. These SE cases in 
particular were found to have developed distinctive social brands to gain market power based on 
their differentiated position. This capability of social brand development allowed the SEs to gain 
an economic return by drawing upon their socially oriented position.  
 These three capabilities extend the list of SE resources and capabilities identified in 
previous studies. Due to their hybrid nature, these capabilities were found to be vital for SEs’ in 
terms of achieving legitimacy with different institutions and balancing their social and economic 
goals.    
 
8.5 The range of growth strategies adapted by Bangladeshi SEs 
As discussed previously, the studied SEs experienced a number of influences from 
multiple institutional domains including the state, market, society, family, third sector and 
donors. These resulted in managerial tensions within organisations, with SEs being compelled to 
apply various strategies to respond to the different influences in order to resolve or minimise 
tensions. Their particular responses ultimately influenced their patterns of growth and therefore, 
these strategies are regarded as growth strategies in this study. While a number of tensions were 
addressed by adopting an isomorphic response (cf. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), others were 
addressed by pursuing a more entrepreneurial response (cf. DiMaggio, 1988; Tracey, 2012). Five 
possible growth strategies emerged from the data analysis: i) forced adoption/coercive adoption, 
ii) proactive response to regulation, iii) adapt, iv) influence, and v) avoid. The discussion on the 
growth strategies is as follows.  
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Forced adoption/coerced adoption 
The analysis shows how some SEs were compelled to adopt particular regulations 
and/or practices imposed by different institutions. Complying with the institutional regulations or 
norms was essential for the survival and legitimacy of the organisation; a situation of mandatory 
compliance with the regulatory requirements. Therefore, this strategy is a form of isomorphic 
response as conceptualised in the theory of institutional isomorphism by DiMaggio and 
Powells’s (1983). This growth strategy was particularly exemplified by the case of BPF as they 
had to coercively comply with the new stricter regime of NGOAB. 
 
Proactive adoption 
Some of the cases provide particular insight into how SEs have been able to promote 
and shape the introduction of new regulatory norms which meet the interests of both the state and 
the SE sector. For example, since the early 2000s, the Bangladeshi government has been 
encouraging NGOs, developmental agencies and labour unions to collaborate with the 
government and to support the garment factories in implementing the child care provision of the 
National Labour Law.  This revived focus of the government opened a new door of opportunity 
for Phulki to access public resources/funding by persuading and supporting the garment firms to 
introduce day care centres for their workers. Phulki acted proactively to contribute to the 
governments’ goal, utilising the regulatory requirement of government as a tool to expand the 
number of their branches. 
  
Adapt 
The evidence shows how some SEs had adjusted their existing organisational activities, 
project designs and strategies in order to integrate the demands of influential stakeholders and 
external actors. There were several examples of which SEs experiencing pressures from a 
particular institutional domain which challenged the advancement of their organisational 
activities. While the SEs were found to have made compromises in relation to some aspects of 
their activities in response to the demands/needs of the actors within that institutional domain, 
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they had also sought to influence the institutional requirements/practices to a certain degree. 
They selectively decided which aspects they had to compromise and adjust to achieve 
legitimacy, then deciding which aspects they would try to change in their favour. For instance, 
when Hathay Bunano faced resistance from the local community regarding female employment, 
they sought to win over the husbands by building relationship and gain their cooperation. At the 
same time, the organisation adjusted its working conditions (such as, allowing religious attire at 
work, adopting a flexible schedule during the harvesting season, allowing workers to bring 
children to work and so on) to suit the social/religious context of rural Bangladesh and the needs 
of their workers.   
 
Influence 
There were examples of some SEs attempting to influence the regulatory and/or social 
practices in a particular institutional domain because those were unfavourable condition to their 
organisation. A number of SE cases had been successful in stimulating regulatory changes 
through lobbying, which is a response strategy previously identified in the theory of reflexive 
isomorphism (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988; Nicholls, 2009; Tracey, 2012). For instance, ASA was found 
to be adopting this strategy when it collectively lobbied the government for the development of 
customised regulations for the MFI sector.          
 
Side-stepping 
The analysis shows that some SEs had developed their resources and capabilities in 
such a way that they could find innovative means to side step an unfavourable institutional 
pressure. For example, all three of the SEs under the Grameen family (GTT, GCCN and GISB) 
had adopted an alternative legal form to disguise their affiliation with Yunus and had also 
developed their own support system through internal and external alliances in order to avoid the 
need for support from the state. Achieving legitimacy was not the prime intention here, rather 
they wanted to minimise the risk of conflict with the government. These SEs tended to be highly 
entrepreneurial in finding alternative means of addressing their support needs while also they 
could safeguard their integrity and legitimacy in a particular tense situation. 
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In short, a range of growth strategies are ‘identified’ above ranging from isomorphic 
responses where changed is coerced by external actors to more entrepreneurial and reflexive 
responses. Of the five growth paths, ‘adapt’ appeared to be the most prevalent among the SE 
cases. The second most dominant growth path was ‘side-stepping’ followed by ‘proactive 
adoption’ and ‘influence’. Situations where ‘forced adoption’ was apparent were few, and thus it 
appeared as the least preferred growth path. Overall, it can be concluded that the studied SEs 
tend to explore more entrepreneurial options in order to respond towards different tensions rather 
than choosing an isomorphic response.    
 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter has addressed the second and the third research questions of the thesis by 
presenting evidence relating to the interplay between different institutional influences and SEs’ 
responses focusing on their management of resources and capabilities. A number of regulatory, 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutions were identified that originated from state, market, 
society, donors, social sector and family. The chapter highlights how particular institutional 
influences had affected the social and economic goals of the SEs and thereof, had created both 
opportunities and challenges for the growth of the SEs. Ten specific managerial tensions were 
identified resulting from the competing pressures from multiple institutional domains. The 
chapter also shows how SE have mobilised their resources and capabilities to address these 
tensions. Following from these findings, it is clear that SE growth strategies need to be 
understood as the outcome of a complex interplay between the various institutional influences, 
SEs’ dual-value system, and how they organise their own resources and capabilities. The five 
growth strategies identified are forced adoption, proactive adoption, adapt, influence and side-
stepping. Table 8.2 summarises this interplay by listing the tensions and subsequent mobilisation 
of resources/capabilities in respond to different institutional pressures.  
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Table 8. 2: SEs’ managerial tensions and orchestration of resources and capabilities  
 
 
Tensions/ institutional domain State Market Society/Beneficiaries Donor  Family Social sector 
Complying with state 
regulatory requirements while 
meeting donors’ expectations  
Forced adoption 
Professional skills development 
External alliance building 
Staffing 
  Influence 
Communicating 
 
  
Maintaining an apolitical 
image while achieving political 
legitimacy 
Adapt 
Communicating 
Engagement 
     
Respecting traditional 
customs while meeting donors’ 
expectations  
  Influence and (finally) 
adapt 
Communicating 
Innovation 
Influence 
Communicating 
  
Balancing family ethos and 
donors’ norms  
   Adapt 
Communicating 
Adapt 
Staffing 
Skills 
development 
 
Balancing social and economic 
goals  
 Adapt 
Earning generation 
External alliance building 
Internal synergistic alliance 
Learning 
Marketing 
Social brand building 
Adapt 
Innovation 
Relationship building 
   
Attaining organisational goal 
while influencing social norms 
 Proactive response 
Networking alliance building 
Influence 
Communicating 
Relationship building 
   
Fulfilling social obligations 
while protecting knowledge 
assets 
 Adapt 
Earning generation 
 
Adapt 
Replicating 
 
   
Convincing two groups of peer 
organisations to attend to the 
same goal 
Influence  
Lobbying 
    Influence (peer 
organisations) 
Networking 
Communicating 
Skills development 
Maintaining an independent 
status while avoiding conflict 
with the government 
Side stepping 
Networking 
Alteration 
Communication 
 Side-stepping 
Communication 
   
Attaining organisational goal 
while respecting traditional 
customs 
 Adapt 
Marketing  
Social brand building  
Adapt 
Communicating 
Relationship building  
Networking 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the key findings from the study and highlights how these have 
answered the research questions. The chapter presents the theoretical and practical implications 
of the key findings, identifies the limitations of the study and suggests some ideas for further 
research.  
 
9.2 Key findings 
The key findings with respect to their research questions are discussed in this section. 
Figure 9.1 shows the refined version of the original conceptual framework (Figure 3.1 in Chapter 
3) presenting the story that has emerged from the findings of the research questions. 
 
9.2.1 The nature of growth in the Bangladeshi social sector 
The research has been focused on Bangladesh and in this institutional context, the thesis 
has explored the hybrid nature of SEs. This study has identified six operational types of SEs 
based on the five dimensions specified in the working definition of SE adopted by the study: 
social mission, economic project, governance structure, institutional setting and income source. 
The analysis of the studied cases using these five dimensions led to identification of six 
categories of SEs in Bangladesh: i) fully donor dependent organisations, ii) NGOs with some 
elements of trading, iii) NGOs with full reliance on trading, iv) social business, v) private and 
public limited companies, and vi) NGOs with a conventional subsidiary enterprise and vi) 
cooperatives (but not included in the study). This typology reflects the operational models of the 
SEs in Bangladesh and thus have addressed the RQ1a.  
The analysis of the operational models has revealed that two dimensions in the EMES 
definition of SE have shown different characteristics through their application in the context of 
Bangladeshi hybrid SEs. First, three specific types of economic projects were apparent among 
the studied cases: service delivery, micro-finance/loan and social mobilisation. The EMES 
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definition does not look into the specific types of economic activities that SEs may accomplish 
and thus offers a more general explanation of the ‘economic project’ dimension. This study, 
therefore, identifies three sub-categories under this dimension that were observed in the studied 
cases.  
Second, this study has looked beyond the ‘participatory governance structure’ that is 
originally considered as one of the key characteristics of SE by the EMES Network (2013). This 
study has found in case of four operational models (except, NGOs with a conventional subsidiary 
enterprise) beneficiaries are not represented in the board and are separated from the governance 
related activities. Although some SEs (e.g. Panther Social and ASA) invite representatives of 
beneficiaries to seek advice from them and to have a dialogue during regular and annual board 
meeting, they do not allow beneficiaries with a right to decision making. Therefore, looking 
beyond the participatory governance structure, the thesis has found SEs boards that are 
composed of founders, their family members and external expert advisors.  
Third, the EMES approach does not include the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms. The EMES ideal-type of SEs have shares of market resources, public grants and voluntary 
resources. The ideal-type SEs may adhere to market-based principles which drive them to trade 
goods or services through price setting. The market resources may come from private customers. 
(The EMES Network 2013: 17-20). However, the data analysis suggest that a number of studied 
SEs are registered under the Private Company Act of Bangladesh, although they have an explicit 
social aim. For instance, the SEs categorised as social businesses (e.g. Panther Social) and 
private and public limited company (e.g. Hathay Bunano and MIDAS) are private sector 
organisation as per their registration status, although they have an explicit social goal. Thus, this 
study advance the EMES approach by including the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms.  
Therefore, the current study has advanced the definition of ideal-type SEs proposed by 
the EMES Network by looking beyond the participatory governance process, by identifying three 
sub-forms of economic projects and also by including the SEs that are registered as private sector 
firms. 
The study has also identified four forms/modes of growth pursued by SEs to maintain 
their dual value system. Expansion and diversification are the two main modes adopted for 
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advancing the social goals, while economic goals have been pursued through autonomous 
growth and partnership. The ‘expansion’ strategy has been applied by increasing the number of 
branches, beneficiaries and/or employees within their existing operations. In contrast, the 
‘diversification’ strategy has been pursued by diversifying organisational units in order to carry 
new projects for disadvantaged groups with different needs and problems. Diversification was 
also carried out in order to complement the activities of the sister concern units (such as, BRAC 
dairy was created to provide income support to the beneficiaries of BRAC Micro-finance). The 
economic goals have been achieved by adopting an autonomous growth strategy. Subsequently, 
four SEs have purposefully avoided donations and/or investments from external organisations 
and/or individuals, as they intend to achieve financial self-sufficiency through the trade of 
products/services rather than relying on donations or grants. In contrast, seven SEs have chosen 
to achieve economic goals through ‘partnerships’ and seeking investments, donations and grants 
from external organisations and individuals. Three different forms of partnerships have been 
identified through further investigation: non-commercial relationships, commercial relationships 
and joint investment relationships. The studied SEs have been mapped in the continuums based 
on their modes of advancing social and economic goals.  
The analysis of the operational models has revealed the hybrid nature of the studied 
SEs. All the six operational models accommodated a value system involving both social and 
economic missions, presence of multiple stakeholders in the governing body, enactment in 
pluralistic institutional domains and income from both trading and non-trading activities. The 
hybrid nature of SEs was further apparent from their forms of growth that were adopted by SEs a 
planned manner to maintain their dual value system (i.e. to pursue social mission and economic 
goals simultaneously). Overall, this part of the thesis identifies the nature of growth of SEs in 
Bangladesh and has addressed RQ1a and RQ1b.  
 
9.2.2 The interplay between institutional influence and SE growth 
The definition of hybrid organisations points to “drawing on two/multiple different 
sectoral paradigms” and “coexistence of values” (Doherty et al., 2014). In line with this 
definition, the studied SEs have shown enactment in multiple institutional domains including 
state, market, society, donors, third sector and family and have also accommodated coexistence 
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of two values, social and economic. There was evidence in the data showing that SEs have 
experienced tensions as because these competing pressures from pluralistic institutions have 
affected the way SEs could accomplish their values, both social and economic. The SEs had to 
respond to these pressures in a strategic manner to access resources and achieve legitimacy from 
institutional actors. The management of tensions, therefore, involved orchestration of SEs’ 
resources and capabilities in a particular way. To this end, the study have identified an interplay 
between the institutional influences, SEs’ value system and their way of mobilisation of 
resources and capabilities at functional level. This interplay was evident irrespective of their 
operational type (as identified in Chapter 6). The list of tensions along with the combination of 
the institutional domains causing those are detailed in Table 9.1. 
 
Table 9.1: Influencing institutions and tensions 
Influencing institutions Tensions 
State-donor-enterprise Complying with state regulatory requirements while meeting donors’ expectations 
State-enterprise Maintaining an apolitical image while achieving political legitimacy 
Society-donor-enterprise Respecting traditional customs while meeting donors’ expectations 
Family-donor-enterprise Balancing family ethos and donors’ expectations/requirements 
Market-society-
enterprise 
Balancing social and economic goals 
Society-market-
enterprise 
Attaining organisational goals while influencing conservatisms in the society 
Society-market-
enterprise 
Fulfilling social obligations while protecting knowledge assets 
Third sector-enterprise Convincing two groups of peer organisations to attend to the same goal 
State-enterprise Maintaining an independent status while avoiding conflict with government 
Society-enterprise Attaining organisational goals while respecting traditional customs 
 
The findings show evidence of conflicting institutional demands in SEs. These 
influences affected, at a strategic level, the way SEs could achieve their social and economic 
missions and at a functional level, the organisation of SEs’ resources/capabilities. For instance, 
the absence of customised regulations for social businesses and the conflicting relationship 
between Yunus and current government made Panther Social register under the Private Company 
Act, which not only required them to pay tax as a private/commercial enterprise but also 
prevented them from seeking donations and grants. Further to this, the employees of Panther 
Social were confused regarding the actual identity of the organisation (i.e. whether they should 
operate as SE or a private sector firm). Their employees were also dissatisfied with them having 
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to pay income tax at the rate of commercial private firm employees, although their salary was 
lower than that offered in typical private sector firms. Thus, at a given time, SEs have 
experienced influences from single or multiple institutions that have affected the way SEs’ could 
pursue their social and economic goals. At functional level, these tensions have influenced SEs’ 
financial, human and knowledge resources. These findings have, therefore, addressed RQ2.  
In order to cope with the tensions, SEs had to respond to the institutional pressures. In 
so doing, a range of resources and capabilities were, therefore, developed and mobilised in a 
particular way by SEs. In the case of Panther Social, for instance, they responded by 
withdrawing the application from NGOAB and registering as a private company. In order to 
enhance the level of employee satisfaction they have revised the salary scale that was higher than 
the conventional NGOs. Panther Social has crafted appropriate communication strategy to reflect 
multiple organisational identities to different stakeholders. In the case of other SEs as well, 
resources and capabilities were similarly orchestrated to manage the tensions in a way that 
ensures appropriate response to the institutional influences, while also mitigating the constraints 
towards achieving SEs’ social and economic goals. A number of capabilities were identified in 
the findings, some of which were already been explored in previous studies, such as 
communicating, alliance building, lobbying, earning generation, replicating (Bloom & Smith, 
2010), marketing (Doherty et al., 2009), learning and skills development (Bull, 2007), 
networking and relationship building (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012), and innovation  (Gawell, 2013; 
Zahra et al., 2009). Further to this, three different capabilities were observed in the studied SEs: 
i) alteration, ii) internal synergistic alliance building, and iii) social brand building.  
An interplay among the institutional influences, SEs’ value system and their 
mobilisation of resources and capabilities is, therefore, evident in the data. The findings further 
show that the interplay led the SEs to a range of growth paths undertaken as a mode of 
responding towards tensions. Five possible growth strategies were identified within the 
continuum. There are: i) forced adoption/coercive adoption, ii) proactive response, iii) adapt, iv) 
influence, and v) side-stepping. 
The findings show that SEs have responded to a number of institutional influences by 
fully adopting a particular behaviour of theirs in line with the demand/s of the respective 
institutional actor/s. While in some cases this adoption has happened due to coercive pressure by 
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the institutional actors (i.e. ‘forced adoption’), in other cases this has occurred out of SEs’ 
proactive initiative (i.e. ‘proactive adoption’). Instead of blind compliance with the demands 
posed by institutional actors, some SEs have partially adapted their response to suit their 
particular situation/goal (i.e. ‘adapt). In a number of cases, SEs have shown a reflexive response 
to particular institutional demand by taking initiatives to influence the institutional actors and 
changing the norms and practices of respective institutions into their favour (i.e. ‘influence’). 
Finally, in a number of situations, SEs have completely avoided a particular institutional demand 
by choosing an alternative path to achieve the goals and thereby seeking support from another 
institutional domain (i.e. side-stepping). Among the five growth paths, ‘adapt’ appeared to be the 
most vital approach. The second most dominant growth path was ‘side-stepping’ followed by 
‘proactive adoption’ and ‘influence’. The situation driving to ‘forced adoption’ was very limited 
and thus it appeared as the least preferred growth path. Overall, this part of the findings answered 
RQ3. 
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Figure 9.1: The interplay among institutional influences, hybrid SE value, and their 
resources and capabilities  
 
 
9.3 Implication for theory and practice 
This section uncovers the theoretical and practical implications of this thesis.  
9.3.1 Contribution to theory  
The study has made three key contributions to the theory. First, it has advanced the 
understanding of the managerial tensions within hybrid SEs by drawing on how such 
organisations experience competing pressures originating from multiple institutions and how 
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these pressures create tensions in achieving their economic and social goals simultaneously. The 
study has further identified a range of tension management strategies that hybrid SEs undertake 
by mobilisation of resources and capabilities in a particular way. This study is a synthesis of 
ideas from three literature domains - hybrid organisations, institutional views and strategic 
management. The study has borrowed the resource and capabilities based view from strategic 
management and tied it with the concept of mixed institutional logics from institutional analysis. 
This cross-fertilisation has allowed the macro-level factors from institutional domains to be 
linked with micro-level issues inside the organisation.   
Thus the findings of the study extend the understanding related to two emerging 
interests in SE research: i) studying the hybrid nature of SEs (e.g. Jay, 2013; Pache & Santos, 
2013) and ii) synthesizing insights from other disciplines to examine tensions in hybrid SEs (e.g. 
Doherty et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2013). In this respect, Doherty et al. (2014) recently proposed 
three important research agenda that require the attention of scholars in the social 
entrepreneurship landscape. Firstly, they have urged SE scholars to investigate the hybrid nature 
of SEs by examining how they balance their social and economic goals and how they embed in 
multiple institutional settings. The RQ1 of this study has responded to this call by identifying the 
operational trajectories of SEs in Bangladesh and their forms of growth. Secondly, Doherty et al. 
(2014) urged for pursuing a study “to investigate the institutional conditions that promote the 
establishment and growth of SEs, and those that hinder their creation and growth”. This study 
has responded to this call by identifying the positive and negative institutional influences and 
finding how these influences create managerial tensions in SEs (RQ2). In their third research 
agenda, they proposed the development of “a theory to explain how SEs sustain relationships 
with an array of stakeholders that have competing objectives at the same time developing 
market-based strategies by hybrid organizations to create and leverage resource portfolios”. 
The current study has identified a number of responses that SEs can exert to achieve legitimacy 
from stakeholders in the state, market, donor agencies, family and society. The study has also 
revealed a number of ways through which SEs have avoided a particular demand originating 
from the public sector by relying on the opportunities present in the private sector. Thus the 
study has found how SEs have developed market-based strategies in order to side-step 
unfavourable norms or practices that they would otherwise have to comply with. Further to this, 
the study also identified how SEs orchestrate resources and capabilities to implement these 
226 
 
responses (RQ3). Previous studies have explored the interplay between structure and agency. 
The current study has advanced this understanding by examining this interplay in hybrid 
organisation context. The study has empirically drawn out how institutional factors influence the 
way hybrid SEs can pursue their social and economic goals and how SEs mobilise their 
resources and capabilities in order to manage internal tensions resulting from institutional 
influences. This study, therefore, contributes to the broader discussion regarding the relationship 
between structure and agency. 
Second, the contribution of the thesis is not limited to SE research only. The thesis has 
also contributed to the institutional and strategic management views. The findings of this study 
have pointed that the resource-based perspective that originally focus on the growth of 
conventional enterprises can be useful for explaining SE growth as well. The resource-based 
view is based on the assumptions of economic value creation and accords limited attention to the 
resources and capabilities required for social value creation. Nevertheless, this thesis has 
identified a set of resources and capabilities that SEs need in order to accomplish their social 
goals, such as ‘Social Brand’ development, internal synergistic alliance building, alteration and 
replication. This study, therefore, advances the resource-based view in terms of its application in 
SE context.  
Furthermore, the findings of the study provides a critical reflection on Scott’s typology 
of institutions. This study has found that the boundary between normative institution and 
cultural-cognitive institution was blurred in Bangladeshi context. A number of institutional 
influences identified in the current study have resulted due to the factors originating from both 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutions such as, conservatism in the society, hierarchy and 
gender roles and family embeddedness. The data analysis shows that the conservatism on women 
employment in Bangladeshi society has resulted due to Islamic religious norms, which in line 
with Scott (1995) is categorised as a normative institution. At the same time, this practice could 
also be a result of the masculine culture in Bangladeshi society that draws on males’ dominant 
role in income generation and in the family. In line with Scott’s typology, therefore, the 
conservatisms observed in Bangladeshi rural societies could as well be categorised as a cultural-
cognitive factor. Similarly, the issues resulting due to the hierarchical structure and gender roles 
in Bangladeshi societies could be the result of country’s masculinity culture. The Islamic 
religious values (i.e. women should be in veil and taking care of family) could also be 
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responsible for the hierarchical structure and gender roles in Bangladeshi society. The tendency 
of SEs being heavily embedded in the family values could have originated from the culture of 
collectivism. At the same time, this could be an outcome of the Islamic values that focus on 
helping family members and respecting the opinion of the elderly. These institutional factors, 
therefore, cannot be neatly categorised as normative or cultural-cognitive, which shows a 
limitation of Scott’s typology in terms of its application in the institutional context surrounding 
the hybrid SEs in Bangladesh.   
Third, the current study has identified the institutional factors that can potentially 
influence the nature of hybrid SE growth in Bangladesh. While a number of findings of the study 
are specific to Bangladeshi context, others can advance the understanding of the nature of SE 
growth in similar institutional environment prevailing in other South Asian countries, such as, 
India, Pakistan and Myanmar. The institutional factors that are specific to Bangladeshi social 
sector context are the absence of customised regulation, Yunus-government conflict, the NGO-
state relationship, national regulations and policies on SEs and the dominance of western donors. 
However, the institutional factors that can also prevail in other South Asian countries are 
conservatism regarding female employment, hierarchal structure and gender roles, family 
embeddedness and limited awareness and affordability of the customers. Therefore, the tensions 
resulting due to these institutional factors can also be apparent in SEs in these countries.  
In addition, this study has identified six different operational models of SEs (RQ1). 
Given the countries in the South Asian region share a number of similar regulatory, normative 
and cultural-cognitive institutional factors, the existence of these six operational models could be 
explored in the context of these countries. Although there are a number of previous studies 
identifying different models of SEs in Europe (Defourny & Nyssens, 2008), the USA (Kerlin, 
2010) and East Asia (Defourny & Kim, 2011), the studies examining the operational models of 
SEs in the South Asian region is still limited. This thesis, therefore, suggests future research to 
explore the application of the six operational models in the South Asian region.  
 
9.3.2 Contribution to policy and practice 
The findings of the study can have a number of implications for policy and practice. In 
the context of policy making, the findings indicate that customised policy, appropriate public 
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support and co-operation from the government facilitate the growth of hybrid SEs. The 
traditional non-profit NGOs in Bangladesh have benefited from structured policy guidance and 
proper support institutions. A number of these are not applicable for the hybrid SEs that are on 
the rise in Bangladesh. This study has found that the absence of customised policy guidance and 
institutional support have led to a number of tensions in these hybrid SEs. In order to overcome 
these tensions, some hybrid SEs had to adopt alternative legal forms which has put them into a 
set of other challenges. For instance, registering as a private limited company had required SEs 
to pay tax like conventional firms, although they were often not able to generate profit at a 
similar rate like conventional firms. Thus their working capital was always found to be at stake. 
The findings of this study imply that the Bangladeshi government should focus on developing 
policies and public support systems that are customised according to the needs of this new 
generation of hybrid SEs. Appropriate tax policy, customised loan facilities and awareness 
programmes should be designed to facilitate growth of these hybrid SEs. In so doing, the policy 
makers in Bangladesh may need to conduct field research and engage in dialogue with SE 
leaders to identify the emerging SE models, their existing problems and support needs in order to 
construct a more favourable institutional environment for them.  
The thesis have multiple implications for SE practitioners as well, especially for the 
leaders/managers of the hybrid SEs. The findings of the study can guide the hybrid SEs in 
Bangladesh to understand how they may experience competing expectations from different 
institutional actors and how those influences may lead to internal tensions. The insights from the 
study can make the SEs comprehend and manage their internal tensions better. The findings five 
ways to respond to different institutional demands: forced adoption, proactive adoption, adapt, 
influence and side-stepping. The study further offers Bangladeshi hybrid SEs with a guidance for 
developing and mobilising a number of resources and capabilities, at the functional level, in 
order to effectively respond to their internal tensions that may be created due to country’s 
institutional context. Thus, Bangladeshi hybrid SEs could adopt the tension management 
strategies identified in the study to deal with similar situations. Further to this, the study show 
that hybrid SEs in Bangladesh focus more on developing entrepreneurial considering the current 
institutional environment surrounding them. In addition to developing the capabilities for social 
value creation, they should develop business-like capabilities for pursuing their economic goals. 
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9.4 Methodological reflections and limitations 
The current study used a qualitative method and involved analysis of only 11 cases. The 
study is mainly exploratory in nature and thus its findings need to be adopted with care. Thus the 
findings from the data are not generalisable. However, a number of findings could be tested in 
the context of hybrid SEs in other developing countries that have similar institutional conditions, 
such as Pakistan, India, Nepal, Myanmar and so on. Although the findings have been derived in a 
structured and organised manner through the use of Nvivo software, the comparison of these 
findings across cases could be done in a more scientific manner should qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) was used with application of fuzzy techniques. This would have enhanced the 
reliability of the findings and the replicability of the study framework.  
Although efforts have been made to purposively select the appropriate cases, this 
process could not be accomplished entirely based on judgement due to access limitations. Thus, 
the inclusion of balanced number of cases from each of the categories listed in the NGOAB 
directory (i.e. traditional NGOs, micro-finance, social business, urban, rural and so on) was 
possible due to the access issue. The cooperatives were also excluded for the same reason. With 
exception to three cases, other SEs were accessed using the researchers’ personal network.   
Another methodological limitation also related to the sample selection process involves 
exclusion of the failure cases. The cases selected for the study are all reputed and well 
established in their respective activity. While there are a handful number of failed SEs in 
Bangladesh, even including the large ones such as, Proshika (Lewis, 2004), those have not been 
considered in the sample set. This is because, the failed SEs have no physical existence and 
hence are difficult to contact and examine.  
Nevertheless, this methodological limitation has left behind a valuable lesson for the 
study. The conceptual framework of the study partly rests on the principles of the RBV, which 
posits that the success of organisations depends on their ability to create sustained competitive 
advantage by the development of appropriate resources and capabilities. The RBV implicitly 
suggests that organisations are fundamentally capable of developing resources and capabilities 
that are valuable, inimitable, rare and original (Barney, 1991). While the RBV presents the bright 
side of organisational life, the critiques of RBV entails the dark side (e.g. Boxall, 1996; Lockett 
et al., 2009). The absence of assumptions that “limit organisational behaviour” is fundamental to 
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RBV (Lockett et al., 2009: 9). In contrast to the RBV, Sinkovics et al. (2014) argue that 
organisation survival depends on their ability to remove constraints and that it is not entirely in 
organisation’s control to develop resources and capabilities in order to alleviate unfavourable 
external factors. This constraint-based view suggests that organisations could be trapped being 
influenced by situational factors which may limit their capacity to develop capabilities required 
to overcome the constraints. This alternative logic could not be explored in this thesis due to 
absence of failure cases in the sample. The findings of the study show that all the studied SEs 
have been able to manage their tensions through deployment of resources and capabilities. 
However, the incorporation of failure cases could have potentially changed this finding. 
Inclusion of failure cases might have allow the thesis to identify institutional influences that are 
of more serious in nature causing more complex tensions.  
Despite these limitations, the study provides considerable insight on the growth of 
hybrid SEs. The study primarily focused on exploring the complex and multi-facetted reality in 
the Bangladeshi institutional context and understanding the tension management processes in 
hybrid SEs within this national context. In so doing, the study has focused on achieving depth 
rather than breadth. The exploratory nature of this thesis has facilitated a synthesis of ideas from 
institutional, strategic management and SE literatures. The insights from this study can be tested 
using larger samples, different context and/or different groups of SEs in future research. 
 
9.5 Suggestions for future research  
Given the methodological limitations of the study highlighted above, a number of future 
research ideas can be derived. Future research focusing on the management of tensions in hybrid 
SEs may benefit from including failure cases. This may allow identification of the tensions that 
are more complex in nature and can potentially challenge the survival of the organisation. The 
findings of such study can not only advance the understanding of tensions in hybrid SEs but also 
elucidate the “limiting behaviours” (Lockett et al., 2009) of such organisations that can shape 
their tension management strategies.  
In an attempt to gain superior understanding on the nature of hybrid SEs, future studies 
may compare the tensions and their management strategies in case of hybrid organisations vis-à-
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vis non-hybrid ones, such as, conventional for-profit firms or traditional non-profit NGOs. Non-
hybrid organisations having single value (either economic or social) and enactment in relatively 
fewer number of institutional domains are likely to experience challenges of different nature. 
Thus an understanding of the tensions in non-hybrids will help future studies to identify hybrid-
specific tensions and their management strategies.     
Further research can also be conducted to compare the nature of hybrid SEs in 
Bangladesh vis-à-vis those in other South Asian countries. The operational models of hybrid 
SEs, their tensions and their management strategies that have been identified in this study can be 
compared with those in hybrid SEs in India, Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal and so on. Future studies 
can compare the institutional influences and the SEs’ internal factors across countries in a 
structured manner.  
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Appendix A: Overview of the studied cases 
 
1) Association for Social Advancement (ASA) 
 
A Origin  
Founded in 1978, Association for Social Advancement (ASA) is a micro-finance 
institution providing credit facilities to the poor rural community. With a view to alleviate 
poverty by empowering underprivileged community in war torn Bangladesh through ensuring 
their access to capital, ASA started its journey with support from donor bodies. The birth of ASA 
was driven by the dissatisfaction of the founder Mr. Shafiqul Haque Chowdhury regarding the 
inefficiency of NGOs and government in creating economic development. He joined up with 
seven philanthropists comprising of academic, lawyer, physicians, government bureaucrats and 
social workers to found ASA.  
 
B The social mission 
The mission of ASA is to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of lives of the 
landless and asset-less rural poor by providing them with access to cost effective financial 
services. The institutional mission of ASA is to support and strengthen country’s economy at the 
bottom of the socio-economic pyramid by facilitating access to financial services for the poor, 
marginalized and disadvantaged who are ignored by conventional financial services. 
 
The main target members of ASA are women who belong to the poor working class 
community based in rural villages and dwell in the slum areas of urban cities. These women can 
be either a homemaker or involved in small labour oriented jobs, such as house maid, garment 
making or farming assistant.  
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C The economic project 
ASA mainly provides two types of micro-finance loans: primary loan and special loan. 
The primary loan has a maximum tenure of 12 months with a loan ceiling of BDT 50,000 
(US$650); and the special loan has a maximum tenure of 24 months and borrower can borrow in 
range from BDT 51,000 to BDT 500,000 (US$652-US$6,440). Both the loan products provide 
the borrowers flexibility in terms of repayment and require no collateral or group guarantees. 
The primary loan is given to the members who join the ASA program for the first time; whereas 
the special loan is for existing members who have been with ASA for 4-5 years, have cleared 
previous debts and now need a larger fund to expand existing projects/business/trade or initiate 
something new. 
 
ASA currently employs 20,226 full-time staffs including 17,847 are males and 2,379 are 
females and no volunteers. ASA have 3,154 branches located across all the districts of 
Bangladesh, of which 85% are located in rural areas and 15% in urban areas serving more than 
4.94 million clients. ASA is currently a self-sustaining institution mainly operating with their 
revenues from crediting functions. They have paid off all their loans and are no longer reliant of 
foreign donations since 2003. 
 
D The governance structure  
ASA is registered as Non-governmental Organization Microfinance Institute (NGO 
MFI) with NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB). They are also registered with, and governed by 
Micro-credit Regulatory Association (MRA) - a subsidiary of the central bank of Bangladesh 
established to regulate the activities of micro-finance institutions. ASA is also a member of 
Microfinance Institution Body of Bangladesh.   
 
ASA is governed and managed by two main tiers of administrative body, the first body 
is the Board of Governors, comprising of eight founding members and the second is the 
Administrative Body. The governing body meets once every month to outline the strategic 
235 
 
directions. The board members receive honarium (i.e. not a salary or dividend), as the revenue 
generated is used for organizational expansion and bearing operational cost. The administrative 
body, headed by the CEO, includes five Executive Vice-Presidents controlling the functional 
divisions as full time employees. The administrative body provides the operational and 
functional direction and is responsible for the overall management of the organization.  
 
2) BRAC Aarong Dairy 
 
A Origin 
BRAC Aarong Dairy has started its operation in 1998 with aim to assist the members of 
BRAC’s Micro-Credit program who borrowed money to invest in cows. A large number of 
micro-credit beneficiaries who bought livestock with the loan amount was facing a number of 
constrains to repay loans on time. These constrains include insufficient local demand to generate 
reasonable profit, lack of refrigeration facility and exploitation by powerful local wholesalers. 
Being inspired to solve this market access constrain of milk producers, Fazle Hasan Abed, the 
Chairperson of BRAC, started BRAC Dairy project to bring them out of poverty cycle. 
 
B The social mission  
BRAC Dairy’s mission is to grant farmers market access, ultimately helping them 
generate income and providing them a way out of poverty. Over the time, the mission has 
expanded to serve high quality milk based products to the customers of Bangladesh. Some of 
BRAC’s milk collection centres are located in a very remote and ultra-poor region of 
Bangladesh. These centres are not cost effective to operate though; BRAC, however, operates 
these centres to increase market accessibility of extremely poor milk producers and thus utilises 
the revenue from other centres to subsidize the operating cost of these centres. There are mainly 
two stakeholders group of BRAC AARONG Dairy, the first are the poor livestock farmers and 
the second are the quality and value conscious urban consumers. Their business model involves 
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channelling the urban money received from the market to the diary project supporting economic 
empowerment of rural dairy producers.   
 
C The economic project  
BRAC AARONG dairy has 100 collecting and chilling stations located in 25 districts of 
Bangladesh, out of these 25, 10 are located in the ultra-poor areas. The enterprise collects 
102,559 litres milk daily and serves 40,000 farmers, 64% of which are women. After collection, 
milk is transported to their processing plant located in Gazipur using their own fleet of milk 
transporters. The processed and packaged milk and milk-based products are then distributed 
through 23 independent distributors and 37 BRAC owned sales centres nationwide covering 
16,000 outlets. The current market share of BRAC AARONG dairy is 22% with a dedicated 
consumer base of around 500,000. 
BRAC AARONG dairy currently employs 1500 full time staffs who are dedicated to 
manage the vast operation of the organization. BRAC AARONG dairy is the first to receive the 
ISO 22000 certificate in Bangladeshi dairy sector and is one of BRAC’s largest enterprises, 
making profits of over US$2.8 million/year. BRAC AARONG Dairy is a financially self-
sustainable enterprise.  
 
D The governance structure 
BRAC AARONG dairy is registered as a SE of BRAC under the company act of 
Bangladesh. The organization is governed by a governing body chaired by Sir Fazle Hassan 
Abed, the Chairperson BRAC. The governing body is the same that of its umbrella organisation 
BRAC. The body is responsible for setting out the overall strategic direction of all BRAC 
subsidiaries. BRAC AARONG dairy senior management is regarded as the Executive 
Management Committee which is chaired by Sir Abed. Other members include the Vice-
Chairperson of BRAC, Managing Director (Enterprises & Investment), and a Senior Director for 
Enterprises who is the daughter of Sir Abed. The Executive Management committee manage the 
operational activities and reports to the governing body. All the revenues generated from the 
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sales of BRAC AARONG dairy products are used to support the operational cost of the unit, 
payment of salaries for all the staff members and executive management committee members 
and the rest is reinvested in the project.  
   
3) Quasem Foundation 
 
A Origin 
 Quasem Foundation started its journey through Alekjan Maternity and Child Welfare 
Center in 1958. It was set up by Late Abul Quasem, founder of Quasem Foundation and Quasem 
Group in Ulipur-Kurigram which is located in the Northern part of Bangladesh. The founder 
along with his family members felt the need to assist government in implementing 
developmental initiatives in Northern Bangladesh. The villagers had to travel 60 miles to reach 
the public hospital causing the death of mother and unborn child. Thus the founder, being an 
established business man, felt the moral obligation to ensure proper maternal health care 
facilities in his village. 
According to government study, there is high rate of blindness in the northern district 
due to lack of health care resources, poor nutrition, and various diseases. Following the success 
of maternity clinic, the children of Late Abul Quasem started Marium Eye Hospital in the Ulipur 
district in 1994, which is their flagship project. The hospital was the first of its kind in the district 
which contributed significantly in eliminating previously non-treated curable eye diseases. 
 
B The social mission  
“Charity begins at home” is the philosophy that guided the formation of the social 
mission of Quasem Foundation. Their social mission is to assist the unfortunate and less solvent 
people of Ulipur and Northern District of Bangladesh by providing affordable treatment for 
curable eye disease.  
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The target stakeholder of Quasem Foundation is poor people who are unable to afford 
expensive treatment for eyes. The target patients are not only restricted to Ulipur district; patients 
from all the surrounding districts and villages of Rangpur take their service. 
 
C The economic project  
At present Mariam Eye hospital provides treatment to about 350 outpatients per day 
including cataract operation, 10 other types of eye operation, refraction services, eye-test and 
prescribing glasses. In 2011, Mariam eye hospital opened another 20 bed hospital in 
neighbouring district of Saidpur and in the same year Mariam eye hospital launched the first ever 
mobile eye hospital of Bangladesh that travels around different villages of Rangpur, providing 
basic eye treatment.  
The northern district of Bangladesh is very flood prone leaving many of its dwellers 
living in extreme poverty. Thus the fees of their service are significantly subsidized in 
comparison to conventional eye hospitals. Patients with extreme poverty are given with free 
treatment. The source of income of the organisation combines CSR funds from their sister 
concern businesses (e.g. Quasem DryCell, Quasem Biscuits) and donations from Sightsavers (in 
the form of technical and expertise share), Government of Japan, Grameen phone and Akij group 
of Bangladesh. Mariam eye hospital currently employs 100 plus full time employees and eye 
specialist who voluntarily provide particular number of eye surgeries during an eye-camp run by 
the foundation.  
 
D The governance structure 
The Quasem Foundation is registered as a charity organization under the NGO act of 
Bangladesh. The foundation is governed by board of directors comprising of six people; this is 
the same board that governs the Quasem Group. The board is chaired by the eldest son of Abul 
Quasem. The other five board directors are also siblings of the chairman. The board of directors 
is responsible for providing the overall strategic direction to the foundation. Donors have no role 
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in decision making or setting the strategic direction; however, they have to submit reports to the 
donor on the usage of funds. 
The Managing Director oversees the operational aspect of the foundation assisted by a 
General Manager, operational manager and executive from the head office located in Dhaka. The 
board of directors neither recover any revenue from the hospital nor take any remuneration from 
the foundation. The profit is used for supporting the operational cost of the foundation.  
 
4) Phulki 
 
A Origin 
Phulki started their operation in 1991 as a non-profit organization providing day care 
facility for the working class mother, especially garment workers of urban Dhaka. The trigger for 
the start for Phulki origins from The Factory Act of Bangladesh, which stipulates that any 
organisation employing 20 women must provide day care facilities. In Dhaka thousands of 
women are involved in the readymade garment industry, while very few garments have day care 
facility in their premise. Thus, garment workers have to accept the work with uncertainty about 
their children left at home.  
The founder of Phulki tried to convince few garments about the importance of work 
based day care and its positive effect on worker’s productivity. Having limited response from the 
factory owners, she decided to start the day care in her own garage. Despite early bottlenecks 
Phulki was able to manage their resources, implement good management and leadership practice 
and started to grow. In due time, they were able to advocate the cause and got few garments on 
their side that allowed Phulki to operate day care in their premise. At the moment Phulki is 
regarded as the pioneer in providing day care facility in work premise as well as off work 
premise for the working class mothers of Mirpur (most of the readymade garments are situated 
here) area of Dhaka. 
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B The social mission  
The social mission of Phulki is to spark the development of the socioeconomic 
conditions of the disadvantaged people by promoting the rights of women and children. The 
overarching goal of Phulki is to provide a safe, secure and healthy environment for the children 
of working class mother. The main stakeholders of Phulki are the working class mothers who are 
involved in garments industry, house maids and small business and are based in the local area of 
Mirpur, Dhaka. 
  
C The economic project  
Phulki provides two types of day care facility; the first one is work place based under 
which Phulki operates day care in the factory premise. This service is offered to mothers 
returning after maternity leave and allows children aged 1 to 3 years. The second one are their 
community-based day care centres that are away from the factory premise allowing kids aged 3-5 
years. Currently, Phulki is managing 12 work place base centres which are 100% funded by the 
garments. Phulki currently operates twenty community base day centres covering the whole of 
Mirpur area. These centres charge nominal price from mothers. Thus Phulki needs support from 
the donors including Action Aid Bangladesh, Aga Khan Foundation, and Global Fund for 
Children, MARP Marketing Y Producto SA and Plan Bangladesh.  Phulki has 120 full-time 
employees, majority of whom are women. 
  
D The governance structure 
Phulki is registered as a non-governmental organization under the NGO acts of 
Bangladesh and is regulated by the NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh. The organization is 
governed by an Executive Committee of eight members, comprising of chairman, vice chairman, 
treasurer and members. The executive committee governs the strategic issues of the organization 
and the day to day activities are managed by the appointed Executive Director. The executive 
director who is the founder of the institution is a recipient of Ashoka fellowship and only 
member of the board who is provided with salary for her involvement with the institution. The 
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other board members do not take any salary/dividend from the organization. All revenues earned 
are used for the maintenance of the institution and reinvested for expansion.   The Executive 
director leads the overall operations of the organizations and is supported by several mid-level 
managers, officers from the office and care giver in the centres.  
 
5) Panther SE 
 
A Origin   
Established in 2010, Panther Media is the first media agency that introduced the idea of 
using rickshaws as platform for advertising by the corporations. Within a year, the organisation 
converted into a social business named Panther SE and got formal registration as SE. From then, 
the earnings from the rickshaw branding project is used to support a social project that assist 
poor rickshaw pullers to save money for purchasing own rickshaw or starting a small business.   
The founder of the enterprise is Mr.Ahad Mohammad Bhai who was inspired by Professor 
Muhammad Yunus, when he heard him speak in a local Social Business Contest held by a local 
school in early 2011. The idea of the enterprise is to put advertising on rickshaws to generate 
income which will be used to improve the lives of poor hard working rickshaw pullers. The 
motivation underlying the idea of the project is to solve the social constrain faced by the 
rickshaw pullers. Most rickshaw pullers in Dhaka city migrate from village and earn their living 
by renting a rickshaw. From their daily income they have to give the half amount to the rickshaw 
owner. Thus they can merely save money; even if they do, they spend the whole amount when 
they go to villages or become sick. Thus they cannot get out of poverty cycle without support. 
Therefore, Panther Social trains them on financial management and supports them to save money 
by opening account and doubling the amount they invest. This amount can help them start a 
business or buy own rickshaw which can improve their living condition. 
Later in 2011, Panther Social added another social business to its portfolio called the 
“Rickshaw Art”. In Bangladesh there are thousands of local artists who can draw/paint pictures, 
there pictures are normally installed behind rickshaws for increasing the aesthetic of the vehicle. 
Due to increasing cost, their arts are no longer purchased by the rickshaw owners leaving these 
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talented artists unemployed and in extreme poverty.  The rickshaw art project sells rickshaw art 
painted by traditional rickshaw artists (i.e. artists who decorate the entire rickshaw with 
decorative painting) to national and international customers. 
 
B The social mission 
The social mission of Panther social is to provide sustainable income generating 
opportunity for the under privileged rickshaw pullers of Bangladesh by using media as a tool for 
change to reduce poverty and promote the concept of social business in Bangladesh and abroad. 
The stakeholders of the organisation are the rickshaw pullers of Dhaka and the rickshaw artist.  
 
C The economic project  
The first economic activity of Panther social is rickshaw branding, as part of this 
program the rickshaw pullers get registered with the company for one year and their vehicle is 
used for branding commercial advertisements. Panther Social helps the pullers to open a savings 
account with the organisation, in which it also contributes the same amount as the rickshaw 
pullers deposit each month. At the end of one year, rickshaw pullers can withdraw the whole 
amount with which they can set own business or purchase own rickshaw which they can ride 
themselves or rent. Panther social also provides these rickshaw pullers and their families with 
free health care, vocational education facilities and training and assistance of on starting a 
business. 
Under the Rickshaw art project, the artists are provided with small fund as a start-up 
capital to draw the pictures. These pictures are then marketed using an international partner in 
the overseas. The price at which the painting is sold is returned back to the painters deducting the 
initial payment made to them as start-up capital. This program has no time limit and thus allows 
painters to leave any time by returning the initial investment made on them. Recently they 
launched a TV show holding SE contest among youth which generates revenue in the form of 
sponsorship. The earnings from rickshaw art project and TV show are also contributed for 
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supporting other initiatives. The organisation currently has 200 rickshaw pullers under their 
savings project and 20 rickshaw artists under the rickshaw art project. 
Panther social is a fairly new SE having five full time staffs. Panther social is financially 
self-sustainable and has no donor partners. 
 
D The governance structure  
Panther social is registered as a social business under the NGO acts of Bangladesh and 
is regulated by the NGO Affairs Bureau of Bangladesh. The enterprise is governed by four 
member board of directors who are well-established and reputed entrepreneurs in Bangladesh. 
The founder Mr.Ahad is the Managing Director of the enterprise, along with his second brother 
and two school friends are the other directors. At the present Mr. Ahad oversees all the 
operational aspect of the enterprise and is assisted by a General Manager, and three officers. The 
board is responsible for outlining the strategic direction of the enterprise and meets twice every 
month. All the earnings from the enterprise are reinvested in the project and used for salary of 
staffs and other administrative cost. Directors are not entitled to any salary/dividend.  
 
6) Hathay Bunano-Pebble 
 
A Origin  
Hathay Bunano produces hand-crocheted and knitted toys for children of 0-6 years and 
exports those to conventional retailers in USA, Australia, UK and other parts of Europe, such as, 
John Lewis (UK), Fun Kids (Australia) etc. To find a sustainable income solution for rural 
Bangladeshi women, the founder along with his wife, who is a British citizen, first introduced the 
model in his birthplace village. The business model is the creation of the founder’s wife who has 
skills in hand crochet, embroidery and knitting since her childhood, coupled with her natural 
talent in product design and a business background. 
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Most areas of rural Bangladesh are predominantly characterised by agricultural sector. 
Women in these areas have very limited opportunity to participate in productive activity. The 
cultural and religious values in these societies do not allow women working outside home 
leaving children apart. This exclusion of women from economic activity makes them lose their 
dignity and live in extreme poverty. To respond to this social constrain, Hathay Bunano aimed at 
creating localised job opportunities for women.  
Furthermore, based on research and experience, the founder realised that the micro-
finance model of different NGOs that is very common in rural Bangladesh has created minimal 
impact on poverty reduction. This is because such loans have high interest rates and draws on the 
assumption that poor people have entrepreneurial skills. However, most of the villagers being 
uneducated and unskilled naturally lack the entrepreneurial skills and thus cannot efficiently 
utilise the loan amount. With high interest rates, micro-finance makes them more prone towards 
risk in long-term. Thus the organisation started the venture to create sustainable employment for 
the villagers by drawing on their inherited crafting skills and enhancing those further through 
proper training.   
In 2004, the founders launched a pilot project of Hathay Bunano by using a training 
centre of an NGO to train A group of 12 women for 6 weeks who started production of hand-
made toys soon after. Seeing the success of the pilot project, they opened their own first centre in 
Narshindi in the same year employing 20 women. Since then the enterprise has seen phenomenal 
growth by opening their own managed centres in remote areas of Bangladesh and providing 
thousands of rural women an employment opportunity. In 2010 the organisation launched their 
own brand of toys called “Pebble” which is now exported to several developed markets around 
the world. 
 
B The social mission 
Hathay Bunano-Pebble’s social mission is to empower women of rural villages of 
Bangladesh by creating sustainable employment opportunity and eradicating poverty. In order to 
achieve their mission the organization has three objectives: firstly, to demonstrate that a 
handicrafts project in Bangladesh can avoid donor dependency by adopting a sustainable 
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business model; secondly to demonstrate that the production process/model followed in RMG 
(readymade garments industry) can be used to manage the production process of a handicrafts 
unit. Finally, to prevent economic migration of rural women by creating localised job 
opportunities.  
 
C The economic project 
The main economic activities of Hathay Bunano-Pebble is manufacturing and marketing 
of hand crocheted and hand knitted children’s toys and clothes. The organisation produces hand-
manufactured toys at its 34 rural production centres located in 12 different districts in 
Bangladesh employing about 3,500 rural poor women. Utilizing its full capacity, HBPS is 
currently producing 10,000 pieces of 350 different children items every month. All the workers 
are initially given with 6 weeks of training. Their wage ranges from US$23-26 per week which is 
higher than that in garment industry.  
 
Design-related functions are centrally controlled from headquarter in Dhaka and then 
communicated production centres. Hathay Bunano-Pebble is 100% financially self-sustainable 
enterprise having no loans, external investments and donations.  
 
D The governance structure  
Hathay Bunano-Pebble started as a non-profit organisation, as per the charter of the 
NGO Act of Bangladesh. In 2010, faced with growing demand of the product in international 
market and the need for expansion, the enterprise changed its registration status as 100% export 
oriented company. In 2012 the enterprise made their first foreign direct investment by creating 
Pebble Child UK Ltd in the UK and a MDXE trading company in Malaysia to control 
distribution in Europe and Asia. 
The company has a board of director including the two founding members and two 
family friends of the founding couples.  The board is responsible for the providing the strategic 
direction while Samantha manages most of the managerial and operational aspects of the firm. In 
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2009 Mrs. Samatha Morshed was awarded MBE for her work in Hathay Bunano. Though Hathay 
Bunano is registered as 100% export-oriented company, it operates as a SE as their profit is 
reinvested in the venture. Samantha and her husband take nominal salary for their work in the 
enterprise and other board members take a honarium based on number of meetings attended.  
 
7) Grameen Caledonian College of Nursing 
 
A Origin  
In 2009, Grameen Healthcare Trust and Glasgow Caledonian University formed an 
agreement to establish a high quality college for the education of nurses and midwives in Dhaka 
following the idea of Prof Yunus. A study conducted by Ministry of Health suggests that there 
are 23,000 registered nurses in Bangladesh who struggle to serve a population of 145 million. 
Therefore, Professor Yunus requested the assistance of Glasgow Caledonian University’s 
Nursing & Midwifery Department and proposed to them to form a nursing college in Bangladesh 
as a joint venture social business project with Grameen Healthcare Trust.  
 
With investment from both the partners and a generous grant of $2.5 million from the 
Nike Foundation, the project started its operation. In 2010, the college started its journey with 38 
female students. At present the college has a total of 138 students. 
 
B The social mission 
The mission of the college is to improve nursing and midwifery facilities and standards 
in Bangladesh to an international level through the provision of the highest quality education and 
research. As part of its secondary aim the college provides subsidised education facilities for the 
daughters of Grameen Bank borrowers and thus contributing further towards their poverty 
situation. At the moment all the students comes from the family of Grameen Bank micro-credit 
members. As this college was the first of its kind, so Professor Yunus and Caledonian University 
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restricted the admission to Grameen Bank borrower’s daughters only to explore the feasibility of 
the project.  
 
C The economic project 
At present the college offers 3 year Diploma in Nursing Science and Midwifery degree 
approved by Bangladesh Nursing council (a state body) and also by University and College 
Grants Commission (UGC) of Bangladesh (independent authority regulating private college and 
universities of Bangladesh). The program includes a combination of conceptual study and 
internship in a hospital or clinic. The college is not yet financially self-sustainable and receives 
donations from foreign NGOs and multinationals. With current growth rate, the college aims to 
be fully self-sustainable by 2017-18. The college now employs 37 full-time staffs which include 
academics, administrative and support staffs.  
 
D The governance structure 
The College is registered as an educational institute under The Private University and 
College Act 1992 of Bangladesh and is a 100% non-profit social business organization. Grameen 
Health Care Trust holds 70% and Glasgow Caledonian University holds 30% stake of the 
organisation. They have representatives from both the institutions in their staff body and Board 
of Governors. The board Chairman is Professor Yunus and Vice-Chairman is the college 
Principal and Director of the Caledonian Centre for Global Health. The vice-principal and 
another board member of the college is a former registered nurse of Bangladesh with experience 
of working in Bangladesh and Middle-East. The other BOGs are two representatives from 
different Grameen projects and two lecturers from Glasgow Caledonian University. The board is 
responsible for the strategic direction of the college; while the College Principal leads the 
Academic & Administrative Committee of the college for managing the academic and 
operational functions. The academic & administrative committee includes Vice-Principal, 
teachers and administrative staffs.  All of revenue earned from the college is re-invested in the 
project, payment of salary and administrative cost. None of the board of governors receives any 
dividend from the project; however, they receive honorium.  
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8) Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) 
 
A Origin  
Established in 2010, Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) is a flagship entity of Grameen 
family.  The aim of this project is to create awareness and facilitate implementation of social 
business ideas in Bangladesh. Once innovative social business ideas are set forth, Grameen 
Telecom Trust formulates them in to prototypes that can be replicated in a sustainable manner. 
Through practical realization of social business ideas Grameen Telecom Trust contributes to the 
broader vision of Grameen Family to create a poverty free Bangladesh. Grameen Telecom 
Trust’s key areas of investment interest are healthcare, education, industrial parks, environment, 
fashion and industries development.   
 
B The social mission 
Grameen Telecom Trust’s social mission is to provide technical and financial assistance 
to facilitate implementation of innovative social businesses. The stakeholders targeted by 
Grameen Telecom Trust are social entrepreneurs who are in need of financial and technical 
support.  
 
C The economic project  
Grameen Telecom Trust has financial stakes in four social businesses of Grameen 
Family. The first social business of the trust is Grameen Distribution Limited (GDL), established 
in 2009, creating employment opportunities for rural women. GDL employs 5000 self-employed 
rural women to market and distribute imported, local and in house manufactured products 
through door to door sales. The members are provided with sales training and products without 
any capital investment made from their end. After selling the product to end customers directly 
249 
 
or to the retailers, members are allowed to keep the profit minus the cost of producing the 
product.  
Established in 2008, the next project of GTT is Grameen Fabrics and Fashions Limited. 
The vision of this project is to create 10,000 jobs for the unemployed by 2020 by developing a 
fashion industry in the social business industrial park in Gazipur. Currently the trust has built a 
factory with technical collaboration from BASF, Germany. The factory is producing 
Bangladesh’s first long lasting impregnated medicated mosquito net. Currently, the project is 
producing 6,000 pieces per day, all of which are exported to Africa. The project is expected to 
produce and distribute 9,000 pieces of net for the local market from 2014. 
The third project of GTT is called Grameen Health Care Services Limited that is 
established in 2006 with the goal to broaden healthcare provision to children, women and 
financially distressed community of rural and urban Bangladesh. The first unit of this enterprise 
is Grameen Green Children Eye Care Hospital in Bogra which operates in partnership with 
Green Children Foundation, USA who has provided half a million US dollar funding for the 
project. The second unit of this enterprise is Grameen Veolia Water limited that is established in 
2008 with participation from Veolia Water AMI, France which is the world leader in water and 
wastewaters services. The main aim of this project is to purify and distribute subsidizes pure 
drinking water to Goalmari village of Bangladesh that suffers from arsenic affected water. The 
project sells bottled water in urban cities of Bangladesh at a higher rate to subsidize the cost of 
selling it to the villagers.  
The final enterprise of GTT is called Grameen Danone Foods Limited, a joint venture 
with Danone group of France. The unit produces nutritious yogurt aimed to improve child 
nutrition of rural Bangladesh at a cost effective manner. The unit markets yogurts branded as 
“Shokti” in villages at a highly subsidized rate and the same yogurt is marketed in urban cities at 
a higher market price to balance the subsidy. The unit started its operation in 2006 and currently 
employs around 250 people in the factory located in Bogra. Besides creating jobs in the factory, 
the unit was able to provide jobs for around 100 ladies who sells   “Shokti” yogurt door to door 
in different villages around the northern district of Bangladesh.  
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In addition, in 2012, the trust has formed a Social Business Learning and Innovation 
Fund (SBLIF) to promote ideas of social businesses and undertake their designing and 
implementation in Bangladesh. 
The activities of Grameen Telecom Trust are primarily financed by donations from 
external stakeholders. There is equity participation by different concerns on project basis as well. 
Grameen Telecom Trust (GTT) currently employs 15 full-time staff and 3 unpaid volunteers.  
 
D The governance structure  
Grameen Telecom Trust is registered as a trust under the Trust Act (1882) of 
Bangladesh. The institution is governed by an eight member Board of Trustees. Professor 
Muhammad Yunus is the Chairman and Managing Trustee. The board of trustee includes 
Managing Director of the trust who is specialist in micro finance and served as board member of 
development organization at home and abroad.  The other members of the trustee all comes from 
different Grameen institutions holding senior administrative/strategic positions in their respective 
units. The board is responsible for providing the strategic direction of the trust. The management 
team which is led by the Managing Director is responsible for heading the overall administration 
of the Trust. As per the trust act and GTT memorandum, the board of trustee cannot not take out 
any earnings/revenue from the trust. The revenue are used for the management of the trust, 
reinvestment in the projects and allocated to the Social Business Learning and Innovation Fund. 
 
9) Grameen Intel Social Business Limited (GISB) 
 
A Origin  
In 2009, Grameen Intel Social Business Limited (GISB) was formed as collaboration 
between Intel Capital and Grameen Trust. The company provide cost effective IT solutions for 
rural entrepreneurs who use the technology to serve their community farmers to improve their 
farming yield. 
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The history of the company goes back to 2007; the Chairman of Intel Mr. Criag Barrett 
visited Bangladesh and during his meeting with Professor Yunus he agreed to invest to create 
world’s first information technology social business in Bangladesh.  The firm’s main office is in 
Dhaka with team members located in USA and India.  
 
B The social mission 
The social mission of GISB is solving social problems by offering information 
technology at affordable prices. The aim of GISB includes developing software that run on a low 
cost computing device, providing IT solutions for rural entrepreneurs supporting agricultural 
improvement of the local community and connecting the rural community with information and 
technology base solutions. 
The main target stakeholder of the firm is the promising rural entrepreneurs who want to 
use low cost computer software driven solutions to support the development of agriculture in 
their community. The secondary stakeholder of the firm is the farmers based in rural villages 
who want to improve their production yield by reduction of cost.  
 
C The economic project   
The main project of Grameen Intel Social Business Limited is their software called 
“mrittikā” which performs soil nutrient analysis and recommendation. The software is marketed 
to rural IT entrepreneurs of Bangladesh and India who uses it to offer soil testing services to the 
farmers and use mrittikā to analyze the results to recommend fertilizer to the farmers for 
achieving cost effective optimum productivity. The software offers customized information to 
the farmers on elements, such as, required nutrients for maximizing yields, fertilizer type, 
quantity, application procedure, sources and options of the required fertilizers. The solutions 
from the software enable farmers to save money by reducing wastage and harmful effects of 
using excess fertilizer.  
The rural entrepreneurs pay onetime cost of US$10 for the software and US$12/year for 
web hosting, technical support and updates. The rural entrepreneurs charge US$.50 per 
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test/advice given to the farmer. The enterprise is funded mostly by the Intel foundation that 
provided the start-up capital and also by Grameen Trust. There is no other external donation 
partner of the enterprise. The firm currently employs eight full-time staff members and 4 
volunteer interns who expert in computing software development.  
 
D The governance structure  
Grameen Intel Social Business Limited (GSIB) is registered as a SE under The 
Company and Information Communication Technology Act of Bangladesh. As GSIB is a joint 
collaboration between Grameen Trust and Intel, the board of directors and staffs involve people 
from both the institutions. The firm is governed by four member board of directors that is lead by 
Professor Muhammad Yunus as the chair of the board. The Vice President is a representative 
from Intel World Ahead Program. The Chief Executive Officer of GSIB has 12 year experience 
working for Intel as a Finance Controller responsible for overseeing financial and strategic 
investments worldwide for Intel. He was transferred to Bangladesh by Intel to lead the 
management team of the GSIB project. The board is responsible for providing the strategic 
direction of the firm. All revenue earned from the project is used for maintenance of the firm and 
payment of salary of the management team and the rest is reinvested for further expansion. 
Board of directors withdraws no salary or dividend.  
 
10) MIDAS Financing Limited (MFL) 
 
A Origin  
MIDAS Financing Limited (MFL) is a Non-Banking Financial Institution (NBFI) 
established in 1995 to provide collateral free loans to small enterprises rather than microcredit 
loan provided by NGOs to individuals. The company started as NGO funded by USAID during 
late 80s to provide micro-credit loans to small scale entrepreneurs. In 1993, their funding from 
stopped as USAID diverted their resources in other projects. This action from USAID prompted 
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the management of MIDAS to stop reliance on donors and start a financially self-sufficient 
private limited company.  
MIDAS realised that being constrained to offer loan security, Bangladeshi small 
enterprises often struggle to get loan from conventional banks. For this reason, MIDAS decided 
to provide collateral free loan to small and new enterprises in Bangladesh. 
 
B The social mission 
The mission of MFL is to provide value added financial services to valued customers 
through strict maintenance of the ethical standard in financial operation. The objective of the 
institution is to provide loans with easy conditions and flexibility to the small scale enterprises 
enabling them to start and grow and also to promote enterprising society for small scale 
entrepreneurs in Bangladesh. Their target clients are small promising entrepreneurs who are 
involved or interested to start a small trade/business including social business in Bangladesh.  
 
C The economic project 
MIDAS Financial Limited provides four types of loans: i) medium term loan for small 
and medium size enterprises enabling them to establish new enterprises or expansion of existing 
enterprises; ii) short-term loan provided to micro enterprises for shorter period of time; iii) 
housing loan which is a long term loan provided to purchase or construct commercial spaces or 
shops for trade; iv) auto loan to support mid-income group of peoples to purchase cars for 
personal or commercial use.   
The interest rates for all the loans vary ranging from 10%-15%. The company provides 
a reduced interest rate loan for women entrepreneurs and social businesses to support good 
cause. MIDAS Financial limited is 100% financially self-sustainable enterprise with no reliance 
on donations. The company at the moment employs more than 200 full-time employees.  
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D The governance structure  
MIDAS Financing Limited (MFL) is registered as a public limited company 
incorporated under The Companies Act 1994 and licensed as Financial Institution under The 
Financial Institution Act 1993. The company got listed with Dhaka Stock Exchange in 2002 and 
Chittagong Stock Exchange in 2004. MFL is a member of Bangladesh Leasing & Finance 
Companies Association (BLFCA) and Bangladesh Association of Publicly Listed Companies 
(BAPLC). 
 MFL is governed by a twelve member Board of Directors providing strategic direction 
for the organisation. The board is chaired by former adviser to the caretaker government of 
Bangladesh and other significant members include former director of Central bank of 
Bangladesh, founder of Bangladesh Federation of Women Entrepreneurs etc. The Management 
team is headed by the Managing Director (MD) and other management staff. The revenue earned 
from the institution is shared with the shareholders (as MIDAS is listed with stock exchange. 
However, BOD only receives honarium. After paying the operating expenses the rest is 
reinvested in the enterprise. 
 
11) Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation (BPF) 
 
A Origin 
Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation (BPF) was established in 1984 as a non-profit, non-
government philanthropic organization. The organisation provides integrated services for the 
marginalized children, children with disabilities in six rural areas of Bangladesh and in three 
urban centres. Their services help disabled children to improve their functional, educational, 
health, nutritional, vocational and social areas. 
The core function of the organization is the development of evidence-based strategies 
for the prevention, early identification and optimum development of child with disabilities. 
Before 1980’s, there has been little social concern for and understanding of disabilities and no 
comprehensive work was undertaken for disabled children by the government or any other 
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development agencies. During that time a group of mothers with disabled child requested 
Professor Sultana Zaman, the founder of the NGO, to take initiatives for the children with special 
needs. Professor Zaman who has a degree on Child Psychology and Mental Development, during 
that time was teaching in the University of Dhaka and was involved as director of a small NGO 
working for child nutrition development. She decided to address the issue of child disabilities by 
herself and thus left the university and her NGO job to establish Bangladesh Protibondhi 
Foundation (BPF) with financial assistance from local and international donors.  
 
B The social mission 
The social mission of BPF is to advocate equal rights for children and adults with 
disabilities by creating opportunity for equal participation in all spheres of life and making them 
independent, self-reliant and contributing member of the mainstream society. The aim of the 
institution is to promote a child friendly right based inclusive society that is free from abuse, 
exploitation and discrimination for all children irrespective of religion, ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, gender and disability.  
BPF main stakeholders are disabled and under privilege children based in rural and 
urban areas of Bangladesh. Their stakeholder is divided into two groups urban (comprising of 
children from good income earning family) and rural (comprising of children coming from a 
poor income earning family).  
 
C The economic project  
Bangladesh Protibondhi Foundation provides three core areas of services health, 
education and rehabilitation/self-reliance support to their stakeholders. BPF’s flagship project is 
Child development clinic which provides clinical/medical/neurological assessment of disabled 
children from detection to sustainable care and rehabilitation support. 
BPF’s also has thirteen inclusive pre and primary schools where disabled children and 
normal children attend classes in the same class room. BPF also operates nine community-based 
rehabilitation programs assisting the disabled and under privileged children and their family with 
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sustainable income generation via agriculture. Besides this, BPFs operates six vocational training 
units training disabled youth in the skill of tie-dye, block printing, stitching and embroidery and 
carpentry. These youths are then rehabilitated in inclusive employment scheme run by partner 
for-profit firms in ready-made garments, shoe manufacturing and furniture manufacturing 
industry. All the projects are distributed in urban as well rural areas; with bulk of the project 
centres located in rural areas due to higher number of disabled children population in rural areas 
of Bangladesh.  
The foundation relies mostly on donation from local and foreign donor partners, such 
as, Square group, Transcom group, BATA, Bank of Ceylon, Save the Children Bangladesh and 
Job-Placement Australia. They are also regularly supported by individual donors coming from 
local and international community. Besides donation, the foundation limited revenues from 
providing clinical/medical support to the disabled children. They charge higher rate for urban 
children who comes from good income earning family while offering subsidized/free rate for 
children coming from poor or ultra-poor family. The foundation also earns revenue from 
community rehabilitation program enabling the disabled children and their families to get into 
agricultural activity (i.e. producing vegetables, poultry). BPF buys their products providing fair 
price and resell those to the mainstream markets. At present, BPF employs 100 full-time staff 
members and occasional volunteers. 
 
D The governance structure  
BPF is registered as Non-governmental and non-profit organization (NGO) under 
Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance of Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh. BPF is also 
registered with NGO Affairs Bureau as a registered member of NGO in Bangladesh. The 
institute is governed by board of trustees comprising of seven board members. It is chaired by 
Professor Sultana Zaman and her eldest daughter is the general secretary of the board. The board 
is responsible for overseeing the strategic aspect of the foundation.  
The administrative and operational aspect of the foundation is overseen by the 
Executive Director and CEO, who is a qualified pediatrician and administrator.  BPF is a 100% 
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non-profit institution; thus as per the charter of the NGO Act, BODs are not entitled to dividend. 
The earnings are used for maintenance and reinvestment for the institution. 
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Appendix B: Interview guides  
Topic guide for interview with SE leaders/managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of the organisation: 
Name and position of the interviewee: 
Size of the organisation (Number of employees): 
Sector/main activity:  
Date of interview:  
 
A. Origin, aims and objectives  
 
1. What is the origin of your organisation?  
      -  Who involved in setting up-single or team? 
      -   Independent start-up or spin out 
      -  Other drivers/stakeholders-government/community? 
 
Main aims and objectives of the organisation  
Main activities by which goals are achieved.  
 Probe with respect to the following dimensions: 
- Social needs addressed-involvement of stakeholders 
- Economic and social aims  
 
2. Who legally owns the enterprise? 
     - Legal form 
     - Ownership structure/composition of the board/senior management team 
     - Succession plan/procedure or senior management member. 
 
B. Opportunities for growing the organisation/how are they seeking to grow? 
 
3. Are you considering ways of growing your enterprise and/or increasing the impact that your 
organisation has? If yes, what has this involved? 
Probe for 
I am developing a PhD thesis at Middlesex University London about the growth and survival of SEs in 
Bangladesh. This study intends to understand the problems of SEs in Bangladesh in relation to their growth. As 
a part of this study I am conducting interviews of owners, managers of Bangladeshi SEs to bring insight of their 
experience on how they are managing the local context and nurturing growth of their SEs. The interview should 
take about an hour. Your response would be a great help in accomplishing the study. I heartily thank you for 
your kind cooperation. 
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- Internally (through new activities, more sites, revenue generation projects, 
organisational/staff development) 
- Externally (through networks and partnerships, others) 
- Opportunities to take over activities from either the public or other sector? 
- Others (active communication,  lobbying local politicians etc) 
 
4. Have you introduced any new service/process/product within the last 2 years? If yes how 
novel is this? 
Probe for 
- If new to the enterprise 
- New to the sector 
- Completely novel (to the world) 
- How this was developed? 
- Where did the main ideas come from? Who involved? 
 
C. Challenges and Support needs 
 
4. What do you see as the main challenges faced by your organisation in relation to sustainability 
and growth?  How do you resolve or manage those? 
Probe for: 
- Internal factors (managerial competencies, work-force skills, gaps or deficiencies, 
operational functions like Marketing, Finance, HRM, R&D) 
- External factors (advice & support availability, training, finance/funding opportunities) 
- Partnership and collaboration (public and private). 
- Others 
 
5. Have you made use of any sources of support; if yes,  
       Probe for: 
- What sort of support 
- How accessed 
- Paid for? 
- How useful was the support(s) and why? 
- Experience/views 
 
6. To what extent the relations within the community influenced the growth of your 
organization? If any, how have you managed these influences? 
       Probe for experience/views in light of: 
- Social/community recognition 
- Opportunity to share, mobilize resources with other entities and scope for learning 
- Local context (norms, religion, ethics, moral values, hierarchy etc) 
 
7. To what extent has your organization been affected by : 
- Policy environment (incentives and impediments, legal enforcements, judicial systems) 
- Other political influences 
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- Regulatory environment (rules and regulations, procedures, monitoring/reporting) 
Probe for - Experience/views and also how they have managed those challneges? 
 
D. For Family enterprise only (ask only if family member involved in the enterprise) 
 
9. To what extent does the family interest and vision influence the aims and objectives of the 
enterprise?   
 
E. Concluding reflection 
  
10. What do you see as the main barriers to the growth of the SE sector of Bangladesh?         
       Probe for- further actions necessary to nurture/sustain growth 
 
11. Are there any other issues that have not been covered in the interview which you would like 
to comment on?  
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your help 
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Topic guide for interview with officers from support institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Background of the interviewee and the organisation 
 
Name of the organisation: 
Name of the interviewee: 
Position of the interviewee: 
Size of the organisation (Number of employees): 
Date of interview: 
 
B. Role of interviewee with the SE (s) in Bangladesh 
 
1. What is your role and experience in relation to the SE sector of Bangladesh? 
Probe for 
- Nature and role of their organisation 
- Experience (specific case, overall) 
- Future plans/suggestion 
 
2. If has a specific experience of dealing with a SE (s) in Bangladesh then  
- What has been their contribution?  
- How do they rate the quality of what the SE (s) of what they do? 
 
C. SE challenges and opportunities 
 
3. What do you see as the main challenges to SE growth in Bangladesh that need to be 
addressed? Why? 
Probe for 
- Internal factors (managerial competencies, work-force skills, gaps or deficiencies, 
operational functions like Marketing, Finance, HRM, R&D) 
- Local context (recognition, norms, religion, ethics, moral values, hierarchy etc) 
- Regulatory environment (rules and regulations, procedures, monitoring/reporting, 
corruption) 
- Policy environment (incentives and impediments, legal enforcements, judicial systems) 
- Other political influences 
 
 
I am developing a PhD thesis at Middlesex University London about the growth and survival of SEs in 
Bangladesh. This study intends to understand the problems of SEs in Bangladesh in relation to their growth. As 
a part of this study I am conducting interviews of owners, managers of Bangladeshi SEs to bring insight of their 
experience on how they are managing the local context and nurturing growth of their SEs. The interview should 
take about an hour. Your response would be a great help in accomplishing the study. I heartily thank you for 
your kind cooperation. 
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4. In light of your experience, how effective is the support available to SEs in Bangladesh? 
 Probe for: 
- Availability 
- Type of support (Financial, non-financial, partnership/collaboration etc) 
- Access  
- Usefulness of the support (s) 
 
D. Concluding reflection 
 
5. Are there any other issues that have not been covered in the interview which you would like 
to comment on?  
 
 
Thank you very much for your help 
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Topic guide for interview with community leaders, local political leaders, religious leaders 
and beneficiaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Background of the interviewee  
 
Name of the interviewee: 
Role of the interviewee in the community: 
Date of interview 
 
B. SEs in the community 
 
1. Do you have any experience of working with/for the SE in your community?  
Probe for 
- Nature of involvement 
- Experience of involvement 
- Future plan/suggestion 
 
2. What has been their contribution to your community? 
Probe for 
- Creation of local employment/partnership 
- Importance of the goods sold/ service provided to the community 
- Alternative options available to address the targeted issues 
 
3. How you have supported the enterprise or were benefitted from their activities? 
Probe for 
- Type of support 
- Intent of support 
- Future plans 
 
C. Local context 
4. To what extent is the SE accepted and supported by the local people?  
Probe for: 
- Cooperation provided towards SE 
- Reason for cooperation 
 
I am developing a PhD thesis at Middlesex University London about the growth and survival of SEs in 
Bangladesh. This study intends to understand the problems of SEs in Bangladesh in relation to their growth. As 
a part of this study I am conducting interviews of owners, managers of Bangladeshi SEs to bring insight of their 
experience on how they are managing the local context and nurturing growth of their SEs. The interview should 
take about an hour. Your response would be a great help in accomplishing the study. I heartily thank you for 
your kind cooperation. 
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5. What measures do the SEs in your community has taken to get co-operation and support 
from the community? 
Probe for: 
- Awareness creation 
- Solve local needs as an insider  
- Build relationship within the community 
  
6. Have there been any difficulties arising from the activities of the SE within the community? 
If yes,  have there been any particular areas of tensions 
        Probe for: 
- Type of tension (s) 
- Reason for tension (s) 
- Steps taken to manage the tension (s)-who involved and why 
 
 
Thank you very much for your help 
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